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The first chapter is a co-authored paper that analyzes the causal impact of air pollution on 
the housing market as the result of a dramatic exogenous increase in air pollution levels in Tehran 
in 2010 in the aftermath of sanctions imposed on Iran. The sanctions, intended to pressure Iran to 
end uranium enrichment activities, targeted gasoline imports into the country. In response, Iran 
rapidly converted some petrochemical plants into refineries to produce gasoline, which was of 
much lower quality than imported gasoline. This caused a quick and drastic increase in air pollution 
levels that varied significantly across individual neighborhoods. Using this natural experiment and 
unique administrative data on Tehran’s housing market, we find that an increase of approximately 
30 parts-per-billion in the outdoor concentrations of nitrogen dioxide leads to a decrease in housing 
prices of roughly 3 percent to 5.2 percent. We find that lower levels of air pollution are associated 
with higher price-rent ratios, and higher levels of air pollution raise the odds that owners will rent 
their property rather than occupy it themselves. Our welfare analysis suggests that the deterioration 
of air quality in 2010 is associated with a reduction in aggregate housing values of $11 billion to 
$16 billion in Tehran alone. Also, this paper offers what we believe is the first examination of 
indirect costs that stem from international sanctions against Iran. 
In the second chapter, I empirically investigate the effect of genetic diversity on income 
inequality in a large cross-section of countries. Previous studies demonstrated that ethnic, 
linguistic and religious fractionalization have significant impact on economic performance 
measures, but the effect will become weaker or disappear once we control for income per capita 
or latitude as a measure of geographic variation. Other than that, linguistic, ethnic and religious 
classifications to some extent suffer from the problem of endogeneity and, at best, they capture 
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part of visible diversity. To address these problems, I construct a cross-country genetic 
fractionalization measure based on the notion of paternal Y-chromosome DNA haplogroups. The 
resulting genetic diversity measure, which is rooted in long-term history, is less subject to the 
problem of endogeneity. In addition, the distances among different populations are accounted for 
in such fractionalization index. Finally, the empirical results show that a higher level of genetic 
fractionalization is associated with a higher level of income inequality. Also, this paper discusses 
the main mechanisms through which the genetic fractionalization measure can affect income 
inequality by presenting empirical evidence. It is presented that the genetic diversity measure is 
successful in explaining interpersonal trust as an index for individual cooperation and also tax 
compliance rates, public good output and even the democracy index as measures for social 
cooperation. 
The third chapter is based on another co-authored paper. This paper examines the direct 
effects of a size-dependent credit extension policy on small manufacturing firms (with 10-49 
workers) in Iran. This policy was launched in November 2005 with the primary aim of quickly 
boosting employment opportunities. The policy was vigorously pursued in 2006 and 2007 and was 
phased out thereafter. We employ a large panel dataset of Iran’s manufacturing plants over the 
period of 2003-2013 to study the impact of this policy on the firms’ level of employment, capital 
stock, and total factor productivity (TFP). We take advantage of the threshold effect of the policy’s 
focus on firms with less than 50 workers to identify its effects on small firms, comparing firms 
with 45-49 workers and those with 50-54 workers while controlling for industry, year, and a 
number of other effects. We find that the policy had induced increased capital formation among 
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CHAPTER 1: AIR POLLUTION, HOUSING PRICES, AND 
COSTS OF SANCTIONS: A NATURAL EXPERIMENT1 
1.1 Introduction 
The association between air quality and housing values has been the subject of economic 
studies since the 1960’s. Cross-sectional studies using hedonic price models suggest a negative 
relationship between air pollution indices and housing prices (e.g. Ridker 1967; Ridker et al 1967; 
Rosen 1974). However, cross-sectional hedonic models suffer from a number of econometric 
problems such as the omitted variable bias (e.g. Small 1975). This raises questions about the 
validity of the causal inference and the accuracy of traditional hedonic model-derived estimates of 
the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for air quality.  
To address these problems, some studies (e.g. Chay et al 2005; Grainger 2013) have 
suggested using policy regulations as instrumental variables for changes in the level of air 
pollution. Chay and Greenstone’s (2005) results show that the elasticity of housing values with 
respect to the level of total suspended particles (TSP) ranges between -0.2 and -0.35 and is larger 
than those found through cross-sectional studies. Their estimates are based on variations in 
pollution and housing prices over the course of 10 years from 1970 to 1980. Other studies also 
utilized IV methods to investigate the long-run association of air pollution and housing values 
between different regions/counties within a country (e.g. Bayer et al 2009; Isen et al 2017). 
However, in longer time horizons, the assumption that the housing supply is inelastic can be 
problematic as there may be variations in unobserved variables that correlate both with the 
pollution level and housing prices. Besides, households and businesses may find enough time to 
                                                 
1 This is a joint work with Kaveh Nafari. 
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move to regions/counties that have better air quality. All of these can lead to biased estimates of 
individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for the clear air. Finding a policy that induces a fast and 
heterogeneous increase in the level of air pollutants within a city can provide a framework that 
addresses these issues.   
In this paper, we examine the casual impact of air pollution on housing prices by exploiting 
the exogenous and heterogeneous jump in nitrogen dioxide levels across Tehran, induced by 
unprecedented international sanctions that targeted Iran’s gasoline imports and led the government 
to produce low-quality gasoline as a substitute. We utilize this unique natural experiment 
combined with a rich dataset that includes around 1 million housing transactions in owner-
occupied and rental housing markets over the course of six years from 2009 to 2014. The dataset 
provides the opportunity to compare the households’ responses between the two markets and 
across locations in the short run when supply is plausibly inelastic, allowing us to measure MWTP 
for air quality. We then examine the impact of air pollution on individuals’ expectations of future 
housing prices and whether there is any evidence of substitution from the owner-occupied market 
to the rental market in highly polluted neighborhoods.  
A second contribution of this paper is its assessment of the indirect environmental impact 
of the international sanctions on Iran in an effort to pressure it to suspend its uranium enrichment 
activities. In this respect, the present study is the first of its kind in this area. Following the 
imposition of sanctions on gasoline imports in 2010 and the increase in the supply of low-quality 
gasoline, air pollution rapidly increased in Iranian cities. The heterogeneous nature of this pollution 
jump within Tehran, which is an important factor in our identification strategy, mostly comes from 
the wind patterns, urban structure, and the differences in neighborhoods’ elevation. Our study 
addresses the causality issue, exploiting heterogeneous severe increases in the levels of pollution 
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in Tehran in the aftermath of sanctions. Since the effects of sanctions were unanticipated, we have 
no reason to believe that households sorted based on their preferences for the pollution before the 
spike.  
One other distinctive feature of this particular pollution spike stems from its increase in the 
level of 𝑁𝑂  as a prominent combustion-induced air pollutant while other studies have largely 
focused on pollutants that are mostly induced by industrial activities.  
Our research design is based on sharp variation in the pollution indices across 1,700 
neighborhoods, and comparing housing values within these neighborhoods over time. We employ 
daily readings of pollution monitors in Tehran to construct daily distance-weighted pollution 
indices for each neighborhood. For each transaction, we provide pollution indices that reflect the 
average level of air pollution over one week, one month, and three months before the transaction 
date in the respective neighborhood. Our model captures the effects of air quality on housing 
prices, rents, and price-rent ratio after adjusting for housing characteristics, time effects, and time-
invariant neighborhoods effects. 
Our findings demonstrate that an approximate 30 parts-per-billion (ppb) increase of 
outdoor concentration of nitrogen dioxide leads to a decrease in housing prices of 3.5 percent to 
5.2 percent. Compared to Chay and Greenstone (2005), these estimates signify a lower elasticity 
of housing values with respect to the level of air pollution. Although these results are closer to the 
findings of most cross-sectional studies, one might consider that this paper’s estimates are mainly 
derived by the housing market responses to an increase in the level of air pollution in a short-time 
horizon. We find similar adverse effects in the rental market, albeit the estimates are smaller in 
magnitude. Our welfare analysis indicates a $11 billion to $16 billion reduction in housing values 
in 2011 induced by the significant increase in the level of pollution due to gasoline sanctions. 
4 
 
Moreover, an increase in the level of air pollution is associated with a decrease in the average 
price-rent ratio at the neighborhood level. This result may suggest that expectations for future 
prices make agents in the purchasing market more sensitive than the rental market to the 
deterioration of the level of air quality. 
In addition to main findings, our results also reveal that if we restrict purchasing and rental 
observations to a shorter time period where supply is more inelastic, the coefficients of interest 
will be larger. Also, we examine how housing quality will interact with the impact of the pollution 
on housing prices. We find evidence on heterogeneity by size and floor, suggesting that the larger 
the housing unit becomes or if the unit’s floor is above two, the weaker the impact of the air 
pollution on the housing value will be. The size and floor’s impact is even stronger in the rental 
market. Further, to mitigate the impact of sellers’ (who have currently occupied the housing unit) 
distaste for pollution, we run same baseline regressions on newly built housing units, where we 
still find significant and negative coefficients for the impact of pollution. Merging rental and 
purchasing data, we find that there is a substitution from the owner-occupied market to the rental 
market. Based on our estimates, the number of properties that are first sold and then offered for 
lease is significantly higher in more polluted neighborhoods. This pattern is consistent with our 
base results on the negative association between pollution indices and price-rent ratios. Finally, in 
section 1.5.4, we follow a semiparametric approach as an alternative to our fixed effect models. In 
this method, instead of neighborhoods’ fixed effects, we include neighborhood location 
coordinates as nonparametric components to our model. In doing so, we control for any spatial 
omitted effect by including the location of each neighborhood in our model. Results from these 
semiparametric regressions support our baseline results when we use neighborhood’s fixed effects. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related literature and the 
history of sanction. Section 1.3 discusses the data. Section 1.4 presents the empirical model, and 
section 1.5 outlines results and discussion followed by robustness checks. Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Literature Review and Background 
1.2.1 Literature Review 
Ridker and Henning (1967) undertake one of the first cross-sectional studies in the 
literature of the impact of air pollution on the housing prices. Their analysis of 167 neighborhoods 
in St. Louis shows that the sulfation level index of the air (SO2, SO3, H2S and H2SO4) explains 
1.2 percent of the variation of the median property among different neighborhoods. Many other 
cross-sectional papers based on hedonic price models showed that a decrease in total suspended 
particles (TSP) results in an increase in property value. Smith and Huang (1995) provide a meta-
analysis of many cross-sectional studies. A growing body of literature also uses the housing market 
to measure values of non-market amenities (e.g. Davis 2004). 
Chay and Greenstone (2005) address the cross-sectional studies problems namely the 
causality issue and the heterogeneous taste for clean air by exploiting 1970 Clean Air Act 
Amendments (CAAA) as an instrumental variable. Grainger (2013) uses a similar instrumental 
variable method to compare the impact of the variation in the level of PM10 (particles with a 
diameter less than 10 micrometers) on rental versus owner-occupied housing values. He finds that 
only half of the increases in the housing value caused by improvement in air quality are reflected 
in the form of higher rents. Both studies are based on variations in pollution and housing prices at 
the county level over the course of 10 years. Also, in a working paper, Sullivan (2017) presents 
wind-based estimates of exposure to pollution using an atmospheric dispersion model and argues 
that current studies underestimate the negative impact of the air pollution. A growing body of 
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literature also investigates the local impacts on the housing market of industrial activities with 
hazardous impacts or toxic pollutants (e.g. Davis 2011; Greenstone and Gallagher 2008; Currie, 
Davis, Greenstone and Walker 2015). Davis (2011) also finds that power plants have a smaller 
impact on local rent prices than on housing values. 
A separate but related body of the literature analyzes the relationship between purchasing 
prices and rents in the housing market. Capozza and Seguin (1996) examine how price-rent ratios 
have predictive power for expected changes in future housing prices. Gyourko et al. (2013) discuss 
the correlation between the price-rent ratio and future expected prices. They show that a higher 
price-rent ratio implies that to obtain higher expected capital gains in the future, homeowners are 
willing to accept lower current yield in the form of rent.  
There is also a body of the literature on the direct impact of sanctions on economic activities 
of the targeted country. Some articles (mostly not peer reviewed or in the literature of economics) 
discuss the economic impacts of recent Iranian Nuclear Sanctions. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that measures the indirect impact of the mentioned sanctions, 
especially their environmental impact. 
1.2.2 History of Sanctions 
Following the development of the nuclear program in Iran, a series of international 
sanctions were imposed on the country’s nuclear enrichment program. In 2006, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported Iran’s suspicious activities and non-compliance with its 
agreements. Consequently, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 against Iran 
nuclear program passed in December of the same year. The resolution demanded that Iran suspend 
all of its enrichment-related activities. As the dispute continued, a number of other resolutions 
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were passed by the Security Council that mainly targeted Iranian economic activities.2 The 
sanctions were not restricted to the Security Council Resolutions. The United States and the 
European Union imposed several other sanctions against Iran. Consequently, Iran’s oil industry, 
banking sectors, and international trade activities faced the toughest sanctions in the country’s 
history.  
In July 2010, the U.S. Congress passed The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
and Divestment Act in order to extend the sanctions against Iran. It mainly targeted Iran’s import 
of gasoline.3 Although Iran was a major producer of oil, the country imported almost 40 percent 
of its gasoline and 11 percent of its diesel fuel at the time. In that year, as a preemptive action, Iran 
began rapidly increasing its fuel production capacity by converting petrochemical plants to 
gasoline production refineries in a two-year plan.4  
Replacing imported gasoline with domestic refinery-produced gasoline resulted in a 
dramatic shock to the level of air pollution in Iran’s large cities, especially the capital city of 
Tehran, starting in December 2010.5 The air quality index of 𝑁𝑂  increased almost 100 percent 
compared to its previous annual average. Since that time, many experts and even government 
officials have blamed the use of low-quality gasoline produced by domestic petrochemical 
refineries as the main cause of air pollution. Later, the Iranian oil minister admitted that the main 
source of the smog is sub-standard gasoline (The Guardian, 2014).  
                                                 
2 Texts of UN resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, 1984, 2049 are available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions. After Iran Deal in July 2015 resolution of 2231 has been passed. It aimed to 
gradually lift UN sanctions against Iran.   
3 The text of the act is available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/hr2194.pdf. 
4 Masoud Mirkazemi Minister of Petroleum at the time announced that Iran’s gasoline production increase action plan would 





The main reasons for that the use of sub-standard gasoline leads to greater levels of air 
pollution are: 1) the low octane levels; 2) the higher level of benzene; and 3) the incomplete 
combustion. Internal combustion engines are one of the main sources of many major pollutants 
such as CO, 𝑁𝑂 , and 𝑂 . According to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the most 
prominent source of nitrogen dioxide is emissions from cars and other road vehicles.  
Daily data on pollution indices obtained from Tehran air quality monitors show the rapid 
increase in levels of both 𝑁𝑂  and 𝑂 . This supports the argument of those who blame the 
excessive presence of hydrocarbons such as benzene and imperfect combustion of refinery-
produced gasoline as the main reason for post-2010 air pollution. 
In this research, we use the level of nitrogen dioxide as an index for air pollution. Nitrogen 
dioxide is considered by many international standards as a major air pollution indicator. For 
instance, the U.S. EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standard uses 𝑁𝑂  as an indicator for a 
group of nitrogen oxides (𝑁𝑂 ). It is classified as one of the six common pollutants along with 
ground-level ozone, particulate matter (e.g. PM2.5 and PM10), carbon monoxide, lead, and 
sulphur dioxide.  
According to the U.S. EPA, high levels of 𝑁𝑂  have major negative health effects. A short-
term exposure of more than half an hour brings adverse respiratory effects on children and healthy 
adults (Chay and Greenstone 2003). Also, it exacerbates symptoms of those who have respiratory 
diseases such as asthma. Increased levels of this highly reactive gas are connected to increased 
visits to emergency rooms and hospitals for patients with respiratory issues (Shima and Adachi 
2000). Nitrogen oxides also reacts with ammonia, moisture, and other compounds to form particles 
that can penetrate into sensitive lung tissue and cause emphysema, bronchitis and premature 
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death.6 Nitrogen oxides are also blamed for photochemical processes that lead to the formation of 
nitric acid (Cleveland 1979). Such acid causes adverse effects on the ecosystem.  
The ground-level ozone that is created by 𝑁𝑂  can also cause shortness of breath, as well 
as throat and eye irritation. The excessive amount of ozone can be a serious problem for the 
environment. Plant scientists blame ozone for 90 percent of the damage to the vegetation in North 
America. As it can travel long distances, the urban-produced ground-level ozone can extend its 
negative effects onto rural and agricultural areas by reducing crop yields.7 
Nitrogen dioxide is a gas that is visible because it absorbs short-wave length blue light. It 
has a reddish-brown color when warm, and is yellowish brown at cold temperatures (Shima and 
Motarki 2000). Nitrogen oxides together with ozone and other photochemical oxidants are key 
components responsible for the creation of smog. Therefore, a rise in the level of pollutants like 
𝑁𝑂  and 𝑂  will not only create easily identifiable negative health effects, but will also create 
smog, so that individuals easily can have a visible, negative way with which to observe and 
evaluate the air quality in a given neighborhood. This fact supports the notion that nitrogen dioxide 
provides a valid index both for the relevant level of pollution and for individual perception of the 
air quality.  
 
1.3 Data 
The Rahbar Informatics Services Company (RISC) provided the housing data. The air 
quality data described below come from the archives of the Tehran Air Quality Control Agency 
                                                 
6 https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/nitrogenoxides/index.html 
7 Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook, The World Bank Group, 1998, pp 223-225.  
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(TAQCA), which provides detailed data on concentrations of six major pollutants including 
nitrogen dioxide over time for a network of monitors. Data on Universal Transverse Mercator 
(UTM) coordinates of Tehran’s neighborhoods and air quality control (AQC) monitors are 
provided by the Iran Post Company. This section describes the data used in this study. 
As of 2009, Iranian law requires all housing transactions, including purchasing and rental 
transactions, to be registered online.8 Typically, an owner sells or leases her property through real 
estate agencies. If the seller (owner) and buyer (renter) reach an agreement, the real estate agent 
will complete specific forms online and record needed information. The information recorded in 
the system includes personal information of the seller (owner) and the buyer (renter), price (rent), 
full address of the unit, size, age, ZIP Code, and date of contract. In the address, the floor number 
of the unit is also available. 
The raw data include 348,645 rental and 735,436 purchasing observations during the years 
2009 to 2014, covering the 22 different municipal districts of Tehran. In the final data, we remove 
transactions for which complete information is not available. All non-residential transactions are 
also excluded.9 We also exclude observations where the district number does not match with the 
zip-code, possibly due to data-entering mistakes. Moreover, to rule out the effects of outliers, the 
rent and price per square meter are trimmed at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. The final sample 
includes 296,613 rental and 690,226 purchasing observations from 2009 to 2014. 
Table 1.1 illustrates the distribution of data across districts by representing each of the 22 
districts, which contain several thousand rental and purchase observations, indicating that the data 
                                                 
8 http://www.iranamlaak.ir/Files/TasvibNameh.aspx 
9 An apartment in this study is defined as a unit that is owned individually, which is very similar to the definition of a condo in 
the U.S. housing market.  
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are representative of all neighborhoods. Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for both rental and 
purchasing data. Data cover around 1,700 neighborhoods (i.e. five-digit zip-codes). The total 
number of neighborhoods in Tehran is around 2,700, including non-residential areas such as parks, 
university campuses, airports, and military zones. We drop zip codes that contain fewer than 10 
residential transactions within six years of the data.  
Later, to create a measure of price-rent ratio at the five-digit zip-code level, we calculate 
daily average rent and price per square meter for each five-digit zip-code in both rental and 
purchasing data, respectively, and merge the two data on the basis of five-digit zip-code, year, 
month, and day. Keeping high-quality matches using this method, the matched data yield 79,292 
unique five-digit zip-code-day level observations.  
The air quality data used in this study come from TAQCA, which collects hourly 
observations on concentration of six major pollutants (CO, 𝑆𝑂 , 𝑂 , 𝑃𝑀2.5, 𝑃𝑀10, and 𝑁𝑂 ) 
using 35 pollution monitors across Tehran. TAQCA archives provide the daily pollution index of 
nitrogen dioxides for each of the monitors. Figure 1.1 shows that the locations of monitors are well 
spread throughout the city. To calculate the pollution level of each neighborhood, we employ UTM 
coordinates for each five-digit zip-code and the 35 air quality monitors. Note that, In Iran, 10-digit 
zip-codes locate an address precisely. A five-digit zip-code typically contains several blocks which 
can properly can properly determine the neighborhood boundaries.10 Each five-digit zip-code may 
include a population of 5,000 residents, which is comparable to the population living in one census 
tract in large cities in the United States.  
                                                 
10 A block is defined as the smallest area surrounded by four streets. 
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In order to construct the pollution indices, for each five-digit zip-code, we select the daily 
reports of the three closest monitors and calculate their inverse distance-weighted average.11 Then 
we calculate the average of those daily indices for one week, one month, and three months before 
the time of each transaction. The logarithms of those averages are used as the value of the 
pollution-index variable in the model. 12 
 
1.4 Model 
Figure 1.2 shows the average level of nitrogen dioxide index value provided by TAQCA 
in Tehran since 2006. The nitrogen dioxide index has been constructed based on monitors’ hourly 
reports on 𝑁𝑂 density in parts per billion (ppb). This figure demonstrates that before autumn of 
2010, the average level of nitrogen dioxide density in the air of Tehran was roughly around 30 
ppb. A few months after the announcement of the start of new gasoline-production policy, 
Tehran’s air quality monitors showed that the level of 𝑁𝑂  increased almost to 90 ppb and then 
stabilized at around 60 ppb. That is an increase of almost 100 percent in the level of the 𝑁𝑂  Index 
from the levels recorded before 2010. 
 The mentioned policy shock, which was caused by sanctions, provides a quasi-natural 
experiment to study the effect of air pollution on the housing market. First, the impact of this 
increase in the level of pollution seems to be independent of other factors that may have an impact 
on the housing market. As shown in Figure 1.2, the level of air pollution before the policy was 
adopted is almost stable, and a few months afterwards we observe an evident jump. Therefore, the 
                                                 
11 The distance-weighted average for each day includes monitors that were active on that day to account for the fact that  some 
monitors may be added, repaired, or removed on a given day. 
12 We also construct another Pollution Index using the daily inverse distance-weighted average of all 35 monitors. The results are 
similar using either version of the Pollution Index. 
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air quality index of 𝑁𝑂  does not seem to follow any specific trend or cycle related to 
macroeconomic factors. The sustained increase in pollution, along with implementation of new 
sets of economic sanctions in 2011 and 2012, make it reasonable to assume that individuals living 
in Tehran would consider that the resulting poorer air quality would continue for the foreseeable 
future. Second, we observe a heterogeneous increase in the levels of pollution in different 
neighborhoods. As previously mentioned, our data come from different monitors in different areas 
of Tehran. Not all neighborhoods and monitors show similar increases in the levels of pollution. 
Hence, the expectation is that the exogenous and heterogeneous increase in the levels of pollution 
has affected transaction values differently across neighborhoods. Figure 1.3 shows trends of the 
𝑁𝑂  index recorded from two separate monitors with roughly the same latitude.  
Figure 1.4 demonstrates the heterogeneity of the pollution index we create to compare air 
quality across zip codes. This figure graphs the weekly pollution index for two days, one year 
before and one year after the time of the pollution spike in December 2010. The figure only 
includes zip codes that cover sales on both days. As Figure 1.4 illustrates, the pollution index graph 
for one year before the shock is fairly flat across zip codes, with an average of almost 25 ppb. One 
year after the peak the heterogeneity of pollution index by zip code is evident with some zip codes 
still meeting the EPA standards for 𝑁𝑂  concentration, while for some others, the pollution level 
is more than twice the standard level. Figure A1 also presents the monthly average of the pollution 
index across zip codes one year before and one year after the pollution spike peak in December 
2010. 
This paper suggests that in neighborhoods that experience less of an increase in the level 
of pollution, the relatively better air quality will be reflected in housing values in the form of higher 
real prices or rents. In fact, in the short run, where supply is reasonably inelastic, price adjustment 
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fully captures the demand responses. Marginal willingness to pay for clean air is not necessarily 
equivalent in the purchasing and rental markets. In the purchasing market, individuals may 
consider the environmental amenities more than they do in the rental market. One explanation is 
that buyers take into account the long-run potential exposure to pollution. For instance, families 
may have concerns about the negative long-run impacts of such low air quality on their children’s 
health.  
To formally examine the association between air pollution and housing prices, we fit the 
following regression model: 
Log of Price Per Square Meterizt = β0 + β1.Log of Pollution Indexzt + β2.Ageizt + β3.Sizeizt + 
𝛽 .Ageizt2 + β5.Sizeizt2 + β6.Ageizt×Sizeizt + Floor Indicatorizt + five-digit Zip-Code Fixed Effectz 
+ Year Fixed Effectst + Seasonal Fixed Effectt + εizt                                                                 (1.1)                                                                    
where 𝑖 is the index of transaction, 𝑧 represents the five-digit zip-code, and 𝑡 indicates the date of 
the transaction. Equation (1.1) controls for seasonal and year fixed effects to account for seasonal 
patterns and macroeconomic variations that impact the overall housing market. It also includes 
five-digit zip-code fixed effects to capture all time-invariant determinants of housing prices in a 
neighborhood. We also report richer specifications that include district trends to allow for different 
over-time adjustment of housing prices in each district. There is a separate municipality in each 
district, which means public investment in infrastructure and local amenities can follow different 
trends across those districts. The inclusion of these regional trends does not affect our results. 
To consider the impact of outliers, we utilize the logged value of housing prices, rents and 
pollution indices in our model. We try other specifications including linear and log-linear model, 
and we find economically and statistically significant results through these specifications, too. 
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However, residuals distribution of the log-log specification look more normal compared to log-
linear and linear models. In addition, log-log specification lead to a higher value of R-squared 
compared to log-linear specification. We also apply Box-Cox lambda transformation to our basic 
sets of regressions and find small lambda between 0.17-0.25. The null hypothesis of lambda is 
rejected for all economically sensible transformations of lambda equal to 0, 1 and -1. However, it 
does not make economic sense to insist on maximizing the log-likelihood score and use the best 
fitting transformation parameter of 0.17. Qualitatively, the number is closer to zero. Therefore, we 
use log-log transformation; though, it is worth underscoring that we also find significant results if 
we use other forms of specification.   
This model follows a fixed effect approach that relies on a comparison of housing 
transaction prices in less- and more-polluted neighborhoods. The constructed time-variant 
pollution-index variable captures the heterogeneous variation of pollution across neighborhoods. 
Therefore, our coefficient of interest in equation (1.1) is 𝛽 . It reflects the impact of different levels 
of pollution across neighborhoods on housing transaction prices. As both the dependent and the 
explanatory variable are in logarithm form, the 𝛽  yields the price elasticity of the air pollution. 
We also run the same regression in the rental market to compare the difference of the 
impact in this market with the impact in the purchasing market. In doing so, we use the logarithm 
of annual real rent per square meter for each transaction as the dependent variable. Moreover, we 
construct a panel data by merging the rental and purchasing data. We run panel regressions with 
the log of neighborhoods’ averages of price-rent ratio as the dependent variable. In the next section, 





1.5.1. Baseline Results 
Table 1.3 presents the baseline results from six regressions using equation (1.1). The 
dependent variable is a natural logarithm of real price per square meter and the parameter of 
interest is the log of the pollution index. These regressions are divided into three groups where we 
use different time periods before the transaction to calculate distance-weighted pollution index for 
each group. All regressions control for age, size, and floor of the housing unit, along with zip-
code, year, and seasonal fixed effects.  The even-numbered columns also include municipal region 
trends. The result of the baseline regression for the purchasing market is based on approximately 
650,000 transactions over six years. Standard errors are adjusted for 1,710 clusters based on the 
notion of five-digit zip-codes. For all regressions in this section, the sample excludes observations 
within two months before and after the pollution spike (Dec 2010) to better capture the 
heterogeneity across zip codes. Results including those four months are available in Appendix 
Table A1 to A3. 
As reported in Table 1.3, all coefficients of pollution indices are highly significant and 
negative. These results demonstrate the elasticity of (negative) 0.035 to 0.052 for house prices with 
respect to the 𝑁𝑂  pollutant factor. In other words, an almost 30-unit increase in the 𝑁𝑂  pollutant 
index (almost equal to the average increase in Tehran) will result in a decrease in housing values 
of 3 percent to 5.2 percent. From Table 1.3, we observe an increase in the impact as the time 
duration of the pollution index changes from one week in column (1) to three months in column 
(3). The 95 percent confidence intervals for columns (1) and (2) do not overlap with the 95 percent 
confidence interval in column (3). This pattern suggests that home buyers/ renters will demonstrate 
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a greater degree of aversion to air pollution if the deterioration in the air quality is more persistent 
in a given neighborhood prior to the time of transaction. 
Table 1.4 presents results of regressions based on equation (1.1), using the log of real rental 
prices as the dependent variable. The coefficients are smaller in magnitude compared to the results 
for the purchasing market in Table 1.3. One explanation for this difference in impact between the 
purchasing and rental markets might be due to long-term concerns in buying versus renting a 
property. In other words, buyers demonstrate larger willingness to pay for the clean air as they 
probably plan to stay longer in that property than tenants. Moreover, one might consider that 
buying a property is a form of investment. Hence, the expectation of future prices might play an 
important role in decision making about purchasing a house. Next, we explore this possibility.   
In Table 1.5, we construct panel data using daily average prices and rents in both the 
purchasing and rental markets for each five-digit zip-code. The dependent variable is the ratio of 
the daily five-digit zip-code average price to rent. Here, as in the previous analyses, the variable 
of interest is the pollution index. Following the baseline regression, we control for average age, 
size, and other features for each zip code. The panel regression also controls for both time and 
five-digit zip-code fixed effects.  
The estimates from Table 1.5 show that a 1 percent increase in the level of air pollution 
index is associated with a 0.019 percent to 0.028 percent decrease in the price-rent ratio. 
Controlling for localized trends (presented in the even-numbered columns) does not change the 
results. Our estimates suggest that in more-polluted neighborhoods, individuals might expect lower 
increases in the housing prices over the long run compared to relatively cleaner neighborhoods. 
This is consistent with the findings of Capozza and Seguin (1996) and Gyourko et al. (2013) that 
show higher price-rent ratios in housing markets are associated with higher expected capital gains.   
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   1.5.2 Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks 
In the short run, housing supply is relatively inelastic, thus, the full welfare effects of 
pollution are exclusively captured by adjustment in prices (rents). On the other hand, over the long 
run, some of the welfare effects can be captured by quantity adjustment as supply becomes more 
elastic. To attenuate the effects of quantity responses, Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present results from 
equation (1.1) that restrict purchasing and rental observations to within 20 months of the pollution 
spike that took place in December 2010.13 Our estimates for the pollution indices in the short run 
for both the rental and owner-occupied markets are larger, but consistent with the base results. 
Over the shorter period of time with arguably more inelastic supply, house price capitalization 
explains the full welfare effect so that the point estimates are larger.14  
Taking advantage of observable characteristics of properties in our data, we also examine 
how variation in quality of houses can affect our baseline estimates. The housing characteristics 
we explore are size, floor and age of properties. Table 1.8 presents the results of this investigation 
for the owner-occupied market. Regression models are based on the augmented versions of 
equation (1.1), which include an additional term for the interaction of the pollution indices with 
each of the above characteristics. We then estimate another regression model that includes all 
interaction terms. The parameter estimates associated with Pollution Index×Property Age across 
different specifications are almost all insignificant, indicating that there is no evidence of 
heterogeneity by property age. On the other hand, we find evidence on heterogeneity by property 
size and floor. Columns (2), (6), and (10), which include an interaction of Pollution Index with 
size, imply that a 100-square-meter increase in the size of a property reduces the effects of 
                                                 
13 Our data start from March 2009, 20 months before December 2010. 
14 The 95 percent confidence interval for the one-week and one-month pollution index in Table 1.6 do not overlap those 
associated with the counterpart estimates in Table 1.3. 
19 
 
pollution on housing prices by half. A possible explanation for this result is that larger properties 
arguably have better quality and higher level of additions, appliances, and other amenities. From 
a buyer’s perspective, these amenities may mitigate the adverse effects of air pollution on the 
desirability of a given property. Also, we include a floor dummy variable equal to one if the unit’s 
floor is three or above. Columns (3), (7), and (11) show that coefficients of interactions between 
the pollution index and floor fixed effect is positive, meaning that the impact of pollution on 
housing prices is smaller for units located at higher floors. There can be different explanations for 
this result. One may argue that older buyers tend to buy units in lower floors, and they are expected 
to have higher distaste for air pollution or as altitude and wind leads to less exposure to the 
pollution at higher floors. We may add that buildings with more than two floors may have better 
quality in terms of appliances, and again these substitutes may mitigate the adverse air pollution 
impacts. 
Table 1.9 presents respective estimates for the rental market. Similar to estimates in Table 
1.8, we find evidence for heterogeneity with respect to size and floor. Point estimates for the 
interaction of size and pollution, or floor fixed effect and pollution are larger in the rental market. 
Moreover, the coefficient estimates of the pollution index in Table 1.9 are significantly smaller 
than their counterparts in Table 1.8, which coincides with our explanation for the baseline results. 
Under the assumption that the size or floor are reasonable proxy for quality of housing, it is 
possible that, at the time of a given transaction, renters, as opposed to buyers, consider the quality 
of housing to be more substitutable with air quality. This is to say, renters behave more like short-
term consumers of housing, while buyers behave more like long-term investors. 
One might expect that in highly polluted neighborhoods sellers with an extreme aversion 
to air pollution are willing to sell their properties at discounted value to move out sooner. In that 
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case, the price response to the pollution may be partially driven by sellers’ aversion to pollution. 
To alleviate this concern, we rerun the specification (1), focusing only on new construction. The 
advantage of this approach is that a seller of a newly constructed property is plausibly indifferent 
to the air pollution levels in the neighborhood of the given property as he or she most likely does 
not reside there.  
Table 1.10 reports the pollution index estimates for a subsample of new construction in the 
purchasing market. Point estimates are smaller in magnitude compared to estimates in Table 1.3, 
ranging from 0.031 to 0.045. This result suggests that sellers’ views regarding air pollution might 
have weak influence on our estimates of local responses to the air pollution.  
Thus far, all the evidence on the effects of air pollution on housing prices and rents use the 
distance-weighted average for pollution indices. Here we explore an alternative estimation that 
uses non-distance weighted emissions of nitrogen dioxide for the pollution indices. In particular, 
we construct a one-mile radius circle around each monitor and assign the average of daily index 
of nitrogen dioxide concentrations from a given monitor to the housing transactions that lie within 
the given circle. Note that if a housing transaction is close to more than one monitor, the pollution 
index is the average of readings from all close monitors.  
Table 1.11 shows the results for the alternative estimations. The regression models are based 
on equation (1.1) and include year, seasonal, and five-digit zip-code fixed effects. The estimates 
indicate that a 100 percent increase in the index level of outdoor nitrogen dioxide is associated 
with a 1.8 to 3.1 percent reduction in housing values. Despite the fact that we drop roughly 80 
percent of our observations, all estimates are still strongly significant, albeit smaller in magnitude 
than the baseline results. Table A.3 presents the results for half-mile circles to check for the 
sensitivity of these results to the choice of distance. We find that our results are robust to the choice 
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of distance. Using similar specifications for the rental market leads to insignificant coefficients as 
only 12 percent to 16 percent of rental observations survive. 
   1.5.3 Effects of Pollution on Buyers’ Decisions on Property Usage 
In this section, we present evidence indicating that the pollution may change the usage of 
purchased properties from owner occupied to non-owner occupied. In fact, buyers of owner-
occupied properties in highly polluted areas can avoid pollution by turning them to rental 
properties. Moreover, based on our findings of the negative correlation between the price-rent ratio 
and the level of pollution, conditional on a property’s price, the current yield (rent) on housing 
investment is more likely to be higher in more-polluted neighborhoods. Therefore, the prediction 
is that the number of properties that are first sold, and then offered for lease will be significantly 
higher in more polluted neighborhoods.  
To check for the validity of this prediction, we merge the purchasing data with the rental 
data on the basis of 10-digit zip code, floor-level, size and district to determine which properties 
appear in both datasets. We tag the properties among these for which the sales date is before the 
rent date. There are 55,532 properties that buyers have offered for lease. We refer to these 
properties as “bought and rent” properties. We formally investigate the impact of air pollution on 
the probability of the substitution of a property from being owner occupied to being rented using 
the following model: 
𝑌  = β0 + β1.Log of Pollution Indexzt + β2.Ageizt + β3.Sizeizt + β4.Ageizt2 + β5.Sizeizt2 + 
β6.Age×Size + Floor Indicator + five-digit Zip-Code Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effects + 
Seasonal Fixed Effect + ε                                                                                                           (1.2)                                                                                           
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where 𝑌  is an indicator equal to one if a property is “bought and rent” and zero otherwise, and 𝑡 
is the date of the transaction. The independent variables are the same as those in equation (1.1). 
Table 1.12 reports the Logit regression results based on equation (1.2). As predicted, we find that 
the probability of switching the usage of a property from owner occupied to non-owner occupied 
is significantly higher in more-polluted neighborhoods. A 100 percent increase in the concentration 
of outdoor nitrogen dioxide is associated with an increase of approximately up to 10 percent in the 
odds of renting a purchased property. 
1.5.4. Spatial Analysis Using Locations and Semiparametric Approach 
In our base model, we use fixed effects for neighborhoods as controls for locations. These fixed 
effects aim to control for any omitted time-invariant variables that may correlate with error terms. 
One concern with the fixed effect approach is that, omitted variables may vary smoothly over 
space. McMillen (2010) argues that in this case a semiparametric approach can be utilized to 
control for spatial trends and be an alternative to a fixed effect approach and other spatial models 
such as spatial lag models. In this approach, the semiparametric regression takes the form of 
Y=Xβ+f(la,lo)+u where latitude or longitude of housing locations are controlled 
nonparametrically. As a result, without any restrictions on the function of coordinates, we control 
for any omitted spatial effect. In this section, we run different regressions similar to our baseline 
model, but this time, instead of five-digit zip-code fixed effects we try to control for other spatial 
variables in our model and lastly run a semiparametric regression. Here, we used the UTM 
coordinates instead of latitude and longitude to be consistent with our other regressions’ results. 
We found similar results when using latitude and longitude instead of UTM, X and Y coordinates.  
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To start, we construct panels of data based on our purchasing and rental datasets by taking 
the median of all observable variables for each day in each neighborhood.15 Table 1.13 presents 
this section’s spatial analysis results for both the purchasing market, and Table 1.14 includes 
results for the rental market.  
First, we start with parametric models while adding controls that vary spatially across 
neighborhoods. On both tables, in columns (1), (3) and (5) we run a panel regression controlling 
for each neighborhood’s median of control variables in equation (1.1). We add a neighborhood’s 
distance from the city center, its square and the respective elevation value to our set of controls.  
Next, we run a semiparametric model. Instead of fixed effects or spatial variables, we 
include neighborhoods’ geographic coordinates as nonparametric components of our model. To 
run our analysis, we utilize McSpatial R-package. The Semip command in this package 
implements Robinson’s (1988) semi-parametric estimator to estimate our model while controlling 
for both UTM coordinates nonparametrically.16 In this method, we first run the nonparametric 
regression of the dependent variable Y on coordinates and nonparametric regressions of X on 
coordinates using locally weighted regression methods. Second, we run the OLS regression of 
residuals of the two sets of nonparametric estimates, omitting the intercept. The resulting 
coefficients of the residuals regression will yield our estimates of β. Based on the mentioned 
method, results in Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Tables 1.13 and 1.14 present the coefficient of 
interest for our pollution index. Results show that the impact of pollution on housing prices are 
robust and significant. The semi-parametric models’ estimate for elasticity of housing values with 
                                                 
15 In our data, we do not have the coordinates of each transaction/address but rather the five-digit-zipcode 
neighborhood. Therefore, we construct a panel data and used each neighborhood’s distance from city center, 
elevation and finally location coordinated as control variables.  




respect to the level of air pollution is between -0.04 to -0.06, which support our fixed effect models’ 
estimates on Tables 1.3. Our Table 1.14’s results for rental market based on the semiparametric 
approach is stronger compared to those results from the fixed effect model or panel regression but 
still the impact is smaller compared to pollution effects in purchasing market. 
1.5.5 Costs of the Sanctions 
All of our analyses show that air pollution has a causal effect on housing prices and rents in 
Tehran. The deterioration of the air quality in Tehran and the subsequent consequences that linked 
to higher levels of pollution can be considered to be indirect impacts of the sanctions. In this 
section, we use the results from Table 1.3 to analyze the extent to which the cost of the sanctions 
is associated with the adverse effect of pollution on the housing market. 
The above hedonic approach leads to an estimation of average marginal willingness to pay 
(MWTP) for a one-unit improvement in the pollution index. However, to measure the welfare 
consequences of the sanction-induced non-marginal increase in air pollution, we need to identify 
the MWTP function (Chay and Greenstone, 2005). Therefore, we calculate the willingness to pay 
(WTP) for pollution under the assumption of linear and homogeneous preferences, which means 
constant MWTP. Under these strong assumptions, we provide our simple welfare analysis here. 
As mentioned before, Tehran’s residents experienced an average of 30 units increase of 
nitrogen dioxide index in the year following the implementation of the gasoline sanction (2011), 
with the capitalization rate of 3.5 percent to 5.2 percent declines in their property values. Since the 
nominal price per square meter in 2011 was 20 million Rials ($1,300 in 2011 dollars), this means 
a reduction per square meter of housing of approximately 700 to 1055 thousands Rials ($48 to $72 
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in 2011 dollars).17 The National Population and Housing Census (NPHC) data from the Iran 
Statistics Center show that in 2011 about 2.6 million residential units were in Tehran, with a total 
accumulative size of approximately 228 million square meters.  These numbers imply that the 
dramatic increase in air pollution due to sanctions is associated with a loss in the housing market 
of approximately $11 billion to $16 billion. The estimated costs will be larger if we were to include 
all other cities, especially large metropolitan regions of Iran. 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
This paper exploits a natural experiment to examine the economic value of air quality and 
infer indirect costs of international sanctions. The exogenous and heterogeneous increase in the 
level of 𝑁𝑂  combined with rich data on individual housing transactions provide a set-up that 
mitigates econometric concerns. One contribution of this research is that with this unique structure, 
we examine agents’ responses to the variation in the levels of the air quality in both purchasing 
and rental markets within one city in the short run.  
We show that air quality has a considerable impact on housing values. In fact, the dramatic 
increase in the level of air pollution in Tehran in 2010 is associated with an average decrease in 
housing prices of 3.5 percent to 5.2 percent. We also find significant reduction in rental prices, 
though the magnitudes are smaller. The panel analysis also reveals that more-polluted 
neighborhoods are associated with lower price-rent ratios, which implies the impact of air pollution 
on expectations of future capital gains. This study also provides evidence on marginal substitution 
                                                 
17 IRR-USD exchange change rate is approximately 15,000 for 2011. 
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between two markets. We find that the increase in the level of air pollution raises the odds of 
renting a purchased property. 
This paper is also the first to use a hedonic approach to study one aspect of the indirect and 
environmental costs of sanctions against Iran. Based on a simple cost analysis, this incidence is 
responsible for the loss of $11 billion to $16 billion (in 2011 dollars) in the housing market in 
Tehran alone. These sorts of sanctions and restrictions remain common throughout the world, and, 
thus, our paper can provide a better perspective of total welfare consequences of these policies. 
Our finding of different responses from rental and owner-occupant properties might be of 
interest for future studies that attempt to separate effects of policies on housing consumption and 
investments. Another extension of this paper is to look at the impacts of sanction-induced increases 











1.7 Tables and Figures 
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Monitors across Tehran 
 













Figure 1.2: Concentration of Nitrogen Dioxide (𝑁𝑂 ) in Tehran 
 
Notes: This figure shows the average quarterly level of 𝑁𝑂  index in parts per billion based on daily readings of Tehran Air Quality 
monitors for years 2006 to 2016. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act was passed by U.S. 















Figure 1.3: Concentration of Nitrogen Dioxide across Tehran 
 
Notes: This figure shows the heterogeneous variations in level of nitrogen dioxide between two districts in Tehran for years 2009 
to 2014. Tehran is divided into 22 municipal regions. District 4, illustrated by the solid line, is located at the west side of Tehran. 
District 22, illustrated by the dashed line, is located at the east side of Tehran. Both districts are considered to be resided by urban 













Figure 1.4: The Level of Pollution Index across Neighborhoods 
 
Notes: This figure shows the heterogeneous variations in level of distance-weighted pollution index across five-digit zip codes for 
two days; one year before (12/15/2009) and after (12/15/2011) the peak of the sanction-induced pollution jump. The figure includes 














Table 1.1: Distribution of Properties across Districts 
 
Notes: This table shows the number of housing transactions in each district for years 2009 -2014. Column (2) presents number of 































Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Notes: This Table presents the summary statistics for sample of residential properties transactions for years 2009 to 2014. Rent and 
price values are deflated to reflect year 2015 prices using the Statistical Centre of Iran Housing Price Index. Each five-digit zip 









Variables Owner-Occupant Market Rental-Housing Market
Mean Price per Square Meter (1000 Rials) 43,654
Mean Rent per Square Meter (1000 Rials) 3,130
Median Size (Square Meter) 72 71
Median Age (Year) 5 9
Number of Neighborhoods (5-digit zip codes) 1,710 1,699
Total Observations 690,217 296,613
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Table 1.3: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 2014. 
Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are based on equation 
(1.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average 
of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average 
of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution 
Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include municipal district trend effects. 
Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0349*** -0.0349*** -0.0416*** -0.0416*** -0.0520*** -0.0520***
(0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00219) (0.00219) (0.00241) (0.00240)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 648,776 648,776 648,606 648,606 647,000 647,000
R-squared 0.619 0.620 0.619 0.620 0.620 0.621
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 1.4: The Impact of Air Pollution on Rental Prices 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on rental prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. Observations 
within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are based on equation (1.1). The 
dependent variable is log of total annual real rent per-square-meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average 
of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average 
of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution 
Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include municipal district trend effects. 
Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.00685** -0.00676** -0.00895*** -0.00886*** -0.0136*** -0.0134***
(0.00271) (0.00270) (0.00312) (0.00311) (0.00354) (0.00353)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 293,605 293,605 293,432 293,432 292,355 292,355
R-squared 0.408 0.411 0.408 0.411 0.408 0.411
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 1.5: The Impact of Air Pollution on Price-Rent Ratio 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on price-rent ratio from years 2009 to 2014. All regressions are based on 
equation (1.1). Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. The dependent variable 
is zip code-day average price divided by average rent. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings 
of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily 
pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those 
daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average 
of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include five-digit zip-code, 
year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include municipal district trend effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0194*** -0.0192*** -0.0235*** -0.0233*** -0.0282*** -0.0282***
(0.00557) (0.00556) (0.00649) (0.00647) (0.00732) (0.00730)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 78,365 78,365 78,362 78,362 78,329 78,329
R-squared 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 1.6: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices within 20 Months of the Pollution 
Spike 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 2011. 
Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are based on equation 
(1.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average 
of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average 
of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution 
Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include municipal district trend effects. 
Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0477*** -0.0478*** -0.0531*** -0.0531*** -0.0573*** -0.0574***
(0.00218) (0.00217) (0.00240) (0.00238) (0.00249) (0.00247)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 353,645 353,645 353,475 353,475 351,869 351,869
R-squared 0.653 0.654 0.653 0.654 0.654 0.655
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 1.7: The Impact of Air Pollution on Rental Prices 20 Months of the Pollution Spike 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on rental prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. Observations 
within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are based on equation (1.1). The 
dependent variable is log of total annual real rent per-square-meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average 
of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average 
of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution 
Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include municipal district trend effects. 
Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0113** -0.0113** -0.0167*** -0.0168*** -0.0212*** -0.0212***
(0.00451) (0.00449) (0.00515) (0.00512) (0.00571) (0.00568)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 96,542 96,542 96,369 96,369 95,292 95,292
R-squared 0.418 0.420 0.419 0.420 0.420 0.421
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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Table 1.8: Responses to Air Pollution by Size, Age and Floor (Owner-occupied Market) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 2014. Observations within 2 months after 
and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. Columns (1), (5) and (9) report estimates from a version of equation (1.1) that includes interaction of 
pollution index and property age. Columns (2), (6) and (10) report estimates from a version of equation (1.1) that includes interaction of pollution index and size. 
Columns (3), (7) and (11) report estimates from a version of equation (1.1) that includes interaction of pollution index and floor dummy that is equal to one if 
the transaction’s floor is higher than two. Columns (4),(8) and (12) report estimates that include all interaction terms. The dependent variable is log of real price 
per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. 
For columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (5), 
(6), (7) and (8), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (9), (10), (11) and 
(12), the Pollution Index is the average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include five-digit 
zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 
10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level. *** = 1 percent level.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Pollution Index -0.0369*** -0.0717*** -0.0387*** -0.0713*** -0.0434*** -0.0814*** -0.0454*** -0.0807*** -0.0530*** -0.0915*** -.0566*** -0.0912***
(0.00217) (0.00459) (0.00208) (0.00455) (0.00248) (0.00498) (0.00233) (0.00492) (0.00273) (0.00524) (0.00250) (0.00518)
Pollution Index    Property Age 0.000268* -.0000419 0.000241 -0.000109 0.000133 -0.00022
(0.000160) (0.000166) (0.000166) (0.000173) (0.000173) (0.000179)
Pollution Index    Property Size 0.000467*** 0.000423*** 0.000506*** 0.000465*** 0.000500*** 0.000467***
(5.59e-05) (5.65e-05) (6.00e-05) (6.04e-05) (6.14e-05) (6.15e-05)
Pollution Index    Property Floor Index 0.009387*** 0.008124*** 0.009677*** 0.008130*** 0.010252*** 0.00856***
(0.00189) (0.00185) (0.00199) (0.00196) (0.00207) (0.00203)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 648,776 648,776 614,060 614,060 648,606 648,606 613,971 613,971 647,000 647,000 613,150 613150
R-squared 0.619 0.619 0.623 0.623 0.619 0.620 0.623 0.623 0.620 0.620 0.623 0.624






Table 1.9: Responses to Air Pollution by Size, Age and Floor (Rental Market) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. Observations within 2 months after and 
before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. Columns (1), (5) and (9) report estimates from a version of equation (1.1) that includes interaction of pollution 
index and property age. Columns (2), (6) and (10) report estimates from a version of equation (1.1) that includes interaction of pollution index and size. Columns 
(3), (7) and (11) report estimates from a version of equation (1.1) that includes interaction of pollution index and floor dummy that is equal to one if the 
transaction’s floor is higher than two. Columns (4),(8) and (12) report estimates that include all interaction terms. The dependent variable is log of real rent per-
square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For 
columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (5), (6), 
(7) and (8), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (9), (10), (11) and (12), 
the Pollution Index is the average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include five-digit zip-
code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 
percent level, ** = 5 percent level. *** = 1 percent level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Pollution Index -0.00804* -0.0546*** -0.0119*** -0.0544*** -0.0113** -0.0612*** -0.0131*** -0.0607*** -0.0197*** -0.0609*** -0.0174*** -0.0655***
(0.00417) (0.00663) (0.00331) (0.00752) (0.00458) (0.00717) (0.003717) (0.00809) (0.00520) (0.00786) (0.00418) (0.00890)
Pollution Index    Property Age 0.000107 0.000200 0.000211 0.000300 0.000549* 0.000658*
(0.000271) (0.000295) (0.000289) (0.000315) (0.000320) (0.000346)
Pollution Index    Property Size 0.000616*** 0.000517*** 0.000675*** 0.000568*** 0.000609*** 0.000517***
(7.82e-05) (8.22e-05) (8.32e-05) (8.79e-05) (8.93e-05) (9.51e-05)
Pollution Index    Property Floor Index 0.017113*** 0.0172*** 0.016774*** 0.0172*** 0.015757*** 0.0173***
(0.004132) (0.00416) (0..004419) (0.00444) (0.004732) (0.00475)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 293,605 293,605 274885 274,885 293,432 293,432 274788 274,788 292,355 292,355 274217 274,217
R-squared 0.408 0.408 0.410 0.411 0.408 0.408 0.4105 0.411 0.408 0.409 0.411 0.411








Table 1.10: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices (New Constructions) 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for new construction transactions from years 2009 to 2014. 
Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. All regressions are based on equation 
(1.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average 
of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average 
of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution 
Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include municipal trend effects. Standard 
errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0308*** -0.0307*** -0.0356*** -0.0355*** -0.0452*** -0.0451***
(0.00364) (0.00363) (0.00412) (0.00412) (0.00429) (0.00428)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 116,051 116,051 116,017 116,017 115,783 115,783
R-squared 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.657





Table 1.11: The Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices Using Alternative Pollution Index 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices from years 2009 to 2014 for the sample of purchased 
properties that are located within 1 mile of at least one monitor. Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike 
(Dec 2010) are also excluded. All regressions are based on equation (1.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square 
meter. For each observation, the pollution index is the daily reading of nitrogen dioxide concentration from a monitor that the 
housing observation lies within the one mile of the given monitor. If a housing observation is close to more than one monitor, the 
pollution index is the average of readings from all close monitors. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those 
daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of 
those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include five-digit 
zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include municipal trend effects. Standard errors in all 
columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0178*** -0.0178*** -0.0231*** -0.0230*** -0.0314*** -0.0313***
(0.00366) (0.00366) (0.00400) (0.00400) (0.00400) (0.00400)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 130,009 130,009 129,995 129,995 129,836 129,836
R-squared 0.607 0.608 0.607 0.608 0.608 0.608





Table 1.12: The Impact of Air Pollution on Property Usage 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on probability of switching a owner-occupied property to non-owner-occupied 
property by buyers. The sample covers all purchasing transactions from years 2009 to 2014, excluding observations within 2 months 
after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010). All logit regressions are based on equation (1.2). The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if a purchased property turns to rental property, zero for all other cases. Pollution index is the daily inverse 
distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zip-code. The Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for one week, one month, and three months before the time of each transaction for columns 
(1), (2), and (3), respectively. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical 










1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
(1) (2) (3)
Pollution Index 0.0944*** 0.125*** 0.147***
(0.0246) (0.0278) (0.0302)
Year Fixed Effects X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X





Table 1.13: Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices Controlling for Elevation, Distance from 
City Center and Neighborhood’s Location (Owner-occupied Market) 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 2014. 
Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report 
estimates from a version of equation (1.1) that also includes distance from city center, its square and elevation. Columns (2), (4) 
and (6) report estimates from a semiparametric version of equation (1.1) that includes each neighborhood’s UTM coordinates as a 
nonparametric component of the model. We report the coefficients of pollution indices as part of the parametric part of the model. 
The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the 
readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2) the Pollution Index is average of 
those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution 
Index is the average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
year, and seasonal fixed effects. In columns (1), (3) and (5), Standard errors are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0384*** -0.0412*** -0.0457*** -0.0481*** -0.0568*** -0.0573***
(0.00172) (0.00195) (0.00167) (0.00214)
Distance from City Center -1.63e-05** -1.65e-05** -1.67e-05**
(7.43e-06) (7.43e-06) (7.43e-06)
Distance Square -1.54e-09*** -1.53e-09*** -1.53e-09***
(5.20e-10) (5.19e-10) (5.19e-10)
Elevation 0.00269*** 0.00269*** 0.00269***
(5.93e-05) (5.93e-05) (5.94e-05)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Observations 440,396 440,396 440,310 440,310 439,509 439,509
R-squared 0.462 0.462 0.462
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months







Table 1.14: Impact of Air Pollution on Housing Prices Controlling for Elevation, Distance from 
City Center and Neighborhood’s Location (Rental Market) 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. Observations 
within 2 months after and before the pollution spike (Dec 2010) are excluded. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report estimates from a 
version of equation (1.1) that also includes distance from city center, its square and elevation. Columns (2), (4) and (6) report 
estimates from a semiparametric version of equation (1.1) that includes each neighborhood’s UTM coordinates as a nonparametric 
component of the model. We report the coefficients of pollution indices as part of the parametric part of the model. The dependent 
variable is log of real rent per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three 
closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2) the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution 
indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily 
pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is the average of 
those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include year, and seasonal 
fixed effects. In columns (1), (3) and (5), Standard errors are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.00525* -0.0136*** -0.00539* -0.0144*** -0.00979*** -0.0190***
(0.00285) (0.00323) (0.00368)
Distance from City Center -2.04e-05*** -2.04e-05*** -2.05e-05***
(5.73e-06) (5.73e-06) (5.73e-06)
Distance Square -1.59e-09*** -1.59e-09*** -1.59e-09***
(3.90e-10) (3.90e-10) (3.90e-10)
Elevation 0.00216*** 0.00216*** 0.00216***
(5.35e-05) (5.35e-05) (5.35e-05)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Observations 227,764 227,764 227,667 227,667 227,105 227,105
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months
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CHAPTER 2: Y-CHROMOSOME GENETIC DIVERSITY AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates how genetic diversity explains income inequality in a broad cross-
section of countries. In recent economic literature, it has been argued that diversity is a key factor 
in explaining differences in economic performance among different nations (Alesina et al., 2003; 
La Porta et al., 1999). For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) presented ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization as a determinant of government quality. Following that, in their paper 
“Fractionalization,” Alesina et al. (2003) revisited the question of the effect of ethnic, linguistic 
and religious heterogeneity on various economic performance measures. As a result, controlling 
for such indices became popular in the literature of economic development. 
Historical and geographical characteristics are important in shaping countries’ economic 
performances, namely income inequality. One of these features is diversity. A diversity measure 
can be based on ethnic, linguistic or religious fragmentations, but they may not be perfect measures 
of diversity. Population classifications based on ethnicity, language or religion are subject to 
changes and sometimes are related to economic changes. Moreover, most ethno-linguistic or 
religious fractionalization indices do not consider how different or distinctive two groups of people 
are. To have both a distance-based measure of diversity and search for a kind of measure that is 
less affected by historical changes, this paper proposes a genetic fractionalization measure. 
It is proposed that the genetic heterogeneity, as a measure of both current and historical 
diversity in a nation, contributes to current income inequality via different channels. The 
differences in characteristics among population groups with different backgrounds may lead to 





means cultural distance among different component groups in that population. In addition, it may 
be more difficult to implement redistributive policies in a heterogeneous nation as members of 
each group have less altruistic views about other groups’ members (Desmet, Ortin & Weber, 
2009). Even such historical diversity can affect the individuals’ current attitudes and beliefs in a 
country. For instance, this paper presents that higher level of genetic diversity is associated with 
less interpersonal trust. A lower level of trust among individual will increase the risk and the cost 
of any transaction, which can be a barrier against diffusion of development in a country and also 
contributes to income inequality. 
A genetic-based fractionalization index can address some important issues related to other 
diversity measures. The first problem with simple fractionalization indices is that their significant 
effect on the dependent variable will become weak or disappear when we control for income per 
capita and latitude as a measure of geographic variation. This suggests the fact that most of the 
effects of these indices come from poor performance of African nations. To overcome this 
problem, Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009) adjusted the popular ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
index (ELF) by the notion of language distance. The ELF index considers both heterogeneity in 
ethnicity and language, but it does not take into account how ethnic groups are close in terms of 
characteristics. Once the language distance is accounted for, their measure will be significant and 
robust in explaining government redistribution even when they control for GDP per capita and 
latitude. In this paper, genetic fractionalization impact is presented to be robust when regressions 
control for latitude or income per capita as my measure also controls for distances among 
populations. 
The second issue is the problem of endogeneity. Both language and ethnic classifications, 





accentuated, or as some say artificially created, Hutu-Tutsi division by Belgian colonizers has been 
pointed out by Alesina et al. (2003). We also have numerous other examples of countries, that in 
their historical process of nation building and unification policies, whose governments imposed an 
official language (usually the one that was spoken by the dominant ethnic group) to other minority 
groups. This research argues that genetic diversity is rooted in long-run history and has been to 
some extent persistent throughout history (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009). Therefore, it is less 
affected by historical incidences. 
Using the notion of genetic distance (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009), I could construct my 
measure of genetic fractionalization for around 140 nations as it was possible by recently available 
studies on mapping of Y-DNA haplogroups for many countries in population genetic literature. 
Human Y-DNA haplogroups’ classifications are based on single-nucleotide polymorphisms 
(SNPs) on the Y chromosome. Y-DNA traces from father to son and is a measure of the most 
recent patrilineal common ancestor of a specific human population. Over thousands of years, many 
mutations in Y-DNA have happened, and population geneticists can use these mutations to divide 
populations and study historical migration patterns.18 
The resulting Y-DNA based genetic diversity measure, which I call the genetic 
fractionalization index, has three main advantages when compared to other fractionalization 
measures: 
1-The distances among different populations are accounted for in such a fractionalization index. 






2- It is more persistent at long-time horizon and has been less affected by recent socio-political 
procedures. Therefore, it is less subject to the probable endogeneity problem compared to linguistic 
or ethnic fractionalization indices, whether they are distance adjusted or not. 
3-It captures part of diversity that other ethno-linguistic or religious fractionalization indices are 
not capable of capturing. Other measures mostly pick up visible differences based on language or 
rely on recent official ethnic classifications, while the genetic fractionalization index not only 
considers current visible diversity, it also is the best available measure of historical diversity. 
Countries’ historical diversity has left its mark on nations’ genetic structure, but due to policies 
like language or religious unification, it is not always reflected in ethno-linguistic indices. 
Following Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), in which they investigate between-nations 
differences in income per capita, this research is focused on within-nations impact of genetic 
diversity on income inequality. In the different set of regressions and controlling for geographic, 
institutional and other exogenous variations, empirical results show that the genetic 
fractionalization index has both statistically and economically significant impact on income 
inequality (Gini Index). In economic terms, the differences in genetic diversity among countries 
explain 12% to 21% of the differences in the national level of inequality. That is, a higher value 
of genetic fractionalization is associated with a higher level of income inequality. The effect is 
found to be robust. Even controlling for other measures of fractionalization will not change my 
results. 
The genetic fractionalization index is also successful in explaining cross-country 
differences in measures of interpersonal trust, tax compliance rates, public good output and 
democracy index. In section 2.6, I will argue that this empirical evidence sheds light on possible 





This is the first study that provides and employs a y-chromosome genetic distance based 
fractionalization measure. Furthermore, it introduces the notion of Y-DNA haplogroups diversity 
to economic literature. It is widely used in medical and population genetic studies, and it can be 
applied to other possible future studies on the effect of genetic diversity on international trade, 
ethnic conflict and regional development. Regarding the fact that genetic structure of nations is 
usually persistent over time, the empirical results of this paper emphasize the notion of how history 
is important in shaping current levels of income inequality.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, the related literature is briefly 
reviewed, especially papers that investigate the impact of fractionalization on economic 
performance and also preceding studies on the notion of genetic distance. In section 2.3, the 
methodology and the regression model are presented. Also the possible mechanisms through which 
the genetic fractionalization affects income inequality are discussed. Section 2.4 is devoted to the 
method of construction of the genetic fractionalization index, plus data introduction. In section 
2.5, empirical results are presented. In section 2.6, there are more discussions about the results, 
and it delves deeper into analysis through more empirical investigation. Section 2.7 concludes.  
Also, in Appendix B, a table of countries by Y-DNA haplogroups’ shares can be found. In 
addition, Appendix B includes the constructed measure of genetic fractionalization for around 140 
countries, alongside other fractionalization measures of Alesina et al. (2003) and distance based 
and non-distance based ethno-linguistic fractionalization measures of Desmet, Ortin and Weber 






2.2 Literature Review 
The notion of genetic distance and its application as an explanatory variable for cross-
country differences in economic performance was first introduced by Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2009), in “The Diffusion of Development.” In that paper, the authors considered genetic distance 
as a barrier of diffusion of development. In their words, “genetic distance between populations 
captures the degree of genealogical relatedness of different populations over time” (p. 473). They 
constructed their measure based on Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) genetic distance measure among 
42 human populations and presented how these between-country distances can explain differences 
in income per capita even when geographical and other measures are controlled. The idea is that 
the so-called vertical characteristics are transmitted from parents to children. These characteristics 
should not be interpreted as only genetically transmitted but also culturally transmitted features. 
Therefore, the genetic distance is a measure of long-term divergence in historical cultural features 
of different populations.   
According to their argument, when for some reason technological or institutional 
innovations occur in one country, it will diffuse faster to nations that are culturally more similar. 
That is to say, those nations that have been separated more recently in history and also have smaller 
genetic distance measures tend to adopt innovations and imitate each other faster and more easily. 
Consequently, genetic distance works like a barrier just as geographic distance.  
Following Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), many papers examined the effect of genetic 
distance on economic outcomes. Ashraf and Galor’s (2013) article, “The out of Africa hypothesis, 
human genetic diversity, and comparative economic development,” used an ancestry adjusted 
measure of genetic diversity based on the data on 53 ethnic groups of 21 countries from the HGDP-





of 145 countries using the notion of migratory distance from East Africa and showed that the effect 
of genetic distance on development outcomes are humped shape rather than monotonically 
negative. In section 2.6.3 I tried to replicate some of their main results using this paper’s measure 
of genetic diversity. 
In another study, Gorodichenko and Roland (2011) demonstrated how using genetic 
distance as an instrument for cultural differences provides evidence of a causal effect of 
individualism on a number of measures like income per worker, total factor productivity and 
innovation. 
The measure Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) used is based on an important but old work of 
Italian population geneticist Luigi Cavali-Sforza. It is restricted in some sense, as the number of 
populations is limited, and the data cannot be used to look at within-nation variation. Recent 
developments in population genetics made information about paternal, maternal or autosomal 
DNA distance and differences available. This new information paved the way for my research to 
construct a genetic fractionalization measure and focus on the effect of within-nation diversity on 
income inequality. 
My method of measuring genetic diversity index is rooted in recent economics literature 
on fractionalization indices. A number of papers have looked at the effect of fractionalization on 
economic performance measures. Canning and Fay (1993) and Mauro (1995) studied 
fractionalization indices’ impact on institutional quality. In an extensive study, La Porta et al. 
(1999) discussed a wide range of determinants of government quality. In that paper, they 
demonstrated that the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index is a significant explanatory variable, 
although the effects are not robust if they control for per capita income or latitude. Easterly and 





growth. This rising importance of fractionalization made this index a popular standard control for 
any cross-country development study. 
As a result of this rising popularity, Alesina et al. (2003) paper, titled “Fractionalization,” 
provided comprehensive measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization indices. 
They examined the effect of such indices on different ranges of dependent variables like growth, 
income redistribution, schooling, infant mortality, determinants of government quality, and 
transfers and subsidies. Alesina et al. (2003) also admitted that ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
measures lose statistical significance for many of the full specifications used by La Porta et al. 
(1999) if they control for latitude or income per capita.  Consequently, Desmet, Ortin and Weber 
(2009), in their article “Linguistic Diversity and Redistribution,” utilized the notion of language 
distance and constructed a series of revised versions of the ELF index. Once they considered 
language distances between speakers of different languages in a nation, the effect of 
fractionalization on government redistribution measures were significant, robust and did not 
diminish even when they controlled for latitude or other probable sources of exogenous variation. 
Combining the notion of genetic distance and its explanatory power for between 
populations’ income differences and popular notions of fractionalization indices as a measure of 
diversity, this paper provides a distance based measure of genetic fractionalization. Empirical 
evidence in this paper signifies both economically and statistically significant impacts of genetic 
fractionalization index on inequality. Furthermore, the results are robust if we control for other 






2.3 Methodology and Mechanisms of Effect 
2.3.1 Why use a Genetic Fractionalization Index? 
We know that the structure of linguistic, ethnic or religious diversity in different countries 
was subject to changes in history. These shifts in composition not only stemmed from historical 
changes in share of each component group, but also the change in the definition of ethno-linguistic 
groups or classes. For instance, Alesina et al. (2003) mentioned the example of Hutu-Tutsi division 
in Burundi by Belgian colonizers, which some say was artificially created. Another good example 
is shaping of the republic of Turkey after the fall of Ottoman Empire. There were many ethnic and 
linguistic minorities, namely Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, Anatolians, Albanians, Slavs and 
Arabs whose identities vanished after the severe and sometimes brutal process of Turkification. 
Those descendants of minorities are still living in Turkey and even may stay in the same place as 
their ancestors. They may keep important elements of their cultures, but today all are considered 
Turks and speak the official Turkish language. 
Religious diversity is another commonly used measure of the fractionalization that can be 
problematic.  In the case of religious diversity, the repressive communist regimes of China and the 
Soviet Union are commonly known examples Of course, the repressive policies regarding religion 
were not restricted to communist states or the 20th century. The Spanish inquisition, historical 
expulsions of the Jewish people, and mass conversions to Christianity in Latin America are few 
examples of many. Other than that, many people either identify themselves as non-religious or do 
not practice the formal religion of their community, making any religious fractionalization measure 
so volatile in course of time. 
Overall, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversities were not persistent in long-run history. 





and even changes in the definition of ethnic or linguistic groups. Genetic composition of nations, 
on the other hand, is rooted deeply in history. It is more persistent as it is only affected by mass 
migration or conquerors, which usually did not happen in a very long-run history. Therefore, any 
genetic fractionalization measure reflects historical diversity better, especially if we look at old 
nations in Europe, Africa and Asia. In terms of the New World, genetic fractionalization is just as 
reliable as ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices are.  In other words, the historical diversity 
within nations has left its mark on genetic composition in a population while, due to socio-political 
forces, it may not be detectable if we only look at diversity in language, ethnicity or religion. Thus, 
the genetic fractionalization index will be less subject to the problem of endogeneity. As a result, 
it is helpful to have a genetic distance based fractionalization measure because it does not have 
some of the weaknesses of other fractionalization indices. In addition, it helps us to understand 
how historical diversity is important in shaping the current state of income inequality. 
2.3.2 Methodology 
In line with studies in fractionalization impact on economic performance, this paper carries 
out the analysis by running Ordinary Least Squares regressions of income inequality measure (Gini 
Coefficients) on the genetic fractionalization index while controlling for other probable sources of 
exogenous variations. Most of the literature including Alesina et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. 
(1999) followed the similar framework and treated fractionalization indices as plausibly exogenous 
variables. 
The full specification set of regression is similar to that of Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009), 
which is in fact, the same as La Porta et al. (1999) specification, plus regional dummies. When 
investigating the empirical results, other measures of ethno-linguistic and religious 





fractionalization indices will not diminish the importance of the genetic diversity measure in 
explaining income inequality. The full specification of my estimated regression equation will be: 
Income Inequalityi = α + β1.Genetic Fractionalizationi + β2.Other Fractionalization Indicesi  + 
β3.Latitudei. + β4.Per Capita Incomei + β5.Legal Originsi + β6.Regional Dummiesi + εi         (2.1)                                 
The coefficients will be estimated for a cross-section of around 140 countries (i) depending on the 
specification used. 
 In the regression specification in equation (2.1), there is a control for latitude as it is a popular 
exogenous measure of geographic variation. The differences in latitude numbers capture 
differences in climate and disease environment. The regression controls for per capita income as 
more affluent nations tend to have better performance in general, which will affect inequality 
respectively. It is mentioned that inclusion of per capita income and latitude as control variables 
will eliminate significant effects of non-distance adjusted measures of fractionalization as it is the 
case in La Porta et al. (1999). Indeed, it is important to evaluate if controlling for such variables 
decreases the size and significance of the genetic fractionalization coefficient. 
Legal systems that enforce property rights and protect contracts represent institutional 
quality in a country. Alesina et al. (2003) argued that we may not have access to an ideal measure 
of institutional quality but the best semi-exogenous option is the legal origin variable. La Porta et 
al. (1999) also mentioned this persistent difficulty by explaining how successful imposition of 
legal origin (whether it is English, French, German, Scandinavian or socialist) can be related to 
the historical structure of a political power. Overall, as legal origin is historically determined, it is 
among the best available independent measures of economic and political institutions’ quality. 





performance in general will leave other parts of variation in income inequality for fractionalization 
measures.  
2.3.3 Causality and Mechanisms of Effect 
 In other studies, fractionalization indices are considered to be exogenous regarding 
variations in dependent economic performance variables. Although this study does not eliminate 
the possible endogeneity problem with any of fractionalization indices, it is proposed that genetic 
fractionalization is less subject to this problem compared with other ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization measures. As mentioned before, genetic diversity is more persistent in long run 
history and has not been affected by mostly recent changes in classification, self-identification and 
state sponsored policies regarding ethnic, linguistic and religious unification. Therefore, it should 
be less affected by recent levels of income inequality. In other words, when we observe a 
significant effect from historically shaped genetic diversity on income inequality, there should be 
less concern about reverse causality. Moreover, when regressions control for other sources of 
exogenous variations, like geographic diversity, as a possible third variable that drives both genetic 
diversity and inequality, the results will not change. Thus, there is a plausible exogenous variable 
in a regression model and also control variables for other possible explanatory candidates. Then, 
if we observe significant coefficients, one should not interpret it as just a correlation. All in all, 
this paper’s stance regarding the causality is just the same as other papers in fractionalization 
literature. Any criticism regarding that is a critique of whole literature, which can be legitimate in 
a general context. But one question will remain; if it is a causal relationship, what are the 





The empirical results support that those countries that have higher scores in terms of 
genetic diversity suffer from higher income inequality. But how does genetic diversity cause cross-
country differences in income inequality? 
Generally, most papers in empirical literature did not propose a detailed solid mechanism 
behind fractionalization indices effect. One main reason mentioned in the literature is that 
individuals have stronger feelings of empathy towards their own group members, which was 
posited by Becker (1957). In line with Becker’s theory, Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009) argued 
that they constructed their measures based on identification-alienation model of Esteban and Ray 
(1994). On genetic distance, Spolaore and Wacziarg’s (2009) model is based on the assumption of 
vertical transmission of characteristics (VTC). These characteristics, whether they are genetic or 
cultural features, separate populations of different genetic groups, and this separation acts as a 
barrier to diffusion of innovation. 
The main problem with these theoretical frameworks is that they are difficult to test 
empirically. It may be reasonable to assume that people of different groups possess less altruistic 
views toward each other, but in order to test such idea, we need empirical data based on surveys. 
Regarding the transmitted characteristics from generation to generation, it is not clear what 
features work as a barrier against trade or innovation adoption. Is it the feeling of distrust or is it 
merely differences in behavioral and cultural environment? 
Considering those argued mechanisms in the literature and related issues and difficulties, 
different channels or mechanisms can be proposed through which the genetic fractionalization 






1-Differences in Characteristics among Genetic Groups. 
2-Social Cooperation in Redistributive Policy. 
3-Historical Effect of Genetic Diversity on Attitudes and Beliefs of Individual (Behavioral Effect). 
The first mechanism should be considered as a direct effect of genetic diversity while the 
second and third channels represent indirect effects. The first possible mechanism is similar to that 
of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). That is to say, members who belong to a specific Y-DNA group 
inherited genetic or behavioral characteristics that make them different from other groups’ 
members. For instance, haplogroup J219 is associated with agricultural revolution in the Fertile 
Crescent (Nasidze, 2003). Therefore, those ancestors of people who belong to this haplogroup 
probably have the longest historical agricultural background. Such background may have an 
interesting impact on the role of women in the society (Alesina, Giuliano, & Nunn, 2013). 
The characteristics can either be cultural or purely related to genetics. Spoloare and 
Wacziarg (2009) debated the problem of distinguishing these two kinds of characteristics. 
Although it is important to examine whether there are cultural elements that make a genetic group 
more hostile toward adopting modern innovation or there are some purely genetic features that 
make some groups more productive, it is difficult to distinguish these two kinds of characteristics. 
The observations only tell us that these different genetic groups are probably associated with 
different and specific features that may be important for economic performance.  
The second proposed mechanism is true for any kind of diversity. People, belonging to a 
specific ethno-linguistic or religious group may have more altruistic views regarding their own 
group members and less toward others. In general, a more diverse society is more subject to 
                                                 





internal conflict and shows less social cooperation in redistributive policy. This possible lack of 
social cooperation paves the way for income inequality. But as mentioned, the superior feature of 
the genetic fractionalization index is that it also reflects the diversity in long-run history. A 
genetically diverse state was more subject to this distrust among groups and also less ability to 
have an efficient government in regards to meeting the tax code and supplying of public goods. 
For this reason, section 2.6 examines the effect of the genetic fractionalization index on different 
measures regarding social cooperation and participation in government.  
As mentioned above, the superior feature of genetic fractionalization is that it has deep 
roots in long-run history. Some countries of Old World, like Italy or Turkey, are good example of 
states that were historically diverse, but due to unification policies, the level of current ethnic or 
linguistic diversity is much lower than it would have been without government interventions. This 
paper’s genetic fractionalization measure can capture such diversity rooted in history. Despite all 
efforts of unification processes, people of different regions or of different family backgrounds may 
possess cultural elements caused by that historical diversity. 
In search of such national effect on attitudes and beliefs of individuals, in section 2.6, it is 
presented that higher genetic fractionalization score is associated with lower national level of 
interpersonal trust. This is a possible third channel of effect. The argument is, even though part of 
what genetic diversity shows may not be visible by linguistic or ethnic classifications, it is a 
measure of historical diversity, and probably historical ethnic conflicts. If a historically diverse 
country were more subject to ethnic conflict, then this background should have left its mark on the 
current attitudes and beliefs of individuals in that country. The national level of interpersonal trust 





linguistic background.  It will be presented that genetic fractionalization can explain variation in 
interpersonal trust index in a broad cross-section of countries. 
To summarize, in section 2.6, I aim to empirically investigate the indirect mechanisms 
behind the effects of genetic fractionalization on income inequality. The genetic fractionalization 
impacts the function of government in imposing tax and supplying of public good. Also, a higher 
score in genetic fractionalization index is associated with less democratic governments and lower 
level of trust among individuals.  
The question of mechanism of effect of genetic fractionalization on inequality can be 
extended to the relationship between the genetic fractionalization and all these variables, namely 
interpersonal trust. In addition, although studies show that tax compliance, public good output and 
investment in health and education are important in alleviating inequality, it is not totally clear that 
these variables cause inequality or if a persistent historical inequality led to poor performance in 
these areas. Admitting these issues, in order to compensate the lack of empirical evidence 
regarding the mechanisms of effect in similar studies, this paper presents more empirical findings 
about the effect of genetic fractionalization on key variables that can contribute to inequality in 
long-run history.  









2.4 Data and Genetic Fractionalization Index 
2.4.1 Genetic Fractionalization Index 
One of the main contributions of this study is utilizing the notion of Human Y-chromosome 
DNA haplogroups to construct a diversity measure for the first time in Economics literature. It is 
based on single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) on the Y chromosome. Y-DNA features traces 
from father to son and these features provide a measure for the most recent patrilineal common 
ancestor of a specific human population. During each thousands of year, mutations in Y-DNA 
happen, and population geneticists can use these mutations to classify groups of people in different 
groups and study a number of subjects, including historical migration patterns.20 
There are many studies in population genetic literature that measure shares of different 
haplotypes (genetic group type) in different countries (See Appendix B). As far as it was available 
in literature, for this paper, data for 34 different haplotypes have been extracted. The available 
estimated shares of haplotypes usually represent more than 99% of the population in about 140 
countries.  The list of countries by share of each haplotype (genetic group type) can be found in 
Appendix B. The table of countries in Appendix B is followed by references that were used to 
extract the data on Y-DNA haplogroups.  
All these Y-DNA haplogroups are the result of a mutation in genes of one paternal ancestor. 
Such mutation and its expansion by a male ancestor will give birth to a new patrilineal line. As a 
result, a genealogical tree of these Y-DNA groups is available similar to that of the linguistic tree. 
In Figure 2.2, readers can observe a Y-DNA haplogroups tree provided by the International Society 
of Genetic Genealogy (ISOGG), which is frequently cited in population genetic literature. Similar 
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to a language tree, when two groups represent more branches in common, it means that they have 
been separated more recently in history. For instance, R haplogroup is separated from Q in QR 
families sometime around 28,000 years ago while all BCDEF family, probably associated with out 
of Africa hypothesis, separated sometime between 70,000 to 80,000 years ago from the rest of 
haplogroup A (Karafet et al., 2005). 
Some of these haplogroups are associated with historical migration of populations. For 
instance, J2 is said to be associated with the expansion of agriculture from Mesopotamia to Europe 
(Di Giacomo et al., 2004). J1 is associated with the expansion of Semitic languages in Middle East 
and North Africa (Chiaroni, 2009). Subclades of R1 are associated with the spread of Indo-
European Languages (Semino, 2000 and Wells, 2001).21 Such mass migrations, followed by recent 
massive conquest (like expansion of Islam in 7th century or Turk-Mongol conquests in 12th and 
13th centuries or European conquest of America), shaped the structure of Y-DNA groups in modern 
countries.  
These diversities are not easily detectable by ethno-linguistic measures, as language 
classifications were subject to changes in definition or political unification policies. But these 
historical diversifications left their marks on the genetic structure of countries. Just as genetic 
studies can help us to clarify the timeline of historical migrations, the genetic structure of a country 
is informative regarding diversity in that country. It also shows how a nation that we consider 
homogenous today is a product of centuries-long co-existence of different and sometimes distant 
cultures in a specific region.  
                                                 





We have shares of different Y-DNA haplogourps for around 140 countries. The family tree 
of these different haplogroups is also available. It represents genetic distance among these 
haplotypes. Based on this information, we can construct a fractionalization measure of genetic 
diversity. This paper follows Fearon (2003) method of calculating distance among branches of 
groups in a family tree format. Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009) also followed the same method 
in order to calculate distances among different languages spoken in a country. The distance 
between two genetic groups in the Y-DNA family tree is defined as 1- the square root of division 
of l (number of shared branches between two haplotypes) to m (maximum number of branches 
between two Y-DNA haplogroups).  So, the distance between two genetic types of i and j is: 
                                                 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 1 − (
𝑙
𝑚
)                                                             (2.2)                                                    
Indeed, distance between haplotype i and j (dij) is pairwise distance between two Y-DNA 
haplogroups. Then by shares of the each haplogroup in a country, we are able to construct a 
genetic-based fractionalization index. The equivalent but language-based index is Desmet, Ortin, 
Weber’s (2009) index of “GI”, which was proposed by Greenberg (1956) for the first time. Si and 
Sj represent shares of haplogroups i and j in a country, respectively. That is, the total number of 
people belonging to a specific haplogroup (Ni), divided by total number of population (N) in that 
country. 
                                                     𝑆𝑖 =                                                                (2.3)                                                 
Based on equationss (2.2) and (2.3), the summation over the population-weighted product 
of these pairwise distances will be the genetic fractionalization index. Therefore: 





Similar to those of other fractionalization measures, this genetic fractionalization index measures 
the probability of two randomly chosen individuals being from different Y-DNA haplogroups. In 
addition, equation (2.4) takes into account the distances between the different Y-DNA haplotypes. 
Constructing this measure is one of the main contributions of this paper as it is the first time in 
literature that a direct and not projected genetic distance based measure of fractionalization is 
introduced for a broad set of countries.  
Using the Y-DNA data, one main difficulty in constructing the genetic fractionalization 
measure was the problem of the New World countries, including North American, Latin American 
and Oceanian countries. Most available studies in these countries are papers on native pre 
European-arrival populations and sometimes are too selective. For example, for Brazil there are 
studies on Y-DNA of major Amerindian tribes.  However, there were no studies that take a sample 
from all parts of nation including people of white, black and mixed origins. Even if there would 
be a comprehensive study on a city of such country, some problems would still exist. New world 
states, especially Latin American nations, are young states, shaped by waves of immigrations. 
Therefore, Y-DNA shares in two coastal cities in Brazil may be totally different, as the share of 
people with European background is different. Another problem is the presence of mixed race 
populations, like Mestizo, Mulatto, etc. In these countries, the term “mixed” is ambiguous. For 
instance, it is not clear that among so-called Mestizo Americans (mixed white and Amerindians), 
what percent of Y-DNAs are from Europe and what percent derived from Amerindians. This 
problem is difficult to avoid, unless there is going to be a comprehensive study on mixed race 
populations in each state, in respect to shares of Y-DNA.  
Cases of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are easier to deal with 





background are more reliable compared to those of Latin America. In the case of North America, 
German, Irish, English and French are the largest ancestries that form current white population.22 
Consequently, I am able to estimate Y-DNA shares of the U.S., Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand using a weighted share of white people (by ancestry), African Americans and Asian 
Americans. Of course, these estimates may have errors, but as the population is mostly European, 
the mistakes in their weights may not significantly bias the measure (for example, ancestries of 
English and Irish descent are genetically close). The case of Latin American States is more 
problematic because, as discussed, there is a considerable mixed-race population. In this paper, 
mixed race is considered as equally shared combination of its elements. That is to say, mixed 
white-Amerindian or Mestizo is considered a population with half European and half Amerindian 
Y-DNA ancestry. It is evident that such method may cause errors in the genetic fractionalization 
measure, particularly for Latin American states. Therefore, in section 2.6, I drop the New World, 
namely Latin American nations as a robustness check.  
The method of constructing genetic fractionalization for countries in America and Oceania 
was an indirect one. For example, for the country of Mexico, there is no comprehensive study on 
Y- DNA structure. However, the Y-DNA structures of Spanish people and Mexican Amerindians 
are available. Based on the CIA World Factbook 2015 information on ethnic groups, 62% of 
Mexicans are of mixed Mestizo background. Of the remaining population, 28% are either 
Amerindians or predominantly Amerindian and 10% are mostly European of Spanish origin. Then 
Mestizo in Mexico is considered to be half Spanish and half Amerindian. Finally, by restructuring 
the percentage, Y-DNA pull in Mexico is re-categorized to be of 59% Amerindian origin and 41% 
of Spanish origin. Therefore, the final shares of each Y-DNA haplotype are a weighted 
                                                 





combination of that genetic haplotype among Mexican Amerindian and white Spanish people. A 
similar strategy was used to derive shares of haplotypes for most countries in the New World in 
the absence of access to a comprehensive country-level study on Y-DNA map for that country.  
Very small states and islands were not included because there were no genetic population 
studies for them. Also, there is no comprehensive reference for a few African and Asian states. A 
measure could be estimated based on neighboring countries for those states, but it could be 
misleading. For example, there were no reliable papers for the country of Bhutan and using its 
large neighbors, India and China would be misleading. Over all, major states including all 
European nations were included and this set of countries covers almost all possible geographical 
variation globally. 
2.4.2 Data 
In the previous subsection, it was explained that how values for genetic fractionalization 
index were constructed. The raw data on Y-DNA shares in each country and reference population 
genetic studies on Y-DNA can be found in Appendix B. Appendix B demonstrates the resulting 
genetic fractionalization index for around 140 countries.  
The data sets that are used in this study include country-level data covering a large cross-
section of countries. For the dependent variable, I used the Gini index, which is a popular measure 
of inequality. Data on the Gini index was derived from the CIA World Factbook. The Factbook 
2015 contains the most comprehensive list of countries with their last available measure of the 
Gini Index. The estimations are mostly based on World Bank Data Sets, and for countries for 





Other fractionalization indices, which appear as control variables in a number of regression 
specifications, are mainly from Alesina et al. (2003). In particular, I obtain three measures of 
language-based, ethnic-based, and religion-based fractionalization indices from Alesina et al. 
(2003). Moreover, the distance-based measure of GI (Greenberg, 1956) comes from Desmet, Ortin 
and Weber (2009).23 
In order to consider geographic variations, income per capita and institutional quality, in 
regressions, absolute value of countries’ latitude, log GNP per capita and legal origins were 
controlled. In line with La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003), the data on latitude is scaled 
from 0 to 1 and comes from CIA 1996. Log GNP per capita is the average from 1970-1995 from 
WDI, the same as it is used in La Porta et al. (1999). Legal origin dummies, whether they are 
English, French, Scandinavian or Socialist dummies, tax compliance, log of infant mortality, 
infrastructure quality, literacy rate and democracy indices are directly taken from La Porta et al. 
(1999). Many of these variables are used in Alesina et al. (2003) too.24 
Finally, the data on interpersonal trust index is from World Value Survey (WVS) Archive’s 
report of 2010 by Jaime Diez Medrano. The report is based on many surveys run by WVS and 
other research institutions and contains a broad set of countries. The trust index is constructed 
based on positive or negative responses in surveys which ask, “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The 
                                                 
23 See Appendix B. Other measures of fractionalization from Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009) are brought to reader. 
You can observe how these variables compare to this paper’s measure of genetic fractionalization. The included 
variables are, non-distance based measures of ELF, RQ, and distance based measure of ER, plus peripheral 
heterogeneity in Desmet Ortin, Weber (2009). 
24 The reason that I used most of control variables from La Porta et al. is to control for same set of variables which is 
widely used in fractionalization literature. Controlling for these mostly exogenous variations in geography and 
institutional quality is also important regarding to the dependent variable of income inequality. As these exogenous 





fact that it is not referring to any specific ethnic, religious, or linguistic group, makes the index a 
plausible measure of interpersonal trust, representing country-level attitude of people. 
2.5 Results 
This section presents empirical results. Cross-country differences in genetic 
fractionalization index are considered to be exogenous regarding the differences in income 
inequality levels (Gini Index). Therefore, similar to other related papers in fractionalization 
literature, this paper follows an Ordinary Least Square regression analysis. The full specification 
of regression is equation (2.1) in section 2.3.2, in which I control for latitude, log of GNP per 
capita, legal origin dummies and regional dummies. Other than those variables, the full 
specification regression model controls for other ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization 
indices. Accepting the fact that there is correlation between genetic fractionalization index and 
other fractionalization indices, controlling for those other indices does not change the economic 
and statistical significance of genetic fractionalization impact. Consequently, it implies that the 
genetic-based index has explanatory power beyond those of other diversity measures. 
Table 2.1 shows regression results for different regression specifications. Empirical results 
support the notion that a more genetically heterogeneous country has higher level of income 
inequality. As I discussed before, my measure of genetic fractionalization index is the measure of 
historical diversity. Those nations that are more heterogeneous in genetic terms are historically 
more subject to immigration and conquest. This historical heterogeneity probably provided an 
environment for more ethnic conflicts, government discriminatory behavior and less cooperation 
among populations of different groups. As a result, historical heterogeneity either has directly led 
to uneven development and inequality or indirectly has changed cultural attitudes toward 





As it is shown in Table 2.1, the coefficients for the genetic fractionalization index are all 
positive and significant. In economic terms, the genetic fractionalization coefficient of 0.314 in 
the last column (controlling for other sources of exogenous variations) predicts that an increase by 
one standard deviation in level of genetic diversity will increase the Gini coefficient by 1.5%. This 
is more than 10% of the difference in Gini scores of first and third quartiles in my list of 140 
countries. For instance, consider a relatively genetically heterogeneous country like Brazil, and a 
relatively genetically homogenous country like China. In economic terms, almost 17% of the 
difference in Gini scores between Brazil and China can be explained by difference between the 
two countries’ genetic fractionalization index. Generally, this paper’s results present that genetic 
fractionalization on average explains 12% to 21% of differences in the national level of inequality. 
One concern with results on Table 2.1 is whether genetic diversity captures the same effect 
that other ethno-linguistic are capable of capturing. That is, genetically heterogeneous countries 
are mostly those countries that have higher linguistic, ethnic or religious diversity. There is 
correlation between this paper’s genetic fractionalization and other fractionalization indices; 
however, the correlation is not a strong one. The highest correlation is between this paper’s 
fractionalization measure and language-distance based measure of Desmet, Ortin and Weber 
(2009). The coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.1832. If controlling for other measures of 
fractionalization does not have much of a negative effect on magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient of interest, then it may be a legitimate claim to say that there is an exogenous part in 
genetic variation index that affects income inequality that cannot be captured by other indices.  
In order to verify if inclusion of other fractionalization indices have a negative impact on 
our coefficient of interest, in Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 there are controls for religious, ethnic and 





Table 2.2 shows the results controlling for the religious diversity index introduced by 
Alesina et al. (2003). This measure identifies the percentage of population of each country in 1980 
belonging to three most widely spread religions of Roman Catholicism, Protestant and Islam and 
the residual that is called other religions. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient of 
interest will not change when we control for religion diversity index. Results show that inclusion 
of religion fractionalization effect does not impact the coefficient of genetic fractionalization 
index. 
Table 2.3 presents the results controlling for measure of ethnic fractionalization index used 
by Alesina et al. (2003). This is a non-adjusted fractionalization measure based on information 
about ethnicity from encyclopedia Britannica 2001. This measure does not consider ethnical or 
linguistic distance and treats culturally similar but nominally distinct groups as separate 
populations. Controlling for ethnic diversity does not significantly change my results. The prior 
effect of such ethnic diversity measure (in the first column) disappears when we control for 
regional dummies, latitude or income per capita. 
The main reason behind the lack of robustness in the effect of simple ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization measure is its association with other control variables. Desmet, Ortin and Weber 
(2009) discussed that simple fractionalization measures act as a sort of African Dummy. Sub-
Saharan African countries that contain many tribes are close to the equator and have low income 
per capita. Any diversity measure that does not take into account how similar these tribes are in 
terms of culture and language will classify these countries as highly heterogeneous. Consequently, 
a popular measure like Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF) is highly associated with 
latitude and income per capita, and inclusion of those variables as control will eliminate the effect 





Similar to this research’s genetic fractionalization index, Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009) 
constructed a fractionalization measure sensitive to language distances. Despite non-distance 
based measures of fractionalization, their adjusted ethno-linguistic fractionalization measures do 
not fully associate with latitude or income per capita. This paper includes their measure of GI 
(Greenberg Index). The GI index is calculated by the same method that is used in this paper but 
considers language branches instead. Their GI, ER, and PH indices have one feature in common 
with this paper’s measure of genetic fractionalization. They not only consider the diversity of 
groups in a population but also the pairwise distance between those groups. The linguistic or 
genetic distance reflects how long ago two groups became separated in history.  
Table 2.4 shows the regression results including the linguistic diversity GI measure of 
Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009). The GI coefficient is less sensitive to inclusion of geographical 
variation measures like latitude. Table 2.4 shows that distance adjusted ethno-linguistic diversity 
measure explains part of variation in income inequality. But the explanatory power has a small 
effect on the genetic fractionalization coefficient. It can be interpreted that there is an exogenous 
variation in genetic index that has its own special impact on income inequality and is not captured 
by linguistic measure. In section 2.6, a method is provided to have better understanding of how 
genetic fractionalization explains part of variation in income inequality that linguistic and other 









2.6 Discussion and More Empirical Evidence 
2.6.1 Linguistic vs Genetic Fractionalization: A Robustness Check 
In the previous section, economically and statistically significant coefficients support the 
idea that genetically heterogeneous countries suffer more from income inequality. We also observe 
that inclusion of other fractionalization indices has small or no impact on the coefficient of interest. 
However, along with this paper’s genetic fractionalization measure, the language distance based 
measure of GI also has significant effect on income inequality in three of four regression 
specifications. Then some questions may arise. What are the advantages of genetic 
fractionalization compared to linguistic fractionalization measure? How preferable is the genetic 
diversity measure? And, is there any way to distinguish the effect of the genetic diversity index 
from language-based diversity measures? 
In order to answer to those questions, I exclude the set of countries known as the New 
World (America and Oceania) and carried out the analysis only for Old World states (Europe, Asia 
and Africa). The idea is that genetic diversity tends to be more associated with ethno-linguistic 
diversity in New World states. In American and Oceanian countries, there is a strong ethnic 
component to genetic diversity. For instance, in the United States, the genetic distance between 
white American, African American, Asian and Latino populations have the highest contribution 
to genetic fractionalization measure for the USA, yet the diversity is visible and can be captured 
by ethno-linguistic classification. 
The New World states are young, and genetic structure and even physical appearance of 
residents in these countries can be reflected in their ethnic origin or sometimes the language they 





of GI, Latin American countries tend to become more diverse with Bolivia standing as the most 
diverse country (Desmet, Ortin & Weber, 2009, p. 15). American states also tend to have high 
income inequality with visible racial gaps. These countries’ scores for the genetic fractionalization 
index are also high. An analysis of this data could conclude that the high association of Gini index 
and linguistic fractionalization in the New World, particularly in Latin America, contributes to the 
GI coefficient in Table 2.4. The gap between the New World and Old World states may also be 
the main reason behind significant coefficients for the genetic fractionalization measure.  
To address the issue, in this section, I dropped the set of New World states. First to see 
how linguistic and genetic fractionalization explain inequality in Old World. Secondly, as 
mentioned before, I indirectly construct measures for America and Oceania. Therefore, dropping 
these countries and observing the results only for Old World states can be a good robustness check 
for the analysis. 
Table 2.5 presents the results when all Latin American, North American and Oceania 
countries are dropped. Running the full specification regression of equation (2.1) and limiting the 
analysis to the Old World states of Europe, Asia and Africa, the coefficient of linguistic 
fractionalization measure of GI will no longer be significant. GI and other fractionalization indices 
are not powerful indices to capture diversity differences among the Old World states because the 
historical diversity in these countries is not fully detectable by ethno-linguistic classifications. On 
the other hand, the genetic fractionalization index is a good measure for historical diversity, and 
Table 2.5 demonstrates that it still is successful in explaining the variation in income inequality 
among Europe, Asia and Africa.  
As mentioned, the case of Turkey can be an interesting example for this discussion. Turkey 





et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) while its score on genetic fractionalization is among the top 
30 heterogeneous states in this paper’s broad list of around 140 countries. Another example would 
be Italy. Italy has an old history of migrations and conquests. It was at the heart of the Roman 
Empire, and migrants and slaves from all over the empire were brought to this country for 
centuries. Barbaric tribes conquered this country in the early middle ages that led to the fall of the 
Roman Empire. Then, for more than 1000 years, Italy was an arena of different autonomous 
kingdoms with their own specific cultures. Italy became unified as one country due to the rise in 
nationalist tempers in Europe in the 19th century. Now most of Italy’s population are called Italians, 
speaking the Italian language. While we know that it used to be a land of diversity for the most 
part of its history, and recent ethno-linguistic diversity measures do not reflect this historical 
diversity. In this paper’s set of countries, based on linguistic fractionalization measure of GI, Italy 
is among the top 30 homogenous states. While based on my genetic fractionalization index, it is 
ranked 100th in terms of homogeneity.25 Examples of Turkey and Italy shed light on how the 
linguistic diversity measure is not capable of fully capturing historical diversity.  
As a robustness check, columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.5 present the regression results when 
the analysis is limited to Old World and regression controls for ethnic and religion fractionalization 
indices. In all specifications, the coefficients of genetic fractionalization index are significant while 
the coefficients of other ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices are not. 
 
                                                 
25 Tabellini (2010) noted that differences in institutional qualities and cultural behavior between north and south 
Italy are due to differences in regional history. In Y-DNA terms it is clear that there is difference in genetic structure 
of south and north Italy which is rooted in different historical backgrounds, Semino et al. (2000). So the case of Italy 






2.6.2 Empirical Evidence for Mechanisms of Effect 
Following the proposed mechanisms of effect in section 2.3, this sub-section aims to 
empirically investigate the possible channels of effect. The results show that in a broad set of 
countries, higher scores of genetic fractionalization index are associated with lower tax compliance 
rates, weaker public good outputs (including measures of infrastructure quality and infant mortality 
as a public health measure), lower scores in democracy index and lower levels of interpersonal 
trust among individuals. This evidence sheds light on the possible mechanisms of effect, 
particularly on the indirect channels of effect26. 
Most economic papers in both fractionalization and genetic distance literature assert that 
there is a significant association between fractionalization variables and many economic 
performance measures but did not present solid empirical evidence for the possible channels of 
effect. In section 2.3.3, I briefly discussed possible theoretical frameworks that exist in the 
literature. However, those famous papers did not present solid empirical evidence for those 
theories. For instance, Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009) discussed that altruistic attitudes are more 
prevalent among homogenous populations compared to diverse ones. As a consequence, it is 
harder to implement redistributive policies in heterogeneous states. However, there is no survey 
or data showing whether people of one ethnic group are actually less altruistic or have negative 
attitudes about other groups’ members. More than that, it is not clear if such negative attitudes 
have any impact on their tendency to support redistribution in society. 
This paper proposes that genetic diversity can affect inequality via direct or indirect 
channels.27 Regarding the direct channel, it is very difficult to find empirical evidence within 
                                                 
26 See section 2.3.2. 





available data sets. Again, this is the case for most of the studies in literature; furthermore, it 
becomes even more difficult in the case of genetic fractionalization. Imagine a genetic group in a 
country that on average places more value on hard work. This can be due to distinguished historical 
background that members of such a genetic group have. In order to verify the relationship between 
genetic background and value of hard work, it is essential to have a sample of people and also 
identify each individual’s genetic background. Then one should measure or run a survey on the 
variable of interest (value of hard work). However, there is no such data available yet. In particular, 
with the framework of measuring variation in Y-DNA haplogroups, it was obviously never the 
interest of population geneticists to gather economic data while studying Y-chromosomes of 
individuals. As a result, while this paper does not reject the possibility of direct effect of genetic 
differences on income differences, due to lack of data, it is not possible to test such a direct 
mechanism here. 
Regarding the indirect mechanisms, this paper classifies them into two groups. The first 
possible channel of indirect effect is associated with social cooperation in redistributive policy. It 
means that the population of each group identifies themselves from other groups’ members, and 
this identification may lead to less social cooperation and tendency to redistribute income in the 
society. Based on such argument, people should comply less with national tax code, and 
governments should perform poorly regarding supply of public goods. The second proposed 
indirect mechanism is about the historical effect of genetic fractionalization on beliefs and attitudes 
of individuals. A historically heterogeneous nation might have experienced more ethnic conflicts 
or discriminatory behavior toward minorities. These historical backgrounds left their impact on 





the differences in languages or ethnicities are not severe and visible now; however, the diversified 
historical background of people may affect beliefs and attitudes of individuals in that country. 
The attempt here is to present some empirical evidence representing indirect mechanisms. 
None of the papers in the literature of fractionalization have perfectly succeeded in doing that. The 
reason is that diversity may affect economic performance measures, namely income inequality, 
through many unidentified channels. This also makes it difficult to utilize the genetic 
fractionalization index as an instrument variable for other explanatory variables of income 
inequality because the exclusion restriction, particularly the lack of direct effect from diversity on 
income inequality, will not be satisfied. Thus, this section presents a series of regression results to 
show the association of genetic fractionalization with other possible contributors to income 
inequality and brings empirical evidence as a general picture that supports the proposed 
mechanisms of effect. 
Genetic diversity is associated with current and historical diversity. If genetic distances 
among component groups in a nation are large, it is more difficult for these groups to integrate and 
adopt each other’s values. As a result, members of an ethnic group can identify themselves with 
that group rather than identifying with the national identity. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) 
mentioned that in the USA where there is an income gap among white and black people, there is a 
lower tendency toward income redistribution as poor people are often seen as “others.” However, 
in Europe where there are less racial components to income distribution, poor people are often 
seen as “unlucky.” More genetic heterogeneity in a country means that there is a wider gap among 
historical or current component groups of that nation. In countries like the USA and Brazil, there 





heterogeneous nations, it is expected to see less social cooperation in order to decrease income 
inequality.  
It is evident that the weak redistributive policy, which is due to lack of cooperation, will 
have a negative impact on income inequality. In this paper’s broad set of countries, the higher tax 
compliance rate correlates with lower scores in the Gini index (with correlation of  -0.25), better 
quality of public good output in infrastructure also has negative correlation with the Gini index 
(with correlation -0.26). Lower rates of infant mortality are associated with lower levels of income 
inequality with moderate correlation of around 0.53. Despite the fact that the relationship between 
democracy and inequality is complicated (Acemoglu et al., 2013)28, even higher scores of 
democracy index are associated with lower income inequality (correlation: -0.23). 
In order to show empirical evidence, Table 2.6 illustrates how the genetic fractionalization 
index can explain variables like tax compliance rates, output of public good like infrastructure 
quality and infant mortality. Table 2.6 follows the regression specification of La Porta et al. (1999). 
It controls for latitude, income per capita, and legal origins. Results demonstrate that a higher 
genetic fractionalization has negative impact on tax compliance. That is to say, in genetically 
heterogeneous countries, people’s compliance rates are lower. In column two and three, two 
measures for output of public goods are available. Coefficients of genetic fractionalization index 
are both economically and statistically significant regarding measures of output of public good. 
Higher genetic diversity is associated with lower scores in infrastructure quality and higher infant 
mortality rate as a measure of public health. As the last column shows, a higher genetic diversity 
correlates with a lower score in democracy index.  
                                                 





Overall these results show that in a genetically diverse country people are less cooperative 
in redistributive policy and less socially cooperative in political procedures. Therefore, it is harder 
to collect tax and supply public goods, which makes it more difficult to smooth income inequality 
through the channel of redistribution. It is important to mention again that despite ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization indices of La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003), genetic fractionalization 
effects in Table 2.6, will not vanish if we control for latitude or log of income per capita.  
If I run the same regression in Table 2.6 but substitute the genetic index with GI measure 
of linguistic fractionalization of Desmet, Ortin and Weber (2009), I will get less significant results. 
However, the main advantage of the genetic fractionalization index is when I limit my analysis to 
the Old World. The results are not presented here, but among Old World countries, only genetic 
fractionalization can explain all dependent variables of Table 2.6 significantly.  
The second proposed mechanism of effect is the impact of diversity on individuals’ 
attitudes and beliefs. This channel represents the effect from the historical diversity on income 
inequality. Historical diversity of countries may not be fully visible now as mentioned with the 
two examples of Turkey and Italy. However, if there is such historical diversity, then how does it 
affect current income inequality? This paper proposes that such historical diversity must have had 
an impact on beliefs and attitudes of individuals.  
In order to test this channel, this research examines the interpersonal trust data of 
Medrano’s (2010) report on a broad cross-section of countries. This trust index is based on many 
surveys at the individual level. In this way, it is a measure of general trust and not exclusively trust 
in other races or ethnic groups. The higher score a country has, the more people in that country 
trust other fellow countrymen. The interpersonal trust index of Medrano also has negative 





Interpersonal trust should be considered as a social capital input to economy. Less trust 
among individuals will increase both the risk and the cost of contracts. It may also have a negative 
impact on international trade and diffusion of innovation and development in general. In Knack 
and Keefer’s (1997) paper titled, “Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country 
investigation,” the authors found that the interpersonal trust index is positively associated with 
both higher and more equal income. In explaining how trust can affect economic performance, 
Knack and Keefer (1997) provided a quote from Arrow (1972), saying that; “Virtually every 
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted 
over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the 
world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence” (p. 1252). Therefore, any kind of 
transaction cost is sensitive to mutual trust in the economy. The other related result in their paper 
is that trust is positively associated with ethnic homogeneity. In their words, “polarization can 
increase rent-seeking activities -whether legal, through the political system, or illegal, through 
theft- that undermine trust” (p. 1279). 
It should be noted that the regression analysis in Knack and Keefer (1997) was limited to 
less than 30 countries. The results in this section are based on more than 100 countries and other 
control variables like latitude are taken to account. Therefore, it is possible to reexamine this 
hypothesis and evaluate how different fractionalization measures (including this paper’s genetic 
fractionalization) can explain interpersonal trust. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) controlled for per capita income in 1980, and the proportion of 
eligible students enrolled in secondary and primary schools in 1960 as both higher income and 
education level are considered to cause higher levels of interpersonal trust. Controlling for these 





positively associated with higher levels of trust. Indeed, in this section, as an extension to their 
paper, the regression analysis has been carried out to see how genetic fractionalization explains 
interpersonal trust index in a broad set of more than 100 countries. In table 2.7, similar to Knack 
and Keefer (1997), the regression controls for income per capita. Also other controls were added, 
including latitude as a measure of geographic variation and illiteracy rate29. The more recent 
variable of illiteracy rate is a measure for national level of education, which is a substitute to school 
enrollment in 1960 in Knack and Keefer (1997). 
Therefore, my regression specification based on Knack and Keefer (1997) will be: 
Interpersonal Trusti= α + β1.Genetic Fractionalizationi + β2.Latitudei + β3.Per Capita Incomei 
+   β4.Illiteracy Ratei + εi                                                                                                               (2.5)                                
In Table 2.7, the regressions’ results are presented. In columns 2nd to 4th in the table, the 
genetic fractionalization index substituted by language-based ethnic fractionalization index of GI, 
ethnic fractionalization and religion based fractionalization measure. In the broad set of more than 
100 countries, genetic fractionalization’s coefficient is both economically and statistically 
significant. Higher scores in genetic fractionalization index are associated with lower levels of 
interpersonal trust. In economic terms, the coefficient of -1.569 in the first column of Table 2.7 
predicts that an increase in one standard deviation in the level of genetic fractionalization index 
will reduce scores of the interpersonal trust index by around 6%. This is almost 20% of the 
difference between first and third quartiles of trust index in a broad set of more than 100 countries 
of this paper. If we run the same regression in equation (2.5) but substitute the genetic 
                                                 
29 Data on illiteracy rate is from La Porta et al. (1999). It is derived from WDI and based on their definition of 
illiteracy, which is the proportion of adults above 15 who cannot read or write a short statement in everyday life. 





fractionalization index with other fractionalization indices, all coefficients of linguistic, ethnic and 
religion fractionalization indices will be weakly significant or insignificant. In the last column, 
adding all other diversity measures will leave the coefficient of genetic diversity almost unaffected. 
As it is proposed by this research, the genetic fractionalization index is a superior measure 
regarding capturing both current and historical diversity. The interpersonal trust index is a cultural 
measure and deals with general attitudes of individuals. Therefore, both current diversity (visible) 
and historical fragmentations (less visible) could have left their impact on the level of interpersonal 
trust. Then it is expected to observe that genetic fractionalization performs much better in 
explaining variation in interpersonal trust. These results generally approve Knack and Keefer’s 
(1997) argument that homogeneity impacts trust level among individuals. However, considering a 
simple ethnic fractionalization measure in a broad set of countries is not sufficient. Once 
researchers utilize a genetic distance based measure that captures the cultural and historical 
distance among individuals, they will have empirical support for the effect of heterogeneity on 
trust. Once again, the results present the advantages of a genetic fractionalization index in 
capturing parts of diversity that other fractionalization measures are not capable of reflecting. 
Table 2.7 shows an important association of genetic diversity and individuals’ beliefs and 
attitudes. As genetic fractionalization is plausibly an exogenous variation, one might think of it as 
an instrument variable for the variable of interpersonal trust. However, as discussed before, the 
genetic-based index may affect inequality through other direct or indirect channels. As a result, it 
will not satisfy the important exclusion restriction property of a good instrument. In line with 
Knack and Keefer’s (1997), Table 2.8 represents OLS regression results of the Gini index on the 
interpersonal trust variable for this paper’s broad set of countries both as an extension to their 





and negative relation between interpersonal trust index and the Gini coefficient, also approve 
results of Knack and Keefer’s (1997). 
2.6.3 Development, diversity and a replication 
Similar to Ashraf and Galor (2013), this study also constructed a within genetic diversity 
measure. The difference is that I used the notion of Y-DNA haplogroups based on the data from 
more than 130 countries, while Ashraf and Galor’s (2013) measure is an estimated genetic 
diversity measure based on the migratory distance from East Africa.  In their recent working paper 
Ashraf et al. (2015), the authors used expected heterogeneity data of more than 230 ethnic groups 
globally and again constructed predicted diversity indices for an extended sample of 1331 ethnic 
groups by the notion of migratory distance from East Africa. In that paper, instead of country level 
per capita measures, they used mean light intensity per capita over the residing area of each ethnic 
group and again show that diversity has a humped shape effect on prosperity per capita. This paper 
supports their proposal as it presents that genetic diversity has an impact on economic development 
measures but also presents an independent country-level measure of diversity by a notion of Y-
Chromosome diversity as a new contribution to economic literature.  
As a result, although it is innovative, I avoid using variables like migratory distance from 
East Africa to extend my sample of countries here.  In an effort to replicate Ashraf and Galor 
(2013), my measure of genetic fractionalization approves that there is a hump shaped effect of Y-
DNA distance adjusted measure of diversity on their variable of log income per capita in 2000 but 
the results are sensitive to controlling for other variables in their model. Also, I could observe a 
hump shaped but not a significant effect of my genetic diversity measure on their value of log 
population density in 1500 ad.  Table 2.9 presents some of their regressions using this paper’s 





Table 2.9 shows that my genetic diversity measure partially approves Ashraf and Galor’s 
results, but the coefficients’ significance is sensitive to inclusion of new variables to model. This 
difference may be because of the different sets of countries that were used in this study and their 
study. The Y-Chromosome diversity index can be constructed for a broader set of countries if the 




This paper investigates the effect of genetic diversity on income inequality. For the first 
time in economic literature, a Y Chromosome-based fractionalization index has been constructed 
for a broad set of countries. In order to do so, this research used the notion of Human Y-
chromosome DNA haplogroups’ shares of the comprehensive list of countries. By the help of the 
family tree of these genetic groups, I calculate measures of pairwise distances between genetic 
groups. Finally the genetic fractionalization index is constructed as the summation of weighted 
product of those distances and components’ shares in each country’s population.  
The empirical results show that the genetic fractionalization has both economically and 
statistically significant impacts on income inequality. In economic terms, the differences in genetic 
diversity among nations explain 12% to 21% of differences in national levels of inequality. The 
results are robust when I control for geographic and institutional variations. Despite the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization indices in La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003), the impact of 
genetic fractionalization is robust even when we control for latitude or income per capita. This 
paper also demonstrated that genetic diversity is successful in explaining the differences in income 





are not. This is the advantage of the genetic diversity index that captures historical diversity, 
compared to ethno-linguistic diversity, which mostly captures current and visible diversity. 
To summarize, this paper’s genetic fractionalization index has two important features 
compared to other fractionalization measures: 
1- Its variations precede those of other measures’ variations and was more persistent throughout 
history. Therefore, it is less subject to the problem of endogeneity as language, religion and ethnic 
classifications are more endogenous to economic and political procedures. 
2- It captures the part of diversity that other ethno-linguistic indices may not be capable of 
capturing. Namely, historical diversity. The examples of Italy and Turkey show that despite that 
these countries are classified as relatively ethnically or linguistically homogeneous, they were 
historically diverse nations and also genetically diverse, and genetic fractionalization index is a 
better measure to capture that.  
Furthermore, I discuss different direct and indirect mechanisms followed by some 
empirical evidence that shed light on these mechanisms. Based on the empirical results, the genetic 
fractionalization measure successfully explains the cross-country differences in tax compliance 
rates, public output and democracy index. Also, higher levels of the genetic diversity are associated 
with lower scores of the interpersonal trust index. These results show that diversity can have a 
negative impact on social cooperation in redistributive policy and more fundamentally on attitudes 
of individuals on the extent to which they can trust others. 
The main contributions of this paper are: 
1- Introducing a distance adjusted fractionalization measure based on the genetic distance for a 





2- In line with studies on the effect of genetic distance on economic performance, this paper used 
the notion of Y-DNA haplogroups and introduced it to economic literature.   
3- The results once again show that how history is important and how historically different 
backgrounds could play role as a fundamental driving force behind different economic 
performance of countries, namely income inequality. 
Using information on the human Y chromosomes, we can study patterns of migration, trade 
and between-countries differences in other economic performance measures, namely economic 
growth. It helps us to measure the hard-to-measure cultural ties and similarities between 
populations and groups within a nation. One extension of this paper is to look at minorities in a 
country or compare a set of countries and construct between-country genetic distances and analyze 
how those distances can explain differences of economic performance. The application of this 
notion of Y-DNA diversity can go beyond development studies and even may be considered in 
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30 Available online at http://www.isogg.org/tree/ISOGG_YDNATreeTrunk.html. The picture is a simplified version 
and does not include some subclades of major haplogroups. To see list of countries with shares of all Y-DNA groups 





Table 2.1: Baseline Results 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the association between the constructed genetic fractionalization measure of this paper and the Gini 
coefficient as the indicator of income inequality. Column (1) shows the result without any control. Column (2) includes regional 
dummies. In column (3), the regression controls for latitude. For column (4), income per capita and legal origins as measures of 
institutional quality are added as controls to the regression model. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Genetic Fractionalization Index 0.507** 0.403** 0.360** 0.314**
(0.223) (0.156) (0.164) (0.142)
East Asia and Pacific 0.0567*** 0.0363** 0.0536***
(0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0164)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.119*** 0.0897*** 0.100***
(0.0161) (0.0228) (0.0194)




Income per Capita 0.0107*
(0.00547)
English Legal Origin 0.0992***
(0.0176)
French Legal Origin 0.0656***
(0.0180)
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.00447
(0.0177)
Socialist Legal Origin 0.0678***
(0.0189)
Observations 128 128 128 126






Table 2.2: Results controlling for religions diversity 
 
Note: This table presents the association between the constructed genetic fractionalization measure of this paper and 
the Gini coefficient as the indicator of income inequality. Religious diversity indices are included in all columns. 
Column (1) shows the result without any control. Column (2) includes regional dummies. In column (3), the regression 
controls for latitude. For column (4), income per capita and legal origins as measures of institutional quality are added 
as controls to the regression model. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level. *** 








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Genetic Fractionalization Index 0.427** 0.382** 0.331** 0.309**
(0.206) (0.154) (0.162) (0.142)
Religious Diversity 0.0639** 0.0274 0.0322 0.00598
(0.0290) (0.0222) (0.0207) (0.0267)
East Asia and Pacific 0.0541*** 0.0326* 0.0535***
(0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0163)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.113*** 0.0816*** 0.0985***
(0.0169) (0.0227) (0.0215)




Income per Capita 0.0103*
(0.00617)
English Legal Origin 0.0999***
(0.0177)
French Legal Origin 0.0676***
(0.0194)
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.00633
(0.0198)
Socialist Legal Origin 0.0679***
(0.0191)
Observations 127 127 127 126







Table 2.3: Results controlling for ethnic fractionalization 
 
Note: This table presents the association between the constructed genetic fractionalization measure of this paper and the Gini 
coefficient as the indicator of income inequality. Ethnic diversity indices are included in all columns. Column (1) shows the result 
without any control. Column (2) includes regional dummies. In column (3), the regression controls for latitude. For column (4), 
income per capita and legal origins as measures of institutional quality are added as controls to the regression model. Stars indicate 







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Genetic Fractionalization Index 0.370* 0.411*** 0.368** 0.329**
(0.216) (0.157) (0.167) (0.144)
Ethnic Diversity 0.0953*** -0.000887 -0.0195 -0.0281
(0.0285) (0.0226) (0.0238) (0.0230)
East Asia and Pacific 0.0575*** 0.0347* 0.0539***
(0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0164)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.120*** 0.0932*** 0.108***
(0.0190) (0.0240) (0.0203)




Income per Capita 0.0113**
(0.00538)
English Legal Origin 0.102***
(0.0171)
French Legal Origin 0.0675***
(0.0176)
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.00196
(0.0176)
Socialist Legal Origin 0.0719***
(0.0180)
Number of Observations 127 127 127 125






Table 2.4: Results controlling for Linguistic Diversity index 
  
Note: This table presents the association between the constructed genetic fractionalization measure of this paper and the Gini 
coefficient as the indicator of income inequality. Linguistic diversity indices are included in all columns. Column (1) shows the 
result without any control. Column (2) includes regional dummies. In column (3), the regression controls for latitude. For column 
(4), income per capita and legal origins as measures of institutional quality are added as controls to the regression model. Stars 







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Genetic Fractionalization Index 0.421* 0.334** 0.316* 0.295**
(0.218) (0.155) (0.160) (0.141)
Linguistic Diversity 0.103** 0.0724** 0.0589* 0.0352
(0.0447) (0.0295) (0.0313) (0.0290)
East Asia and Pacific 0.0494*** 0.0358** 0.0540***
(0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0168)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.117*** 0.0958*** 0.104***
(0.0164) (0.0230) (0.0200)




Income per Capita 0.0103*
(0.00547)
English Legal Origin 0.0957***
(0.0186)
French Legal Origin 0.0654***
(0.0188)
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.000257
(0.0207)
Socialist Legal Origin 0.0633***
(0.0203)
Number of Observations 127 127 127 125






Table 2.5: Results excluding the new world 
 
Note: This table presents the association between the different fractionalization measures and the Gini coefficient as the indicator 
of income inequality. New world countries of Americas and Oceania has been excluded. Column (1) shows the result for this 
paper’s genetic fractionalization measure including all control variables. In Columns (2), (3) and (4), genetic fractionalization 
measure has been substituted by linguistic, ethnic and religious fractionalization respectively. In the last column, all different 
fractionalization measures were included in the model. Only genetic fractionalization index can significantly explain the variation 
of income inequality among Old world countries. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Genetic Fractionalization Index 0.363** 0.326*
(0.168) (0.180)
Linguistic Diversity (GI) 0.0366 0.0513
(0.0389) (0.0426)
Ethnic Diversity -0.0237 -0.0401
(0.0251) (0.0292)
Religious Diversity -0.000712 -0.000526
(0.0294) (0.0289)
East Asia and Pacific 0.0551*** 0.0461*** 0.0458*** 0.0448*** 0.0571***
(0.0173) (0.0166) (0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0177)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.102*** 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.121***
(0.0187) (0.0214) (0.0217) (0.0222) (0.0241)
Latitude -0.0673 -0.0421 -0.0630 -0.0625 -0.0413
(0.0519) (0.0649) (0.0556) (0.0576) (0.0612)
Income per Capita 0.0127** 0.0108* 0.0114** 0.0114* 0.0120**
(0.00519) (0.00561) (0.00551) (0.00623) (0.00566)
English Legal Origin 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.105***
(0.0171) (0.0196) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0180)
French Legal Origin 0.0628*** 0.0619*** 0.0639*** 0.0615*** 0.0665***
(0.0173) (0.0192) (0.0179) (0.0194) (0.0210)
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.00379 -0.00923 -0.00915 -0.00591 -0.00817
(0.0173) (0.0214) (0.0173) (0.0196) (0.0239)
Socialist Legal Origin 0.0698*** 0.0626*** 0.0702*** 0.0672*** 0.0680***
(0.0174) (0.0213) (0.0185) (0.0191) (0.0185)
Number of Observations 103 102 102 103 101






Table 2.6: Genetic Fractionalization Effect on Social Cooperation in Redistributive Policy 
 
Note: This table presents the association between the constructed genetic fractionalization measure of this paper and measures that 
present the quality of social cooperation in redistributive policy while including Latin American countries. Column (1) shows that 
there is a negative association between genetic diversity and tax compliances. Columns (2) and (3) present the negative impact of 
diversity on public goods provision. In the last column, results show that there is a negative association between my diversity 















Dependent Variable Tax Compliance Public Good Output Public Good Output Democracy
(Infrastructure Quality) (Log of Infant Mortality)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Genetic Fractionalization Index -9.392*** -14.05*** 3.355*** -13.45**
(2.843) (4.923) (1.045) (6.124)
Latitude 2.107** 4.054** -0.908 6.356***
(1.003) (1.840) (0.553) (2.200)
Income per Capita 0.280** 0.546*** -0.346*** 0.836***
(0.115) (0.204) (0.0908) (0.255)
French Legal Origin -0.388 -0.267 0.217** -2.212***
(0.284) (0.509) (0.0999) (0.696)
Socialist Legal Origin -1.575*** -2.664*** -0.346** -2.955***
(0.342) (0.692) (0.134) (0.882)
German Legal Origin 1.325*** 3.270*** -0.801* -0.965
(0.437) (0.800) (0.482) (1.540)
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.234 0.113 -0.400*** -0.359
(0.502) (1.691) (0.152) (0.867)
Number of Observations 139 139 139 139





Table 2.7: Genetic Fractionalization Effect on Interpersonal Trust Index 
 
Note: This table presents the association between the fractionalization measures and interpersonal trust index. Linguistic diversity 
indices are included in all columns. Column (1) shows the result for this paper’s genetic fractionalization measure including all 
control variables. In Columns (2), (3) and (4), genetic fractionalization measure has been substituted by linguistic, ethnic and 
religious fractionalization respectively. In the last column, all different fractionalization measures were included in the model. Only 
genetic fractionalization index can significantly and robustly explain the variation of the trust index. Stars indicate statistical 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Genetic Fractionalization Index -1.569** -1.543**
(0.663) (0.696)
Linguistic Diversity (GI) -0.197* -0.176
(0.118) (0.134)
Ethnic Diversity -0.106 -0.0127
(0.119) (0.132)
Religious Diversity -0.0148 0.0840
(0.107) (0.113)
Latitude 0.376** 0.279* 0.348** 0.388** 0.279*
(0.153) (0.158) (0.156) (0.162) (0.152)
Income per Capita 0.0799** 0.0784** 0.0830** 0.0855** 0.0738**
(0.0332) (0.0330) (0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0331)
Illiteracy 0.00264 0.00211 0.00284 0.00265 0.00229
(0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00176) (0.00180) (0.00180)
Number of Observations 105 104 105 105 104






Table 2.8: Interpersonal Trust Index Effect on Income Inequality 
 
Note: This table shows there is a negative association between the interpersonal trust index that is used in this paper and the Gini 






































Table 2.9: The partial replication of Ashraf and Galor (2013) 
 
Note: This table replicates some of Ashraf and Galor (2013) results. It shows that there is a hump-shaped relationship between the 
genetic fractionalization index of this paper and the variable of income per capita in 2000 as it is used in their paper. Column (1) 
and Column (3) demonstrates the coefficient of interest when including or not including for continent dummies. Columns (2) and 
(4) are equivalent of their paper’s Table 5’s columns (1) and (2). Column (5) replicates their paper results on the impact of predicted 
diversity on population density. In the last column. Although signs of coefficients of interest are correct, they are not statistically 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Genetic Fractionalization Index 45.4*** 19.8* 11.24
(14.81) (10.96) (22.82)






Ashraf & Galor Predicted Diversity 251.0***
(69.54)
Ashraf & Galor Predicted Diversity Square -177.4***
(51.41)
Continent Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No
Number of Observations 122 143 122 143 123 145
R-Squared 0.121 0.133 0.452 0.473 0.041 0.219
Income per Capita in 2000
Ashraf & Galor Predicted Diversity 
(Ancestory Adjusted)
Ashraf & Galor Predicted Diversity 
Square (Ancestory Adjusted)
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CHAPTER 3: SIZE-DEPENDENT INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF IRAN’S CREDIT 
EXTENSION POLICY, 2005-201331 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been well documented that small firms often face serious credit constraints that limit 
their investment and production options (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Banerjee and Esther 
Duflo, 2014). Policymakers in many countries have taken this stylized fact as implying that getting 
the banks to extend credit to small firms on easier terms may be an effective means of expanding 
employment and output. However, such an assessment is not always warranted because the impact 
of credit expansion on small firms’ employment and production depends on the way and the 
circumstances under which the policy is implemented. If banks are pressured to lower the standards 
for assessing and monitoring projects for which they lend, risks could go up and the banking 
system may end up in a default crisis without any gain in total employment or output. Prospects 
of such a crisis or, more generally, lack of confidence in the future of the economy may also prompt 
the recipients of easy credit to divert their borrowed resources toward capital flight or activities 
that cause asset bubbles rather than employment and output generation. Even when the borrowed 
funds are invested in the firms, they may simply lead to substitution capital for labor and end up 
with minimal or potentially negative employment effects. These possibilities suggest that 
alleviating the credit constraints facing small firms may not be easy to achieve, and policies that 
aim to achieve this goal need to be designed and implemented with a great deal of care. 
Furthermore, adopted policies for this purpose must be examined as the process unfolds to detect 
problems that may emerge in the implementation process. Such assessments can also enrich the 
                                                 





knowledge and insights about the ways in which the economic and institutional settings and policy 
characteristics shape the effectiveness of credit extension policies. In this paper, we examine a 
policy of this kind that was implemented in Iran during 2005-2013.32 
 The case of Iran is interesting for at least two reasons. First, the characteristics of the credit 
extension policy adopted in 2005, known as the Plan to Expand Quick-Returns Small Firms 
(PEQRSF)33, highlight many caveats of such programs and the role of their contexts. Second, the 
Plan can be treated as a natural experiment that allows one to address the simultaneity issues 
inherent in the impact assessment credit policies. PEQRSF, which was introduced shortly after the 
surprise election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president in 2005, made it significantly easier 
for firms to obtain credit for expansion projects if they had had less than 50 workers in the previous 
year. This threshold effect offers an opportunity to compare the performances of firms just below 
and just above it in order to estimate the effects of the policy.  
A number of past studies have tried to assess the impact of PEQRSF on the performance 
of the beneficiary firms (e.g., Modarresi-Alem, 2011; Hosseinzadeh and Nosrati, 2014), but have 
essentially focused on the number jobs associated with the expansion projects of small firms that 
had received credit through the Plan. This approach on simultaneity issues misses out on the effects 
of the policy on pre-existing activities of the borrowers and on firms that did not receive loans. In 
this paper, we attempt to address these shortcomings. Our analysis is based on a large annual panel 
dataset of Iran’s manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers—Survey of Manufacturing Firms 
(SMF), produced by the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI). The dataset does have some limitations 
                                                 
32 All Gregorian years in this paper refer to the Iranian years with which they have 9 months of overlap. That is, 
Gregorian year t represents Iranian year t – 621, which starts on March 20 or 21 of Gregorian year t and ends on 
March 19 or 20 of Gregorian year t +1. 
33 In Persian: Tarhe Gostareshe Bongahhaye Kuchake Zudbazdeh (طرح گسترش بنگاه های زود بازده). A summary of the 





for our purposes, but it offers a wealth of information on manufacturing firms that can be used, 
under reasonable assumptions, to address many of its shortcomings. In particular, SMF does not 
include any data on loans taken by firms. So, we focus on the direct and indirect differential effects 
of the opportunity to be able to borrow under the Plan’s terms. 
Our analysis shows that PEQRSF has had positive effects on capital accumulation among 
small firms during 2006-2008, though that effect gradually eroded over time. However, these 
effects do not contradict the reports in the Iranian media that, based on Central Bank of Iran’s 
estimations, almost 38% of the financial resources offered through PEQRSF were diverted to uses 
unrelated to the purposes of the policy.34 Indeed, our other results are in line with the Central 
Bank’s finding that many of the proposed projects were fictitious or did not result in the promised 
employment increases. Our estimates show that the employment effects of PEQRSF were mostly 
negligible and very short-term. This is in contrast with a number of existing studies of PEQRSF 
that find positive effects on the recipient firms’ performance based on the employment figures 
directly associated with the proposed projects. Finally, we find no direct total factor productivity 
(TFP) effect that can be attributed to the credit extension plan. The results suggest that although 
part of the credit provided through PEQRSF may have been diverted away from the borrowing 
firms, it did contribute to capital formation among small firms. But, the additional capital stock 
may have had negative TFP effects and may have largely substituted for labor rather than creating 
employment. Moreover, according to the Central Bank, the default rates among PEQRSF borrows 
appear to have been high, adversely affecting the banking system, which has had dire consequences 






for the entire economy. We relate the reasons for these outcomes to the haphazard design and 
implementation of the Plan and to its economic and institutional context.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3.3 provides a description of PEQRSF and its context. Section 3.4 discusses the data. 
Section 3.5 presents the empirical model, and section 3.6 presents and discusses the results. 
Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Many studies in the literature of economics discussed how small and medium enterprises 
are financially constrained Some empirical studies show that small firms have a major role in the 
employment rate of countries while their ability to contribute to economic growth is usually 
hindered by economic obstacles such as limited access to finance. Financial and institutional 
developments, especially in developing countries, may mitigate the growth constraints 
experienced by small firms. (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Banerjee and Esther Duflo, 2014). 
These firms may be more exposed to a fundamental market failure case of credit rationing problem 
explained by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). This market imperfection may justify government 
intervention to provide low-interest and easy to access loans to small firms. However, many 
economists may have conservative views regarding any size-dependent government regulation to 
support small enterprises. 
Some studies provide evidence on how a size-dependent regulation has created distortions 
in firm size distributions and misallocation of labor force. The labor misallocation induced by size-





productivity (e.g. Guner et al., 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Gourio and Roys, 2014; Garicano 
et al., 2016). 
 
3.3 Characteristics and Context of PEQRSF 
In November 2005, a few months after the inauguration of Mahmud Ahmadinejad’ first 
presidential term, the Iranian cabinet of ministers passed a set of regulations to support and expand 
small enterprises in the country. The Plan’s initial targets included the increase in the level of 
employment, the increase in the level of non-oil exports and encouraging economic 
entrepreneurship activities by removing credit constraints against small firms. Consequently, the 
banking system with the support of the government provided cheap and easy loans to extension 
projects proposed by any small enterprises.35 
The Plan was considered an ambitious economic policy at the time. However, critics were 
suspicious of its success and claims of creating one million jobs per year as a result of 
implementing it. Main concerns include the deviation of provided financial resources from 
manufacturing and productive to non-productive sectors of the economy. Moreover, small firms’ 
possible failing to repay their loans would greatly hurt the banking system, and the government 
failure to support banks would deteriorate the situation, all leading to a crisis in the banking sector 
or inflationary monetary policies by a heavily indebted government. Later reports on Iranian media 
claimed that based on Central Bank of Iran’s estimations, almost 38% of the provided financial 
                                                 






resources were deviated. Many of the proposed firms’ projects were factitious or did not result in 
the promised goals of the employment increase.36 
With regards to the time and extension of this credit expansion, In the following two years 
after the start of PEQRSF, that is roughly 2006 and 2007, 292,817 and 267,341 projects by small 
firms were qualified to receive credits from the banking system. In next years, we observe a drastic 
decrease in the number of approved proposals. A decrease by more than 80% happened in the year 
2008 with 23698 projects and even larger decreases in years 2009 and 2010 with almost 6475 and 
8349 approved projects. The timing and the extension of the discussed intervention indicate that 
the main years of PEQRSF implementation was 2006, 2007 and 2008. Even in those three years, 
only a portion of those approved projects actually received funding, and roughly 60 percent of the 
proposed employment target were achieved.37 
 
3.4 Data 
We employ the recently available comprehensive dataset of Iranian Manufacturing 
Enterprises provided by Statistical Center of Iran. This dataset is an unbalanced panel of firms 
with 10 employees and more over the approximate period of 2003-2013. The data is based on 
census of data on all firms during 2003-2005, a mix of complete census for large firms (sized 50 
and above), and a census of small firms (10-49 employees) in 13 least populated provinces 
combined with large samples of small firms in 17 more populous provinces. The combined census-
sample of small firms covers almost 75% of all small firms in each year. The data kept track of 
                                                 
36 http://hamshahrionline.ir/details/194922 






firms that fell below 10 workers for a period of the data time span. The raw data includes 167,401 
yearly observations of 34,646 firms over the period of 2003-2013. Finally, once we account for 
missing or zero values of labor, the stock of capital and firms’ annual value added, 26,009 firms 
with 148,974 observations will remain. 
The dataset contains the nominal annual values of production outcome, value added, the 
stock of capital, investment, intermediate inputs and the total number of labor forces in each firm 
along with many other firm-level variables representing other features of each enterprise namely 
starting year, ownership status, skilled and unskilled labors, wages, depreciation costs and other 
expenditures. We adjusted all nominal values utilizing annual industry specific PPI (base year of 
2011) provided by Statistical Center of Iran (SCI). In our model’s s specification, all variables are 
the log transformation of the respective deflated variables. 
The data also includes industry indicators of ISIC codes for each firm. We used 2-digits ISIC codes 
(2 digits ISICs 15 to 37) to estimate the time variant productivity levels for each firm within the 
respective industry. In addition, in the final estimate of the impact of the policy on each factor we 
include industry dummies using the mentioned ISIC 2-digit levels. 
One problem would arise when using capital stock variable from the data set. The data on 
the capital stock were not available for years before 2005 and after 2011. Moreover, using this 
capital stock variable in the total factor productivity estimates of Wooldridge control function 
approach, results in estimates of value-added elasticities with respect to capital that are too small. 
Here we followed an alternative way of deflating and estimating the capital stock variables. 
Therefore, at first different categories of capital stock and investment (machinery, building, etc.) 
are deflated with their respective PPI indices. Then, employing the deflated real investment data 





for the dataset’s missing years. Finally, the aggregate capital stock for each firm in each year has 
been calculated using the sum of the deflated category-specific capitals. This alternative approach 
leads to more sensible value-added elasticities of capital when we estimate the production function.  
 
3.5 Methodology 
The main purpose of the Iranian plan to encourage and extend small enterprises of 2005 
was to create jobs. Therefore, in this paper we present a model that causally captures the impact 
of the policy on the variations in the number of employees at firm level. In addition, we try to 
investigate if such a policy has any significant impact on the level of firms’ capital and 
productivity. Thus, we need to estimate production functions of each industry based on the 
available data. 
 There are different methods of production function estimation leading to TFP estimates in 
the literature. Namely, fixed effect approach, IV approach and control function methods. The 
popular two steps control function methods of Olley-Pakes (OP), Levinsohn-Petrin (LP), 
Ackenberg-Caves-Frazer (ACF) and the single step Wooldridge method are known to economic 
researchers. As we needed the time variant firms’ level productivities, the fixed effects approach 
is not of the main interest of this paper. In addition, although fixed effects approach addresses the 
issue of endogeneity, there are number of reasons that make control function approaches to be 
more advantageous methods (see Ackenberg, Caves & Frazer 2015).  
 Olley and Pakes (1996) introduced the first control function approach to overcome the 
problems of OLS estimates. They mentioned the selection problem generated by the relation of 





because of the relationship between the productivity and the input demand. They suggested a two 
steps approach using the investment levels as the proxy variable of the productivity level. 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) alternatively suggested the use of intermediate input levels as a proxy 
variable for productivity. Ackenberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) argue that both approaches may 
suffer from the functional dependence problem. Therefore, coefficients in the first stage of the 
estimation will be collinear. In their alternative approach labor and the intermediate input/ 
investment are both a function of productivity. 
In this paper, we used Wooldridge control function method to derive estimates of the productivity. 
We followed the model and utilize the Stata module -prodest- provided by Mollisi and Rovigatti 
(2017) to generate are production function estimates. We consider a Cobb-Douglas functional form 
for each firm i in industry j at time t: 
Yijt = αj + Lijtβlj + Kijtβkj + Pijt + εijt                                                                                                                                      (3.1) 
All these variables are in log form and defined at the firm level as follows. Yijt represents the real 
value added, Lijt is total employment, Kijt is real capital stock, and Pijt is a measure of the firm’s 
unobservable productivity relative to an industry-level productivity factor, αj. The parameters βlj 
and βkj are the elasticities of output with respect to labor and capital, respectively, and εijt is a 
random output shock. The TFP of firm i at time t is αj + Pijt, which is identified to be estimated via 
a control function approach along with βlj and βkj. 
 Equation (3.1) has been estimated with Wooldridge method for each ISIC 2-digits industry 
in Iran’s manufacturing sector. The estimates of βlj and βkj is presented in Table 3.2. Compared to 
fixed effect and LP method that are used in other papers on production function estimates of Iranian 





for other countries. Also, the sum of these elasticity coefficients is not statistically different from 
1 in most industries. You can find more information regarding this TFP estimates and also on 
aggregate trends of TFP, employment, labor productivity in Esfahani and Yousefi (2018).  
 Tracking patterns of the change in TFP, employment or the firm’s capital stocks during 
years of 2003-2013 may return a valuable big picture of the aggregate trends of these factors of 
production in Iranian manufacturing sector. However, a causal inference necessitates a more 
detailed comparison among firms when we want to estimate the impact of a specific policy. 
Therefore, we exploit a discontinuity framework based on policy’s requirement that credit rules 
be eased for firms with less than 50 workers in the year prior to loan application. To investigate 
the policy’s impact on different factors of production, we compared two sets of different firms; 
those sized between 45 and 49 with those sized 50-54. It should be mentioned that we do not know 
which firms received PEQRSF loans. Thus, these categories are proxies for treated firms (those 
small firms that received some form of PEQRSF loan) and similar (in terms of size) control firms 
that did not enjoy the hasty government induced credit injection. 
 Based on estimates of firm-level capital stock and total factor productivities, we utilize a 
dynamic panel estimation model to investigate the causal impact of the mentioned policy on 
production factors while comparing these two size-based categories of firms. Following the 
Arellano and Bond (1991), a number of dynamic panel estimators were introduced to consider 
problematic panels such as the case of large N and small T. Using this notion, we followed 
xtabond2 Stata command package to estimate our panel equations. Xtabond2 implements a system 
of two equations known as system GMM by transforming all regressors using difference GMM 
and allows for exploiting instruments for both the level equation and the first differences equation 





 In this subset of the data, firms that were between 45 and 50 in year 2005, 2006 and 2007 
are considered to be qualified firms that were exposed to the Iranian plan to encourage and extend 
small enterprises in years 2006, 2007 and 2008, which are the main years of the implementation 
of the program. 
In our empirical model using xtabond2 module, we estimate different equations with changes in 
labor, capital, and the level of productivity as dependent variables while the explanatory variables 
incorporate current levels, lagged levels, difference and lagged difference of labor, capital and 
productivity in addition to year dummies, industry indicator, a dummy for being smaller than 50 
in the previous year of observation and the interaction indicators that determine if the firm was 
small (has less than 50) in one year, two years and three years before the time of observation. 
These indicators help us to disentangle the time effects and the general impact of being small from 
the impact of the policy in the respective years. 
 
3.6 Results 
As discussed above we used system GMM dynamic panel estimators. In all of our 
estimates, we utilize a panel data with small number of years T and large number of firms N. 
Therefore, a fixed effect panel estimates by demeaning process generates a constructed correlation 
between regressors and error terms (Nickell 1981). In addition, as each dependent variable in our 
estimates likely depends on its own lagged value and regressors such as labor, capital and 
productivity are not exogenous to our models, we need instruments such as some lagged values of 
each variable to overcome the endogeneity problem. This demands a model with many 





In our estimates, dependent variables as a form of difference in each production factor are 
functions of their past realization while other current and past levels of other factors of production 
may be controlled in equations. 
Results based on the system GMM estimator using xtabond2 are presented in Tables 3.3 
and 3.4. In Table 3.3 Column 1, the dependent variable is the difference in the level of firms’ labor. 
On the right side of the equation, regressors include, current levels, differences and lagged 
differences of firms’ capital stock and productivity. Also, we include lagged difference and level 
values of firms’ labor. All difference and level variables are in log forms.  We also add year, and 
industry (ISIC-2 digits notion) dummies to our model in addition to an indicator that gets 1 if the 
firm number of employments is less than 50 in the year of observation. Then we add a set of 
indicators presenting the size status of each firm in each year. For instance, in Table 3.3, 
s50_06_2007 is an indicator that gets 1 if the year of observation is 2007 and the observed firm 
had less than 50 employees in year 2006. We run all estimates by limiting our observations to 
those firms with the size in the previous year of observation fall between 45 and 54. In this context, 
we expect firms that were small in years 2005, 2006 and 2007 have experienced a relative increase 
(compared to slightly larger firms) in the level of labor, capital stock and productivity in few years 
following PEQRSF’s implementation.  
In Table 3.3, Column 1 we used the fourth lagged of all level regressors, fourth lagged of 
difference regressors (except for year and industry dummies) and third and fourth lagged of small 
indicator as GMM-style instruments for first difference equation while year and industry dummies 
were assigned as IV-style instruments for the level equation. Our results show that in general being 
small in policy implementation years do not significantly explain the difference in the level of 





the level of employment in the following year. Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in difference 
equation does not show significant AR (2) pattern. In addition, the Hansen test of over 
identification restrictions does not reject the validity of the instruments. 
In Table 3.3 Column 2, the dependent variable is the difference in the level of firms’ capital 
stock. On the right side of the equation, regressors include lagged values of levels and differences 
in the capital stock and productivity. Here also we control for size, year, industry and year-size 
interaction indicators as used in column 1. Here, we utilized first lagged of all level regressors and 
second lagged of difference regressors (except for year and industry dummies) as GMM-style 
instruments for first difference equation while once again year and industry dummies were 
assigned as IV-style instruments for the level equation. In column 3 we followed same logic but 
this time we dropped lagged difference in productivity from the right-hand side. In column 4, we 
add lagged value of the level and difference in labor to the set of regressors in column. In both 
column 3 and 4 we followed the same logic regarding the assignment of instrument variables. 
Results show that small firms that were small in the previous year of the policy implementation 
years of 2006 2007 and 2008 observed an increase in the rate of change in capital stock in policy 
years (12 to 24 percent based on different specifications). For all estimates regarding capital stocks 
both Sargan and Hansen tests of overidentification do not reject the validity of instruments, and 
also there is no significant evidence regarding AR(2) autocorrelation patterns in difference 
equations. 
In Table 3.4 Column 1, the dependent variable is the difference in the level of firms’ 
productivity. On the right side of the equation, regressors include lagged values of levels and 
differences in the productivity. We control for firm’s size, year, industry and year-size interaction 





variable of size indicator has been used as GMM-style instruments for the first difference equation. 
Year and industry dummies were IV-style instruments for the level equation. In column 2 and 3, 
we add lagged levels of capital stock and labor as control variables. We also add second lagged of 
capital and labor as GMM-style instruments respectively. The resulting estimates satisfy 
significant autocorrelation and overidentification tests. However, we could not observe any 
statistically significant impact from the policy on small firms in the years of implementation. 
We run the same AB models in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for firms sized between 40 and 49 (50 
and 59). This time we compare firms below 45 (55) with those that were sized above 45 (55) during 
the years of PEQRSF implementation. Results are presented in appendix Tables C.1 (C.3) and C.2 
(C.4). These placebo tests show no considerable impact neither on the change in the level of labor 
and capital stock nor in the firm level total factor productivity. In other words, the 50-employees 
cutoff in Table 3.2 indicate a meaningful variation in at least the stock level of capital during the 
years 2006-2008 while 45 and 55 cutoffs do not demonstrate any notable pattern difference in 
capital, labor or productivity between smaller firms and the relatively larger comparison group.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this research, we analyzed the impact of Iranian credit expansion policies in years 2006-
2008 to support small firms. We exploit a panel of all Iranian manufacturing firms from 2003 to 
2013 and utilized a system GMM dynamic panel estimator. Our results show that the mentioned 
policy has a positive significant but short-term impact on firms’ change in the level of capital stock. 
However, the impact on the change in the firms’ level employment was weak and there was almost 





in levels of the factors of production in 2000’s in Iran, the mentioned specific policy has not led to 
a significant change in the manufacturing sector employment levels as it was initially promised. 
Most of this newly available credit led to a short run increase in the level of capital if not totally 
deviated. This is the first paper that attempts to address the causal impact of such policy in Iran 



















3.8 Tables  
Table 3.1: Summary Outcome of the Plan to Expand Quick-Returns Small Firms (PEQRSF) 










2005 37,396 15,195 61,303 5,791 10,440
2006 761,265 292,817 756,062 189,843 224,028
2007 304,266 267,341 699,769 214,450 303,512
2008 18,161 23,698 103,747 20,785 78,410
2009 22,093 6,475 51,716 3,786 31,929
2010 28,105 8,349 65,727 1,637 14,168
2011 6,762 1,415 15,018 56 211














Table 3.2: Results of Production Function Estimates by Wooldridge Method  
 
Note: This table presents estimated coefficients for labor and capital derived from the Wooldridge Method of the Production Function Estimates in each industry (2digits ISIC). See 
Esfahani and Yousefi (2018) for more information regarding these production function estimates. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent 
level. *** = 1 percent level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ISIC15 ISIC16 ISIC17 ISIC18 ISIC19 ISIC20 ISIC21 ISIC22 ISIC23 ISIC24 ISIC25 ISIC26
Industry Food Product Tobaco Products Textiles Wearing Apparel Publishing, Chemical 
Labor 0.732*** 0.422*** 0.612*** 0.641*** 0.593*** 0.691*** 0.634*** 0.754*** 0.653*** 0.683*** 0.622*** 0.694***
(0.007) (0.049) (0.01) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.032) (0.045) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007)
Capital 0.328*** 0.118*** 0.211*** 0.511*** 0.492*** 0.263** 0.278*** 0.256*** 0.659*** 0.274*** 0.310*** 0.297***
(0.025) (0.041) (0.039) (0.122) (0.133) (0.117) (0.047) (0.087) (0.109) (0.0356) (0.039) (0.024)
Observations 27009 22 12,596 1,864 2,147 1,603 3,226 2,443 1,270 9,355 8,752 30,585
Number of Firms 4,602 5 2,385 414 490 306 571 460 227 1,544 1,786 5,832
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
ISIC27 ISIC28 ISIC29 ISIC30 ISIC31 ISIC32 ISIC33 ISIC34 ISIC35 ISIC36 ISIC37
Industry Basic Metals Electrical Furniture Recycling
Labor 0.745*** 0.721*** 0.723*** 0.791*** 0.635*** 0.724*** 0.702*** 0.787*** 0.750*** 0.675*** 0.641***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.08) (0.017) (0.048) (0.028) (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) (0.102)
Capital 0.354*** 0.356*** 0.209*** 0.418** 0.210*** 0.257** 0.288*** 0.111*** 0.235** 0.297*** 0.194
(0.042) (0.040) (0.033) (0.192) (0.045) (0.128) (0.074) (0.041) (0.103) (0.065) (1.310)
Observations 6,114 11,517 10,635 376 4,910 785 1,631 6,752 1,623 4,277 130
































Table 3.3: AB Dynamic Panel Estimates: The Policy Impact on Changes in Labor and Capital 
 
Note: This table presents dynamic panel estimates of the impact of being small in years of PEQRSF implementation on the change 
in the level of capital stock and labor. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level. *** = 
1 percent level.
Dependent Variable D.Ln Labor D.Ln Capital D.Ln Capital D.Ln Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L. Ln Labor -1.1952*** 0.0033
(0.1347) -0.0396
L.Ln Capital -0.0611*** -0.0738*** -0.0702***
(0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0166)






L.D Labor -0.3210*** 0.0059
(0.0953) (0.0321)




L.D Capital 0.0869 0.1266* 0.0970 0.1399***
(0.1632) (0.0609) (0.0606) (0.0521)
L.D Productivity -0.0758** -0.0054 -0.0077
(0.0348) (0.0088) (0.0085)
L.Smaller than 50  -0.2372*** -0.0853 -0.0693 -0.0824
(0.0850) (0.0698) (0.0687) (0.0649)
s50_05_2006    -0.5462 0.1361* 0.1286* 0.1250*
(2.927) (0.0793) (0.0774) (0.0749)
s50_05_2007   -0.3937 -0.0508 -0.0492 -0.0490
(0.3169) (0.0310) (0.0318) (0.0357)
s50_05_2008   -0.4024 -0.0300 -0.0317 -0.0307
(0.3752) (0.0253) (0.0248) (0.0244)
s50_06_2007    0.4520 0.225** 0.2006* 0.2085**
(0.4509) (0.1049) (0.1030) (0.0953)
s50_06_2008  0.1925 -0.0358 -0.0319 -0.0320
(0.4251) (0.0325) (0.0343) (0.0349)
s50_06_2009   -0.0220 -0.0159 -0.0213* -0.0185
(0.0895) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0129)
s50_07_2008    0.6787** 0.2493** 0.2163** 0.2181**
(0.28) (0.1023) (0.1074) (0.0887)
s50_07_2009    0.0533 0.0265 0.0414* 0.0292
(0.1717) (0.0222) (0.0237) (0.0262)
s50_07_2010 -0.1494 0.0111 0.0107 0.0103
(0.102) (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0136)
s50_08_2009   0.1710 0.0756 0.0258 0.0645
(0.1844) (0.0826) (0.0869) (0.0730)
s50_08_2010  0.1568 0.0222 0.0142 0.0236
(0.1373) (0.0246) (0.0271) (0.0274)
s50_08_2011   -0.1179 0.0411 0.0402 0.0351
(0.0756) (0.0265) (0.0268) (0.0245)
s50_09_2010    0.2534 0.0340 0.0239 0.0213
(0.1635) (0.0827) (0.0848) (0.0699)
s50_09_2011    0.2077* -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0219
(0.1125) (0.0387) (0.0350) (0.0445)
s50_09_2012   -0.1247* -0.0132 -0.0114 -0.0147
(0.0758) (0.017) (0.0171) (0.0171)
s50_10_2011   0.0350 0.0690 0.0419 0.1177
(0.165) (0.1022) (0.1043) (0.0897)
s50_10_2012    0.3141** 0.0012 0.0156 -0.0076
(0.1328) (0.0293) (0.0331) (0.0346)
s50_10_2013   -0.0034 0.0208 0.0158 0.0172
(0.0715) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0206)
Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ISIC2 Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5802 5896 5949 5896





Table 3.4: AB Dynamic Panel Estimates: The Policy Impact on the Change in Productivity 
 
Note: This table presents dynamic panel estimates of the impact of being small in years of PEQRSF implementation on the change 
in the level of estimated firms’ productivity. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent level. 
*** = 1 percent level. 
 
Dependet Variable D.Productivity D.Productivity D.Productivity
(1) (2) (3)
L.Productivity -0.6464*** -0.6604*** -0.6944***
(0.1072) (0.0878) (0.0806)
L.D Productivity -0.1669** -0.2087*** -0.2047***
(0.0848) (0.0745) (0.0674)




L.Smaller than 50 0.0467 0.0645 -0.0993
(0.1881) (0.1835) (0.2372)
s50_05_2006    -0.0546 -0.0824 -0.0337
(0.1945) (0.1905) (0.1897)
s50_05_2007   0.0326 0.0168 0.0506
(0.0813) (0.0795) (0.0819)
s50_05_2008   0.0652 0.0283 0.0226
(0.0610) (0.0609) (0.0615)
s50_06_2007    0.0124 -0.0591 -0.0588
(0.2605) (0.2549) (0.2499)
s50_06_2008  0.0161 -0.0295 -0.0266
(0.1003) (0.0951) (0.0921)
s50_06_2009   0.0303 -0.0049 -0.0006
(0.0597) (0.0599) (0.0611)
s50_07_2008    -0.1991 -0.1203 -0.0176
(0.3274) (0.3061) (0.3013)
s50_07_2009    -0.0043 0.0179 0.0483
(0.1016) (0.0999) (0.0992)
s50_07_2010 0.0366 0.0058 -0.0052
(0.0704) (0.07) (0.0699)
s50_08_2009   -0.2608 -0.3196 -0.3028
(0.3009) (0.2913) (0.2797)
s50_08_2010  0.0185 -0.0633 -0.0851
(0.1361) (0.1288) (0.1206)
s50_08_2011   0.0084 0.0033 0.0165
(0.0772) (0.0758) (0.0747)
s50_09_2010    -0.0677 0.0442 0.2140
(0.3225) (0.3048) (0.2871)
s50_09_2011    -0.1171 -0.1301 -0.0997
(0.12) (0.1132) (0.1014)
s50_09_2012   -0.1206 -0.1337* -0.1313*
(0.0768) (0.0778) (0.0782)
s50_10_2011   -0.0180 -0.0732 -0.0712
(0.348) (0.3233) (0.292)
s50_10_2012    -0.0293 -0.0562 -0.0284
(0.128) (0.1223) (0.1176)
s50_10_2013   0.1292 0.0844 0.0890
(0.0807) (0.0841) (0.0846)
s50_11_2012   0.1393 0.1153 0.1306
(0.3054) (0.2925) (0.274)
s50_11_2013   -0.1177 -0.1257 -0.0865
(0.0982) (0.0970) (0.1034)
Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes
Industry ISIC2 Indicator Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5802 5802 5802
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APPENDIX A: INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 1 
Figure A.1: The Level of One Month Average of Pollution Index across Neighborhoods 
 
Notes: This figure shows the heterogeneous variations in level of distance-weighted pollution index across zip codes for two days; 
one year before (green) and after (red) the peak of the sanction-induced pollution jump. The figure includes 1166 zip code that 














Table A.1: Baseline Regression Including Months of Increase (Housing Prices) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices for purchased transactions from years 2009 to 2014. All 
regressions are based on equation (1.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square meter. Pollution index is the daily 
inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) 
and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns 
(3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For 
columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each 
transaction. All specifications include five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also 
include municipal district trend effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0352*** -0.0352*** -0.0426*** -0.0426*** -0.0550*** -0.0550***
(0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00194) (0.00194)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 690,223 690,223 690,053 690,053 688,447 688,447
R-squared 0.617 0.618 0.617 0.618 0.618 0.619





Table A.2: Baseline Regression Including Months of Increase (Rental Price) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on rental prices for rental transactions from years 2009 to 2014. All regressions 
are based on equation (1.1). The dependent variable is log of total annual real rent per-square-meter. Pollution index is the daily 
inverse distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) 
and (2), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns 
(3) and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For 
columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each 
transaction. All specifications include five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also 
include municipal district trend effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.00201 -0.00198 -0.00326 -0.00322 -0.00725** -0.00715**
(0.00255) (0.00254) (0.00292) (0.00291) (0.00332) (0.00330)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 296,612 296,612 296,439 296,439 295,362 295,362
R-squared 0.409 0.411 0.409 0.411 0.409 0.412





Table A.3: Panel Analysis Including Months of Increase 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on price-rent ratio from years 2009 to 2014. All regressions are based on 
equation (1.1). The dependent variable is zip code-day average price divided by average rent. Pollution index is the daily inverse 
distance weighted-average of the readings of three closest monitors’ measures of 𝑵𝑶𝟐 for each zipcode. For columns (1) and (2), 
the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) 
and (4), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For 
columns (5) and (6), the Pollution Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three month before the time of each 
transaction. All specifications include five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also 
include municipal district trend effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0257*** -0.0255*** -0.0308*** -0.0307*** -0.0372*** -0.0372***
(0.00512) (0.00511) (0.00601) (0.00599) (0.00687) (0.00687)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 79,292 79,292 79,289 79,289 79,256 79,256
R-squared 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158









Notes: This table presents the impact of air pollution on housing prices from years 2009 to 2014 for the sample of purchased 
properties that are located within 1/2 mile of at least one monitor. Observations within 2 months after and before the pollution spike 
(Dec 2010) are also excluded. All regressions are based on equation (1.1). The dependent variable is log of real price per-square 
meter. For each observation, the pollution index is the daily reading of nitrogen dioxide concentration from a monitor that the 
housing observation lies within the one-half mile of the given monitor. If a housing observation is close to more than one monitor, 
the pollution index is the average of readings from all close monitors. For columns (1) and (2), the Pollution Index is average of 
those daily pollution indices for one week before the time of each transaction. For columns (3) and (4), the Pollution Index is 
average of those daily pollution indices for one month before the time of each transaction. For columns (5) and (6), the Pollution 
Index is average of those daily pollution indices for three months before the time of each transaction. All specifications include 
five-digit zip-code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. The even-numbered columns also include municipal district trend effects. 
Standard errors in all columns are clustered by five-digit zip-code and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pollution Index -0.0153** -0.0153** -0.0241*** -0.0242*** -0.0330*** -0.0332***
(0.00669) (0.00670) (0.00760) (0.00756) (0.00782) (0.00774)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
5-Digit Zip-code Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seasonal Fixed Effects X X X X X X
District Trends X X X
Observations 34,081 34,081 34,077 34,077 34,031 34,031
R-squared 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.618 0.617 0.618





APPENDIX B: INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2 
Table B.1: Fractionalization Measures 
 
iso_code countries Genetic Indexreligion ethnic language gi elf er rq ph
ALB Albania 0.167        0.472        0.220        0.040        0.028        0.257        0.012        0.113        0.026        
DZA Algeria 0.161        0.009        0.339        0.443        0.046        0.313        0.019        0.133        0.043        
AGO Angola 0.132        0.628        0.787        0.787        0.038        0.785        0.006        0.147        0.019        
ARG Argentina 0.123        0.224        0.255        0.062        0.127        0.213        0.054        0.093        0.118        
ARM Armenia 0.137        0.458        0.127        0.129        0.096        0.174        0.043        0.079        0.091        
AUS Australia 0.082        0.821        0.093        0.335        0.039        0.126        0.018        0.058        0.038        
AUT Austria 0.133        0.415        0.107        0.152        0.042        0.540        0.016        0.239        0.033        
AZE Azerbaijan 0.151        0.490        0.205        0.205        0.349        0.373        0.142        0.147        0.332        
BHR Bahrain 0.165        0.553        0.502        0.434        0.467        0.663        0.108        0.175        0.314        
BGD Bangladesh 0.112        0.209        0.045        0.092        0.034        0.332        0.013        0.140        0.030        
BLR Belarus 0.103        0.612        0.322        0.467        0.037        0.397        0.014        0.156        0.033        
BEL Belgium 0.101        0.213        0.555        0.541        0.110        0.734        0.024        0.177        0.065        
BLZ Belize 0.156        0.581        0.702        0.630        0.624        0.693        0.172        0.188        0.433        
BOL Bolivia 0.086        0.208        0.740        0.224        0.650        0.680        0.201        0.207        0.463        
BIH Bosnia 0.124        0.685        0.630        0.675        0.053        0.416        0.018        0.158        0.044        
BWA Botswana 0.172        0.599        0.410        0.411        0.076        0.444        0.023        0.154        0.059        
BRA Brazil 0.178        0.605        0.541        0.047        0.011        0.032        0.005        0.016        0.011        
BGR Bulgaria 0.169        0.597        0.402        0.303        0.178        0.224        0.083        0.103        0.172        
BFA Burkina Faso 0.070        0.580        0.738        0.723        0.091        0.773        0.014        0.133        0.051        
BDI Burundi 0.074        0.516        0.295        0.298        0.001        0.004        0.001        0.002        0.001        
CMR Cameroon 0.166        0.734        0.863        0.890        0.248        0.942        0.009        0.049        0.062        
CAN Canada 0.111        0.696        0.712        0.577        0.129        0.549        0.038        0.193        0.097        
TCD Chad 0.219        0.641        0.862        0.864        0.591        0.950        0.029        0.045        0.177        
CHL Chile 0.100        0.384        0.186        0.187        0.030        0.034        0.015        0.017        0.030        
CHN China 0.071        0.664        0.154        0.133        0.107        0.491        0.031        0.155        0.083        
COL Colombia 0.114        0.148        0.601        0.019        0.026        0.030        0.013        0.015        0.026        
CRI Costa Rica 0.074        0.241        0.237        0.049        0.049        0.050        0.024        0.024        0.049        
HRV Croatia 0.134        0.445        0.369        0.076        0.010        0.087        0.005        0.042        0.010        
CYP Cyprus 0.161        0.396        0.094        0.396        0.361        0.366        0.178        0.180        0.358        
CZE Czech Republic 0.119        0.659        0.322        0.323        0.008        0.069        0.004        0.033        0.008        
COD Dem Rep of Congo 0.117        0.702        0.875        0.870        0.376        0.948        0.021        0.046        0.077        
DNK Denmark 0.107        0.233        0.082        0.105        0.018        0.051        0.009        0.025        0.017        
DOM Dominican Republic 0.185        0.312        0.429        0.039        0.051        0.053        0.025        0.026        0.051        
ECU Ecuador 0.113        0.142        0.655        0.131        0.243        0.264        0.109        0.115        0.238        
EGY Egypt 0.186        0.198        0.184        0.024        0.048        0.509        0.016        0.205        0.038        
SLV El Salvador 0.075        0.356        0.198        0.004        0.004        0.002        0.002        0.004        
EST Estonia 0.103        0.498        0.506        0.494        0.457        0.476        0.214        0.217        0.451        
ETH Ethiopia 0.202        0.625        0.723        0.807        0.109        0.843        0.014        0.116        0.057        
FJI Fiji 0.122        0.568        0.548        0.548        0.503        0.607        0.198        0.221        0.493        
FIN Finland 0.079        0.253        0.131        0.141        0.121        0.140        0.059        0.067        0.120        
FRA France 0.113        0.403        0.103        0.122        0.097        0.272        0.038        0.109        0.087        
GAB Gabon 0.093        0.667        0.769        0.782        0.137        0.919        0.010        0.070        0.032        
GMB Gambia 0.097        0.097        0.786        0.808        0.094        0.748        0.021        0.167        0.064        
GEO Georgia 0.144        0.654        0.492        0.475        0.453        0.576        0.130        0.165        0.366        
DEU Germany 0.111        0.657        0.168        0.164        0.067        0.189        0.029        0.082        0.063        
GRC Greece 0.169        0.153        0.158        0.030        0.041        0.175        0.018        0.078        0.039        
GTM Guatemala 0.086        0.375        0.512        0.459        0.518        0.691        0.153        0.166        0.500        
GUY Guyana 0.184        0.788        0.620        0.069        0.077        0.078        0.037        0.037        0.076        
HTI Haiti 0.144        0.470        0.095        0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000        





Table B.1: Fractionalization Measures (Cont.) 
 
iso_code countries Genetic Indexreligion ethnic language gi elf er rq ph
HUN Hungary 0.129        0.524        0.152        0.030        0.153        0.158        0.071        0.071        0.153        
ISL Iceland 0.078        0.191        0.080        0.082        0.001        0.019        0.001        0.010        0.001        
IND India 0.127        0.326        0.418        0.807        0.427        0.930        0.027        0.061        0.111        
IDN Indonesia 0.093        0.234        0.735        0.768        0.138        0.846        0.015        0.110        0.064        
IRN Iran 0.148        0.115        0.668        0.746        0.512        0.797        0.107        0.143        0.403        
IRL Ireland 0.052        0.155        0.121        0.031        0.028        0.223        0.013        0.103        0.027        
ISR Israel 0.163        0.347        0.344        0.552        0.407        0.665        0.094        0.158        0.296        
ITA Italy 0.150        0.303        0.115        0.115        0.039        0.593        0.011        0.167        0.031        
JAM Jamaica 0.132        0.616        0.413        0.110        0.011        0.011        0.006        0.006        0.011        
JPN Japan 0.159        0.541        0.012        0.018        0.014        0.028        0.007        0.014        0.014        
JOR Jordan 0.159        0.066        0.593        0.040        0.051        0.484        0.016        0.175        0.040        
KAZ Kazakhstan 0.117        0.590        0.617        0.662        0.521        0.701        0.152        0.187        0.369        
KEN Kenya 0.180        0.777        0.859        0.886        0.472        0.901        0.043        0.084        0.135        
KOR Korea, South 0.096        0.660        0.002        0.002        0.003        0.003        0.002        0.002        0.003        
KWT Kuwait 0.146        0.675        0.660        0.344        0.031        0.556        0.011        0.201        0.026        
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 0.088        0.447        0.675        0.595        0.481        0.670        0.144        0.193        0.349        
LVA Latvia 0.076        0.556        0.587        0.580        0.077        0.595        0.027        0.211        0.065        
LBN Lebanon 0.157        0.789        0.131        0.131        0.144        0.161        0.068        0.075        0.142        
LSO Lesotho 0.164        0.721        0.255        0.254        0.007        0.260        0.003        0.121        0.006        
LTU Lithuania 0.085        0.414        0.322        0.322        0.044        0.339        0.018        0.140        0.042        
MKD Macedonia 0.165        0.590        0.502        0.502        0.212        0.566        0.064        0.203        0.152        
MDG Madagascar 0.187        0.519        0.879        0.020        0.051        0.656        0.011        0.164        0.035        
MWI Malawi 0.166        0.819        0.674        0.602        0.067        0.519        0.018        0.167        0.048        
MYS Malaysia 0.093        0.666        0.588        0.597        0.525        0.758        0.101        0.143        0.341        
MLI Mali 0.109        0.182        0.691        0.839        0.303        0.876        0.027        0.095        0.113        
MLT Malta 0.144        0.122        0.041        0.091        0.016        0.016        0.008        0.008        0.016        
MRT Mauritania 0.137        0.015        0.615        0.326        0.170        0.172        0.079        0.079        0.167        
MEX Mexico 0.061        0.180        0.542        0.151        0.127        0.135        0.057        0.061        0.123        
MDA Moldova 0.137        0.560        0.553        0.553        0.122        0.589        0.034        0.183        0.091        
MNG Mongolia 0.126        0.080        0.368        0.373        0.054        0.331        0.020        0.133        0.047        
MAR Morocco 0.124        0.003        0.484        0.468        0.062        0.466        0.023        0.172        0.057        
MOZ Mozambique 0.164        0.676        0.693        0.812        0.029        0.929        0.002        0.064        0.008        
NAM Namibia 0.164        0.663        0.633        0.701        0.488        0.808        0.081        0.134        0.239        
NPL Nepal 0.118        0.142        0.663        0.717        0.333        0.742        0.057        0.144        0.201        
NLD Netherlands 0.107        0.142        0.663        0.717        0.137        0.389        0.045        0.142        0.113        
NZL New Zealand 0.116        0.811        0.397        0.166        0.095        0.102        0.045        0.048        0.094        
NIC Nicaragua 0.109        0.429        0.484        0.047        0.081        0.081        0.040        0.040        0.081        
NER Niger 0.223        0.201        0.652        0.652        0.540        0.646        0.157        0.183        0.420        
NGA Nigeria 0.130        0.742        0.850        0.850        0.463        0.870        0.061        0.104        0.137        
NOR Norway 0.091        0.205        0.059        0.067        
OMN Oman 0.152        0.432        0.437        0.357        0.269        0.693        0.056        0.184        0.149        
PAK Pakistan 0.101        0.385        0.710        0.719        0.091        0.762        0.015        0.148        0.051        
PAN Panama 0.124        0.334        0.553        0.387        0.322        0.324        0.136        0.136        0.303        
PNG Papua New Guinea 0.134        0.552        0.272        0.353        0.598        0.990        0.005        0.009        0.038        
PRY Paraguay 0.094        0.212        0.169        0.598        0.322        0.347        0.137        0.141        0.314        
PER Peru 0.063        0.199        0.657        0.336        0.350        0.376        0.137        0.138        0.336        
PHL Philippines 0.079        0.306        0.239        0.836        0.090        0.849        0.011        0.116        0.036        
POL Poland 0.083        0.171        0.118        0.047        0.006        0.060        0.003        0.029        0.006        
PRT Portugal 0.130        0.144        0.047        0.020        0.011        0.022        0.006        0.011        0.011        
QAT Qatar 0.126        0.095        0.746        0.480        0.545        0.608        0.203        0.217        0.500        
ROU Romania 0.154        0.237        0.307        0.172        0.134        0.168        0.063        0.079        0.130        
RUS Russia 0.106        0.440        0.245        0.249        0.183        0.283        0.071        0.112        0.165        
RWA Rwanda 0.069        0.507        0.324        0.001        0.004        0.000        0.002        0.001        





Table B.1: Fractionalization Measures (Cont.) 
 
Note: This table presents the list of countries by this paper’s genetic fractionalization measure and other fractionalization indices. 
iso_code countries Genetic Indexreligion ethnic language gi elf er rq ph
SEN Senegal 0.054        0.150        0.694        0.696        0.076        0.772        0.013        0.156        0.039        
SRB Serbia and Montenegro 0.155        0.574        0.112        0.359        0.042        0.150        0.096        
SGP Singapore 0.086        0.656        0.386        0.384        0.515        0.748        0.102        0.157        0.298        
SVK Slovakia 0.116        0.565        0.254        0.255        0.196        0.307        0.084        0.130        0.180        
SVN Slovenia 0.107        0.287        0.222        0.220        0.021        0.174        0.009        0.084        0.020        
ZAF South Africa 0.193        0.860        0.752        0.865        0.394        0.869        0.048        0.109        0.118        
ESP Spain 0.093        0.451        0.416        0.413        0.046        0.438        0.015        0.174        0.037        
LKA Sri Lanka 0.120        0.485        0.415        0.464        0.306        0.313        0.150        0.153        0.303        
SUR Suriname 0.191        0.791        0.733        0.331        0.595        0.788        0.114        0.158        0.301        
SWZ Swaziland 0.164        0.444        0.058        0.172        0.005        0.228        0.002        0.107        0.005        
SWE Sweden 0.110        0.234        0.060        0.197        0.088        0.167        0.039        0.074        0.083        
CHE Switzerland 0.124        0.608        0.531        0.544        0.079        0.547        0.026        0.182        0.067        
SYR Syria 0.114        0.431        0.540        0.182        0.203        0.503        0.062        0.172        0.157        
TWN Taiwan 0.064        0.684        0.274        0.503        0.076        0.488        0.026        0.189        0.062        
TJK Tajikistan 0.103        0.339        0.511        0.547        0.360        0.482        0.138        0.177        0.320        
TZA Tanzania 0.166        0.633        0.735        0.898        0.149        0.965        0.004        0.033        0.022        
THA Thailand 0.066        0.099        0.634        0.634        0.254        0.753        0.040        0.168        0.111        
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 0.200        0.794        0.648        0.125        0.487        0.696        0.125        0.178        0.338        
TUN Tunisia 0.176        0.010        0.039        0.012        0.005        0.012        0.003        0.006        0.005        
TUR Turkey 0.156        0.005        0.320        0.222        0.258        0.289        0.108        0.119        0.245        
TMN Turkmenistan 0.111        0.233        0.392        0.398        0.221        0.386        0.082        0.146        0.194        
UGA Uganda 0.180        0.633        0.930        0.923        0.461        0.928        0.029        0.064        0.119        
UKR Ukraine 0.113        0.616        0.474        0.474        0.066        0.492        0.022        0.194        0.053        
ARE United Arab Emirates 0.148        0.331        0.625        0.487        0.623        0.777        0.117        0.143        0.382        
GBR United Kingdom 0.092        0.694        0.121        0.053        0.044        0.139        0.020        0.063        0.042        
URY Uruguay 0.107        0.355        0.250        0.082        0.007        0.092        0.003        0.044        0.007        
USA USA 0.138        0.824        0.490        0.251        0.092        0.353        0.033        0.136        0.078        
UZB Uzbekistan 0.141        0.213        0.413        0.412        0.263        0.428        0.093        0.150        0.228        
VEN Venezuela 0.137        0.135        0.497        0.069        0.024        0.026        0.012        0.013        0.024        
VNM Vietnam 0.086        0.508        0.238        0.238        0.161        0.234        0.067        0.097        0.150        
YEM Yemen 0.098        0.002        0.008        0.065        0.579        0.020        0.229        0.044        
ZMB Zambia 0.164        0.736        0.781        0.873        0.035        0.855        0.004        0.110        0.015        





Table B.2: Table of Countries by Shares of each Y-DNA Haplogorups  
 
iso_code countries A B C E E1b1a E1b1b E2 F G K G H I I1 I2 J J1 J2 L T M S P Q QM3 QxM3 R1 R1a R1b R2 N O O1 O2 O3
ALB Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0.255 0 0 0 0 0.018 0 0 0.036 0.181 0 0.036 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.091 0.182 0 0 0 0 0 0
DZA Algeria 0 0 0 0 0.079 0.51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.225 0.049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.118 0 0 0 0 0 0
AGO Angola 0 0.048 0 0 0.618 0 0.143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARG Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0.096 0 0 0 0 0.056 0 0 0.028 0.052 0 0.021 0.11 0 0.024 0 0 0 0.06 0 0 0 0.028 0.508 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARM Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 0.055 0 0 0 0 0.109 0 0 0 0.027 0 0.146 0.236 0.009 0.036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.009 0.362 0 0 0 0 0 0
AUS Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0 0 0.01 0 0.014 0 0 0.129 0.064 0 0 0.032 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.041 0.616 0 0 0.07 0 0 0
AUT Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0.075 0 0 0.12 0.095 0 0.01 0.09 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.19 0.32 0 0.005 0 0 0 0
AZE Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0.056 0 0 0 0 0.181 0 0.028 0 0 0 0.11 0.306 0.069 0.042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.069 0.111 0.028 0 0 0 0 0
BHR Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0.076 0.076 0 0 0.009 0 0.021 0.132 0 0 0 0.337 0 0 0.043 0.026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.105 0.012 0.047 0 0.115 0 0 0
BGD Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.008 0 0 0.193 0 0 0 0.041 0 0 0.019 0.038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.232 0 0.155 0 0.207 0 0 0
BLR Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.055 0.185 0 0.01 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.51 0.055 0 0.1 0 0 0 0
BEL Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0.12 0.075 0 0.01 0.04 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.04 0.61 0 0 0 0 0 0
BLZ Belize 0 0.018 0 0 0.228 0.053 0.053 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.337 0 0 0.263 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BOL Bolivia 0 0.003 0 0 0.033 0.036 0 0 0 0 0.012 0 0 0.006 0.023 0 0.006 0.033 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.09 0 0.008 0.283 0 0 0 0 0 0
BIH Bosnia 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.03 0.555 0 0.005 0.04 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.15 0.035 0 0.02 0 0 0 0
BWA Botswana 0.051 0.109 0 0 0.547 0.044 0.212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.037 0 0 0 0 0 0
BRA Brazil 0 0.015 0 0 0.189 0.123 0.044 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.018 0.033 0 0.017 0.076 0 0.017 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.017 0.379 0 0 0.011 0 0 0
BGR Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0.235 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.04 0.22 0 0.03 0.11 0 0.015 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.17 0.11 0 0.005 0 0 0 0
BFA Burkina Faso 0 0.009 0 0.038 0.811 0.028 0.113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BDI Burundi 0 0.057 0 0 0.826 0.027 0.074 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.008 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMR Cameroon 0.011 0.073 0 0 0.549 0.012 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.331 0 0 0 0 0 0
CAN Canada 0 0 0 0.03 0 0.043 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.113 0.068 0 0.008 0.043 0 0.008 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.038 0.578 0 0 0.05 0 0 0
TCD Chad 0.11 0.137 0 0 0.11 0.048 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0.058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.376 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHL Chile 0 0.003 0 0 0.033 0.057 0.008 0 0 0 0.021 0 0 0.011 0.039 0 0.011 0.056 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.015 0.483 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHN China 0 0 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0 0.096 0.163 0.554
COL Colombia 0 0.007 0 0 0.085 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0.017 0 0 0.008 0.031 0 0.008 0.045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.034 0.208 0 0.011 0.421 0 0 0 0 0 0
CRI Costa Rica 0 0 0 0.045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.014 0 0 0.007 0.025 0 0.007 0.036 0 0.011 0 0 0 0.442 0 0 0 0.009 0.312 0 0 0 0 0 0
HRV Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0.055 0.38 0 0.01 0.06 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.24 0.085 0 0.005 0 0 0 0
CYP Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.06 0.37 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0
CZE Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.11 0.13 0 0 0.06 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0.34 0.22 0 0.005 0 0 0 0
COD Dem. Rep of Congo 0.028 0 0 0 0.639 0.139 0.194 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DNK Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0.34 0.075 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.15 0.33 0 0.01 0 0 0 0
DOM Dominican Republic 0 0.021 0 0 0.276 0.101 0.064 0 0 0 0.016 0 0 0.008 0.029 0 0.008 0.042 0 0.013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.011 0.362 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECU Ecuador 0 0.005 0 0 0.071 0.046 0.016 0 0 0 0.013 0 0 0.006 0.023 0 0.006 0.034 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.051 0.312 0 0.008 0.34 0 0 0 0 0 0
EGY Egypt 0 0.027 0 0 0.027 0.359 0 0 0 0.075 0.095 0 0 0 0 0 0.197 0.122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.034 0.041 0 0 0 0 0 0
SLV El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 0.039 0 0 0 0 0.017 0 0 0.008 0.031 0 0.008 0.045 0 0.014 0 0 0 0.442 0 0 0 0.011 0.385 0 0 0 0 0 0
EST Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0.035 0 0 0.01 0 0.035 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.32 0.08 0 0.34 0 0 0 0
ETH Ethiopia 0.178 0.008 0 0 0 0.488 0.004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.269 0 0 0 0.037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FJI Fiji 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.224 0.252 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.355 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.131 0 0 0
FIN Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.035 0 0.615 0 0 0 0
FRA France 0 0 0 0 0 0.075 0 0 0 0 0.055 0 0 0.085 0.065 0 0.015 0.06 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.03 0.583 0 0 0 0 0 0
GAB Gabon 0.005 0.067 0 0 0.794 0.001 0.062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.055 0 0 0 0 0 0
GMB Gambia 0.05 0.03 0 0.03 0.79 0.08 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GEO Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.318 0 0.015 0 0 0 0.045 0.318 0.016 0.016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.106 0.091 0.045 0 0 0 0 0
DEU Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0.055 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.16 0.06 0 0 0.045 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.16 0.445 0 0.01 0 0 0 0
GRC Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 0 0 0 0 0.065 0 0 0.035 0.11 0 0.03 0.21 0 0.045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.115 0.155 0 0 0 0 0 0
GTM Guatemala 0 0.003 0 0 0.033 0.035 0.008 0 0 0 0.012 0 0 0.006 0.021 0 0.006 0.031 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.37 0.19 0 0.008 0.269 0 0 0 0 0 0
GUY Guyana 0 0.015 0 0 0.196 0.057 0 0.014 0.006 0 0.005 0.107 0 0.002 0.009 0.022 0.002 0.013 0.026 0.019 0 0 0.013 0.091 0 0 0.085 0.003 0.114 0.063 0 0.084 0 0 0
HTI Haiti 0 0.045 0 0 0.585 0.142 0.135 0 0 0 0.003 0 0 0.002 0.006 0 0.002 0.008 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.069 0 0 0 0 0 0





Table B.2: Table of Countries by Shares of each Y-DNA Haplogorups (Cont.) 
 
iso_code countries A B C E E1b1a E1b1b E2 F G K G H I I1 I2 J J1 J2 L T M S P Q QM3 QxM3 R1 R1a R1b R2 N O O1 O2 O3
HUN Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0.035 0 0 0.085 0.18 0 0.03 0.065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.295 0.185 0 0.005 0 0 0 0
ISL Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.23 0.42 0 0.01 0 0 0 0
IND India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.014 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 0.051 0 0 0.055 0.031 0 0 0.027 0 0 0 0.182 0 0 0.135 0 0.18 0 0 0
IDN Indonesia 0 0 0.009 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.036 0.027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0 0.019 0 0 0 0 0 0.2005 0.2775 0.262
IRN Iran 0 0 0 0 0.018 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.117 0.02 0.005 0 0 0 0.113 0.201 0.05 0.034 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.143 0.101 0 0 0 0 0 0
IRL Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.06 0.06 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0.81 0 0 0 0 0 0
ISR Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0.223 0 0 0 0 0.0776 0 0.0328 0 0 0 0.1976 0.2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1044 0.0888 0 0 0 0 0 0
ITA Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0.135 0 0 0 0 0.09 0 0 0.045 0.055 0 0.03 0.155 0 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.39 0 0 0 0 0 0
JAM Jamaica 0 0.0475 0 0 0.6175 0.1425 0.1425 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0
JPN Japan 0 0 0.347 0 0 0 0 0 0.085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.307 0.145
JOR Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 0 0 0 0 0.041 0 0.034 0 0 0 0.355 0.083 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.014 0.178 0 0 0 0 0 0
KAZ Kazakhstan 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.056 0 0 0 0 0.037 0.056 0.019 0.019 0 0 0 0.093
KEN Kenya 0.138 0.034 0 0 0.517 0.137 0.172 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
KOR Korea, South 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.155 0.019 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.055 0 0.027 0.282 0.455
KWT Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0.0502 0.0502 0 0.0102 0.0048 0 0.0211 0.0782 0 0 0 0 0.264 0.1188 0.0187 0.0442 0 0 0.0092 0 0 0 0.1167 0 0 0.0459 0 0.0612 0 0 0
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.135 0.019 0 0 0.019 0 0 0.019 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.019 0 0 0 0 0.63 0.019 0 0.019 0 0.058 0 0.019
LVA Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.02 0 0 0.005 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.4 0.12 0 0.38 0 0 0 0
LBN Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.162 0 0 0 0 0.065 0 0.048 0 0 0 0.189 0.271 0.052 0.047 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0.081 0 0 0 0 0 0
LSO Lesotho 0.051 0.109 0 0 0.547 0.044 0.212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LTU Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.38 0.05 0 0.42 0 0 0 0
MKD Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0.215 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0.03 0.245 0 0.02 0.14 0 0.015 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.135 0.125 0 0.005 0 0 0 0
MDG Madagascar 0 0.086 0 0 0.343 0 0.086 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.343 0 0 0
MWI Malawi 0.027 0.091 0 0 0.482 0.218 0.164 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MYS Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.06 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.32 0.3
MLI Mali 0.04 0.027 0 0.027 0.711 0.17 0.027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MLT Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 0 0.065 0 0 0.01 0.11 0 0.08 0.21 0 0.045 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.035 0.325 0 0 0 0 0 0
MRT Mauritania 0 0.0053 0 0 0 0.2328 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0741 0 0 0 0 0 0
MEX Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0.028 0 0 0 0 0.012 0 0 0.006 0.022 0 0.006 0.032 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.54 0 0 0 0.008 0.336 0 0 0 0 0 0
MDA Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.05 0.24 0 0.04 0.04 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.305 0.16 0 0.015 0 0 0 0
MNG Mongolia 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0 0 0.53 0.015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.045 0 0 0 0.091 0 0 0.106 0 0 0.015 0.106
MAR Morocco 0 0 0 0 0.064 0.759 0 0.009 0 0.018 0.009 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.05 0.041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.041 0 0 0 0 0 0
MOZ Mozambique 0.051 0.109 0 0 0.547 0.044 0.212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NAM Namibia 0.051 0.109 0 0 0.547 0.044 0.212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NPL Nepal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.078 0 0 0.104 0 0 0 0.117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.013 0 0 0 0.351 0 0.104 0 0.208 0 0 0
NLD Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0.035 0 0 0 0 0.045 0 0 0.165 0.075 0 0.005 0.035 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.49 0 0 0 0 0 0
NZL New Zealand 0 0 0.0005 0 0 0.014 0 0 0.0839 0.0387 0.0105 0 0 0.098 0.049 0 0 0.021 0 0 0.0244 0 0 0.0005 0 0 0 0.0315 0.469 0 0.0081 0.0586 0.0086 0.0147 0.0499
NIC Nicaragua 0 0.0045 0 0 0.0585 0.0506 0.0135 0 0 0 0.0159 0 0 0.008 0.0292 0 0.008 0.0424 0 0.0133 0 0 0 0.3405 0 0 0 0.0106 0.4152 0 0 0 0 0 0
NGA Nigeria 0.027 0.096 0 0.045 0.682 0.039 0.069 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.014 0 0 0 0 0 0
NOR Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.315 0.045 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.255 0.32 0 0.025 0 0 0 0
OMN Oman 0 0 0 0 0.074 0.157 0 0 0 0 0.017 0 0 0 0 0 0.38 0.099 0 0.083 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.091 0.017 0 0 0 0 0 0
PAK Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0.027 0.025 0 0 0 0.202 0 0 0.116 0 0 0 0 0.022 0 0 0 0.371 0 0.078 0 0 0 0 0
PAN Panama 0 0.0075 0 0 0.0975 0.0505 0.0225 0 0 0 0.012 0 0 0.006 0.022 0 0.006 0.032 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.15 0 0.008 0.276 0 0 0 0 0 0
PNG Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.304 0.161 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.232 0.232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.054 0 0 0
PRY Paraguay 0 0.0025 0 0 0.0325 0.0425 0.0075 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.0075 0.0275 0 0.0075 0.04 0 0.0125 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.15 0 0.01 0.345 0 0 0 0 0 0
PER Peru 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.0235 0 0 0 0 0.0101 0 0 0.005 0.0184 0 0.005 0.0268 0 0.0084 0 0 0 0 0.5461 0.0889 0 0.0067 0.2312 0 0 0.02 0 0 0
PHL Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.28 0.03 0.39
POL Poland 0 0 0 0 0.035 0 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.085 0.075 0 0 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.575 0.125 0 0.04 0 0 0 0
PRT Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0 0 0 0 0.065 0 0 0.02 0.035 0 0.03 0.095 0 0 0.025 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.015 0.56 0 0 0 0 0 0
QAT Qatar 0 0 0 0 0.013 0.0294 0 0.006 0.0088 0 0.0283 0.053 0.0005 0 0 0.0506 0.2445 0.0937 0.0504 0.0096 0 0 0.0054 0.0064 0 0 0.0364 0.1161 0.0157 0.0426 0 0.036 0 0 0
ROU Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.045 0.282 0 0.015 0.135 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.175 0.12 0 0.005 0 0 0 0
RUS Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.05 0.105 0 0 0.03 0 0.015 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0.46 0.06 0 0.23 0 0 0 0
RWA Rwanda 0 0.04 0 0 0.83 0.03 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0





Table B.2: Table of Countries by Shares of each Y-DNA Haplogorups (Cont.) 
Note: Table A presents list of countries by shares of Y-DNA Haplogroups38                                                                                                                                    
 
                                                 
38 In the first row you can see list of genetic haplotypes presented by universal letter codes. Some of the haplogroups are sub sample of other haplogroups. 
In this case the mother haplogroup reflect proportion of people that belong to the mother haplogroup but are not part of any of its mentioned subsets. 
iso_code countries A B C E E1b1a E1b1b E2 F G K G H I I1 I2 J J1 J2 L T M S P Q QM3 QxM3 R1 R1a R1b R2 N O O1 O2 O3
SEN Senegal 0 0 0 0.05 0.813 0.065 0.029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRB Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 0.18 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.085 0.335 0 0.005 0.08 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0.16 0.08 0 0.02 0 0 0 0
SGP Singapore 0 0 0.0045 0 0 0 0 0.0106 0.0536 0.0193 0 0.0212 0 0 0 0.0047 0 0 0.0051 0.0029 0.0026 0 0.0025 0.0045 0 0 0.0167 0 0 0.0124 0.0668 0.0166 0.0816 0.1625 0.4501
SVK Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0.065 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0.065 0.175 0 0.01 0.02 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.415 0.145 0 0.03 0 0 0 0
SVN Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.09 0.22 0 0 0.025 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.38 0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0
ZAF South Africa 0.0427 0.0912 0 0 0.4576 0.0415 0.1773 0.0008 0.0004 0 0.006 0.0058 0 0.022 0.01 0.0013 0.0007 0.0047 0.0014 0.0021 0 0 0.0007 0 0 0 0.0046 0.0053 0.0654 0.0034 0 0.0045 0 0 0
ESP Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.015 0.055 0 0.015 0.08 0 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.69 0 0 0 0 0 0
LKA Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.103 0 0 0 0.103 0 0 0 0.103 0 0 0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.128 0 0.385 0 0 0 0 0
SUR Suriname 0 0.0158 0.0015 0 0.2048 0.0588 0.0473 0.0233 0.0106 0.0041 0.005 0.091 0 0.0025 0.0091 0.0189 0.0025 0.0132 0.0218 0.0164 0 0.0025 0.0107 0 0 0 0.0751 0.0033 0.1139 0.0534 0 0.0712 0.0328 0.0454 0.0429
SWZ Swaziland 0.051 0.109 0 0 0.547 0.044 0.212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWE Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.37 0.05 0 0 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0 0.16 0.215 0 0.07 0 0 0 0
CHE Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0.075 0 0 0 0 0.075 0 0 0.14 0.095 0 0 0.025 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0.035 0.5 0 0.01 0 0 0 0
SYR Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0.3 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0
TWN Taiwan 0 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0.063 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.224 0.085 0.582
TJK Tajikistan 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.026 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0.184 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.447 0 0.079 0 0 0 0 0
TZA Tanzania 0.027 0.091 0 0 0.482 0.218 0.164 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
THA Thailand 0 0 0.029 0 0 0 0 0 0.029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.441 0.088 0 0.353
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 0 0.025 0 0 0.325 0.075 0.075 0.015 0.007 0 0 0.115 0 0 0 0.0255 0 0 0.0275 0.0155 0 0 0.0135 0 0 0 0.091 0 0 0.0675 0 0.09 0 0 0
TUN Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.493 0 0.047 0 0.007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.324 0.034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.061 0 0 0 0 0 0
TUR Turkey 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.113 0 0 0 0 0.109 0 0.054 0 0 0 0.09 0.243 0.042 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.069 0.161 0 0.038 0 0 0 0
TMN Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.07 0.37 0.03 0 0 0 0 0
UGA Uganda 0.138 0.034 0 0 0.517 0.137 0.172 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UKR Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0.055 0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0.035 0.135 0 0.01 0.07 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.45 0.075 0 0.075 0 0 0 0
ARE United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0.0194 0.0441 0 0.015 0.007 0 0.0255 0.117 0.0005 0 0 0.0255 0.1227 0.0531 0.0421 0.0346 0 0 0.0135 0.002 0 0 0.091 0.0377 0.0239 0.0675 0 0.14 0 0 0
GBR United Kingdom 0 0 0 0.03 0 0.0183 0 0.0012 0.0006 0 0.0129 0.0092 0 0.1156 0.0593 0.002 0 0.0288 0.0022 0.0059 0 0 0.0011 0.0043 0 0 0.0073 0.0425 0.6074 0.0054 0 0.0072 0 0 0
URY Uruguay 0 0.002 0 0 0.026 0.0704 0 0 0 0 0.0276 0 0 0.0138 0.0506 0 0.0138 0.0736 0 0.023 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0.0184 0.6348 0 0 0 0 0 0
USA USA 0 0.0063 0.0003 0 0.0819 0.0489 0 0 0.003 0.0006 0.0247 0 0 0.1092 0.0493 0 0.0006 0.0322 0 0.0064 0 0 0 0.0579 0 0 0 0.075 0.4372 0 0.0081 0 0.0048 0.0082 0.0277
UZB Uzbekistan 0 0 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0.079 0.115 0.068 0 0 0.022 0 0 0.134 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0.055 0 0 0 0 0.251 0.098 0.022 0.014 0.041 0 0 0
VEN Venezuela 0 0.0082 0 0 0.106 0.0669 0 0 0 0 0.0182 0 0 0.0091 0.0333 0 0.0091 0.0485 0 0.0152 0 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 0.0121 0.4181 0 0 0 0 0 0
VNM Vietnam 0 0 0.029 0 0 0 0 0 0.043 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.071 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.029 0 0.057 0.329 0.4
YEM Yemen 0 0 0 0 0.032 0.129 0 0 0 0 0.016 0 0 0 0 0 0.726 0.097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ZMB Zambia 0.051 0.109 0 0 0.547 0.044 0.212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





APPENDIX C: INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3 
Table C.1: The Policy Impact on Changes in Labor and Capital for Firms Sized 40 to 49 
 
Note: This table presents dynamic panel estimates of the impact of being small in years of PEQRSF implementation on the 
change in the level of capital stock and labor. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent 
level. *** = 1 percent level.
Dependent Variable D.Ln Labor D.Ln Capital D.Ln Capital D.Ln Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L. Ln Labor -1.3521*** -0.0664*
(0.1074) (0.0352)
L.Ln Capital -0.1009*** -0.0975*** -0.0884***
(0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0208)






L.D Labor -0.1815** 0.0140
(0.0897) (0.0242)




L.D Capital 0.0328 0.1576*** 0.1714*** 0.1473***
(0.1058) (0.0551) (0.0519) (0.0447)
L.D Productivity -0.0505* -0.0171 -0.0169
(0.0291) (0.0128) (0.0123)
L.Smaller than 45 -0.0934 0.0254 0.0361 -0.0449
(0.0918) (0.07) (0.0750) (0.0734)
s45_05_2006    4.7393 0.0077 -0.0030 0.0338
(4.0368) (0.0794) (0.0879) (0.0789)
s45_05_2007   -0.0385 0.0077 0.0272 0.0061
(0.7732) (0.0391) (0.0395) (0.0403)
s45_05_2008   -0.0137 -0.0134 -0.0158 -0.0111
(0.1473) (0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0189)
s45_06_2007    0.165 -0.0587 -0.1095 -0.0250
(0.8549) (0.1168) (0.1167) (0.1185)
s45_06_2008  0.0648 -0.0278 -0.0404 -0.0186
(0.2268) (0.0292) (0.0303) (0.0308)
s45_06_2009   -0.0134 -0.0077 -0.0036 0.0080
(0.0722) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0175)
s45_07_2008    -0.0576 0.0403 0.0675 0.0474
(0.2648) (0.1055) (0.1134) (0.1002)
s45_07_2009    0.2369 -0.0158 -0.0091 -0.0079
(0.1746) (0.0476) (0.0494) (0.0432)
s45_07_2010 0.097 0.0028 0.0046 0.0060
(0.1204) (0.017) (0.0169) (0.0161)
s45_08_2009   -0.3984 0.0341 0.0016 0.0418
(0.2329) (0.1203) (0.1305) (0.1072)
s45_08_2010  -0.0154 -0.0092 -0.0033 0.0173
(0.1827) (0.0308) (0.0294) (0.0267)
s45_08_2011   0.0082 0.0442 0.0357 0.0453
(0.0885) (0.0327) (0.027) (0.0328)
s45_09_2010    -0.2439 -0.0094 -0.0180 -0.0272
(0.1643) (0.0925) (0.0962) (0.0921)
s45_09_2011    0.0099 -0.0051 -0.0118 0.0003
(0.1344) (0.0272) (0.0375) (0.0263)
s45_09_2012   -0.0885 0.0084 0.0066 0.0118
(0.0725) (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0148)
s45_10_2011   -0.2092 -0.1239 -0.1010 -0.1061
(0.1717) (0.1094) (0.1035) (0.1053)
s45_10_2012    -0.0166 -0.0117 -0.0106 -0.0156
(0.1262) (0.0253) (0.0259) (0.0233)
s45_10_2013   -0.1334* -0.0560** -0.0551** -0.0481*
(0.0779) (0.0267) (0.0268) (0.0262)
Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ISIC2 Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5902 6012 6079 6012





Table C.2: The Policy Impact on the Change in Productivity for Firms Sized 40 to 49 
 
Note: This table presents dynamic panel estimates of the impact of being small in years of PEQRSF implementation on the 
change in the level of estimated firms’ productivity. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 




Dependent Variable D.Productivity D.Productivity D.Productivity
(1) (2) (3)
L.Productivity -0.4847*** -0.5183*** -0.5804***
(0.0921) (0.0801) (0.0804)
L.D Productivity -0.0869 -0.1711** -0.1734***
(0.0880) (0.0707) (0.0643)




L.Smaller than 45 0.0336 0.0370 0.0078
(0.1835) (0.1798) (0.2319)
s45_05_2006    -0.0762 -0.1443 -0.0909
(0.1937) (0.1967) (0.1986)
s45_05_2007   0.2180** 0.1508 0.1375
(0.1004) (0.0926) (0.0945)
s45_05_2008   -0.0738 -0.1169* -0.1215*
(0.0662) (0.0671) (0.0681)
s45_06_2007    -0.4892 -0.3803 -0.3088
(0.292) (0.2776) (0.2708)
s45_06_2008  -0.1057 -0.1552 -0.1951*
(0.1162) (0.1062) (0.1064)
s45_06_2009   0.0571 0.0179 -0.0296
(0.0847) (0.0854) (0.0811)
s45_07_2008    0.0839 0.1686 0.3164
(0.3547) (0.3326) (0.3149)
s45_07_2009    0.1641 0.2149 0.0965
(0.1579) (0.1504) (0.1355)
s45_07_2010 0.1134 0.0993 0.0844
(0.071) (0.0687) (0.0675)
s45_08_2009   -0.6253 -0.7466* -0.4099
(0.4378) (0.4139) (0.3792)
s45_08_2010  0.1458 0.0563 0.0037
(0.1501) (0.1361) (0.128)
s45_08_2011   -0.0303 -0.0675 -0.0615
(0.0787) (0.076) (0.0763)
s45_09_2010    -0.4474 -0.3414 -0.1877
(0.3474) (0.3207) (0.2979)
s45_09_2011    -0.0569 -0.1019 -0.1239
(0.1159) (0.1012) (0.0953)
s45_09_2012   -0.0567 -0.0578 -0.0797
(0.0867) (0.0857) (0.0854)
s45_10_2011   -0.1635 -0.0232 0.0526
(0.3854) (0.3264) (0.3175)
s45_10_2012    -0.1126 -0.0777 -0.1462
(0.1276) (0.1166) (0.1253)
s45_10_2013   0.0166 -0.0130 -0.0120
(0.0817) (0.0825) (0.0825)
s45_11_2012   0.2682 0.0743 0.2519
(0.3264) (0.3058) (0.3083)
s45_11_2013   -0.0382 -0.0415 -0.0378
(0.1003) (0.0975) (0.1038)
Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes
Industry ISIC2 Indicator Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5902 5902 5902





Table C.3: The Policy Impact on Changes in Labor and Capital for Firms Sized 50 to 59 
 
Note: This table presents dynamic panel estimates of the impact of being small in years of PEQRSF implementation on the 
change in the level of capital stock and labor. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 percent 
level. *** = 1 percent level.
Dependent Variable D.Ln Labor D.Ln Capital D.Ln Capital D.Ln Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L. Ln Labor -1.4414*** 0.0208
(0.1149) (0.0309)
L.Ln Capital -0.0310* -0.0415** -0.0429**
(0.0171) (0.0184) (0.0182)






L.D Labor -0.1566 0.0035
(0.1016) (0.0287)




L.D Capital 0.2054 0.1218* 0.0739 0.1101*
0.1288 (0.0680) (0.0744) (0.0587)
L.D Productivity -0.0461 -0.0022 -0.0072753
0.0357 (0.0076) 0.0071
L.Smaller than 55 -0.1958*** 0.0337 0.0369 (0.0340)
(0.0688) (0.0880) (0.0882) (0.0769)
s55_05_2006    -1.2414 0.0288 0.0398 0.0317
(3.1418) (0.0999) (0.0986) (0.0962)
s55_05_2007   0.8667 -0.0237 -0.0207 -0.0209
(0.9074) (0.0307) (0.0301) (0.0345)
s55_05_2008   -0.2731 0.0154 0.0136 0.0114
(0.2482) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0207)
s55_06_2007    -1.9811 0.0503 0.0300 0.0379
(1.6864) (0.1099) (0.1134) (0.1026)
s55_06_2008  0.1380 -0.0034 0.0048 -0.0044
(0.4096) (0.03) (0.0326) (0.0319)
s55_06_2009   -0.0520 -0.0169 -0.0157 -0.0187
(0.0841) (0.013) (0.0137) (0.0136)
s55_07_2008    0.3756 -0.0752 -0.0963 -0.0701
(0.373) (0.1194) (0.126) (0.1108)
s55_07_2009    0.3391 0.0422* 0.0408 0.0289
(0.2496) (0.0248) (0.0262) (0.0262)
s55_07_2010 0.0681 0.0143 0.0104 0.0135
(0.0606) (0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0144)
s55_08_2009   -0.4895* -0.0653 -0.0724 -0.0275
(0.2731) (0.1086) (0.1111) (0.0972)
s55_08_2010  -0.1032 -0.0188 -0.0269 -0.0275
(0.1255) (0.0247) (0.0287) (0.0281)
s55_08_2011   -0.0955 0.02486* 0.0298** 0.0191
(0.0698) (0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0144)
s55_09_2010    0.1115 0.0322 0.0440 0.0542
(0.1396) (0.1017) (0.1074) (0.0945)
s55_09_2011    0.1146 0.0307 0.0361 0.0057
(0.1121) (0.0211) (0.0234) (0.0231)
s55_09_2012   -0.1093* -0.0227 -0.0233 -0.0239
(0.0586) (0.021) (0.0215) (0.0206)
s55_10_2011   -0.0850 -0.0896 -0.1062 -0.0217
(0.1211) (0.0981) (0.1014) (0.0915)
s55_10_2012    0.0732 -0.0290 -0.0318 -0.0396
(0.0952) (0.0314) (0.0316) (0.0319)
s55_10_2013   -0.0398 0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0007
(0.0622) (0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0242)
Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ISIC2 Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5287 5353 5388 5353





Table C.4: The Policy Impact on the Change in Productivity for Firms Sized 50 to 59 
 
Note: This table presents dynamic panel estimates of the impact of being small in years of PEQRSF implementation on the 
change in the level of estimated firms’ productivity. Stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level, ** = 5 
percent level. *** = 1 percent level. 
 
 
Dependent Variable D.Productivity D.Productivity D.Productivity
(1) (2) (3)
L.Productivity -0.7040*** -0.7209*** -0.7335***
(0.1221) (0.0872) (0.0772)
L.D Productivity -0.3003*** -0.3095*** -0.2405***
(0.0893) (0.0692) (0.0615)




L.Smaller than 55 -0.2637 -0.1657 -0.2553
(0.2909) (0.2735) (0.2504)
s55_05_2006    0.4715 0.3412 0.3424
(0.3306) (0.3135) (0.2829)
s55_05_2007   0.0377 0.0523 0.0419
(0.0993) (0.0968) (0.0979)
s55_05_2008   0.0637 0.0296 0.0363
(0.0723) (0.0702) (0.069)
s55_06_2007    0.4197 0.1546 0.2440
(0.3847) (0.3679) (0.349)
s55_06_2008  0.1011 0.0556 0.0716
(0.1121) (0.1047) (0.1009)
s55_06_2009   0.0539 0.0253 0.0239
(0.0653) (0.0654) (0.0643)
s55_07_2008    -0.1137 -0.0991 -0.1088
(0.4224) (0.3907) (0.3624)
s55_07_2009    -0.2197 -0.1772 -0.1710
(0.1409) (0.1288) (0.118)
s55_07_2010 -0.0501 -0.0715 -0.0651
(0.0627) (0.0614) (0.0599)
s55_08_2009   0.4874 0.2524 0.3048
(0.4455) (0.4047) (0.3546)
s55_08_2010  -0.1330 -0.1372 -0.1177
(0.1260) (0.114) (0.1047)
s55_08_2011   -0.0444 -0.0384 -0.0412
(0.0691) (0.0673) (0.0654)
s55_09_2010    0.5948 0.4673 0.4804
(0.3878) (0.3508) (0.3152)
s55_09_2011    -0.0624 -0.0412 -0.0120
(0.135) (0.1296) (0.1222)
s55_09_2012   -0.0082 -0.0105 -0.0086
(0.0714) (0.0714) (0.0693)
s55_10_2011   0.6031 0.4212 0.4275
(0.4201) (0.4106) (0.3696)
s55_10_2012    -0.1817 -0.1780 -0.1543
(0.1338) (0.1246) (0.1145)
s55_10_2013   0.1234 0.0855 0.0858
(0.0865) (0.0885) (0.0872)
s55_11_2012   0.7305* 0.5968* 0.6045*
(0.384) (0.3421) (0.3343)
s55_11_2013   -0.0174 -0.0461 -0.0313
(0.1171) (0.1144) (0.1076)
Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes
Industry ISIC2 Indicator Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5282 5282 5282
Number of Firms 2707 2707 2707
